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The causes and consequences of labor migration have been widely studied in multiple disciplines. 
There is not much doubt that migration is driven to some extent by regional inequality, but the 
effect of migration on inequality is ambiguous in existing theories and empirical studies which 
often present mixed or even contradictory conclusions. 
Focusing on China, this study aims to investigate the effects of internal migration on 
regional inequality via panel data analysis. It contributes to the literature by linking migration to 
inequality at both local growth channel and national dynamic channel. The panel data used in 
this study include all thirty-one province-level administrative units across China for the years 
1992 through 2008. Fixed-effects method is adopted to control time-invariant, province-specific 
characteristics and structural equations modeling strategy allows estimated coefficients to vary 
across regions. 
The empirical evidence from this study indicates that whether and how migration affect 
regional inequality depend on the developmental stages and industrial structures of involved 
areas. The analytic results also support the notion that the effects of migration on inequality 
change across regions and time periods. Not only do the findings contribute to the existing 
debate, but also have important policy implications. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATIONS 
It has been widely noted in the literature of both sociology and economics that migration plays 
an important role regarding population redistribution and is strongly related to regional economic 
development and social inequality. These relationships have been studied in a large body of 
literature. Most migration studies focus on capitalist economy, in which individual choice is the 
main determinant of migration. People migrate to better themselves economically and socially; 
thus regional differentials provide incentives for individuals to migrate. This assumption, 
however, is less valid in socialist and transitional economies where human migration is largely 
controlled by the government. 
Migration and inequality are interdependent upon each other. We have seen that 
inequality, or regional wage differentials, creates a natural incentive for people to migrate. On 
the other hand, migration has nontrivial impact on regional development as well. Most scholars 
agree that internal migration tends to promote the economic growth of a country, because 
persons tend to move from regions of relatively high rates of natural increase to regions of 
relatively rapid economic expansion. The result is a better allocation of capital and human 
resources, and a favorable effect on economic growth takes place. What is controversial is the 
nature of the impact of internal migration on regional inequality. Okun (1968) argued that it is 
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theoretically impossible to determine the impact of internal migration on regional inequality, as it 
is required to consider the economic and demographic structures of the regions, whether the 
faster-growth regions are also the more-developed regions, and whether the time frame is long-
term or short-term. 
What make China interesting are the ways economic reforms and regional inequalities are 
related to population movement. Since the economic reform in 1978, China has experienced a 
surprisingly high growth rate for more than thirty years, and the world economy has witnessed 
China’s rise as the “world factory” and its dominance in manufacturing. The success of the 
Chinese economy is closely connected with internal labor migration: without the large-scale 
migration of the rural population that supplies almost unlimited cheap labor to power the Chinese 
economic engine, the rise of China would have been impossible. It is for that reason that rural-to-
urban migration in China has been a particularly important social and economic phenomenon 
and has attracted much attention from both academics and policy makers. 
For much of the socialist period of China until the late 1970s, labor migration (e.g., rural-
to-urban migration) was strictly controlled by the government. Since early 1980s, population 
mobility has risen dramatically as one of main consequences of China’s economic reforms and 
the relaxation of migration controls. As a transitional economy, China has shifted gradually from 
planned allocation of labor to a more open labor market. Much of the China-related literature 
studies population redistribution on the one hand, and the relationship between migration and 
regional inequality on the other. 
Economic reforms have widened the development gaps between regions. Economic 
growth, job opportunities, and higher wages in more-developed regions (urban areas) provide a 
strong incentive to migrants from less-developed regions (rural areas) to migrate to urban areas. 
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Those migrants are major sources of cheap labor that facilitate industrialization in more-
developed regions, further accelerating economic growth. Therefore, the relationship between 
migration and regional inequality is expected to be strong and bidirectional (Fan, 2005). 
In the existing literature about China’s migration, there is consensus that regional 
inequality serves as a pull factor to labor migration. In particular, the “three economic belts,” a 
product of China’s the seventh Five-Year Plan (1985–1990) that divided the whole nation into 
three regions (eastern, central, and western), each with its own comparative advantage and 
economic specialization, provides a convenient regionalization scheme to describe the level and 
changes of regional inequality. Migration from the central and western regions to the eastern 
region increased dramatically in recent periods as the regional inequality widened almost at the 
same time. The massive population flow is the result of both structural changes caused by 
economic growth and institutional changes caused by relaxation of mobility control (Cai and 
Wang, 2003). 
However, whether labor migration increases or decreases regional inequality remains a 
debate. As far as China is concerned, the relationship between migration and inequality is 
ambiguous. Different studies, utilizing on different methods and datasets, derive different results 
about this relationship. In this dissertation, I will empirically test the relationship between labor 
migration and regional inequality in China. I investigate the impact of labor migration on 
regional income disparity among eastern, central, and western regions and their contribution to 
overall inequality in China. This study will shed light on the ambiguous relationship between 
migration and inequality in China. Not only does this study contribute to migration literature, it 
also has policy implications regarding China’s labor migration circumstances. 
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1.2 INTERNAL MIGRATION IN CHINA SINCE 1949 
China is the most populous developing country in the world. During the Maoist period, China’s 
approach to labor was one based on centralized allocation. This approach entailed low job 
mobility and controlled labor migration. The household registration (hukou) system was 
established in the 1950s to control population mobility and limit migration from rural to urban 
areas. This system assigns a hukou location for every Chinese citizen: agricultural hukou or 
nonagricultural hukou. Through hukou system, the government allocated housing and jobs and 
rationed food and other necessities. This linkage made it almost impossible for people to live in 
urban areas without local hukou. Yang (1993) argued that not only does hukou system determine 
one’s residence and access to government provision of social services, and thereby influence 
one’s incentive to migrate, it also directly determines one’s access to urban wage employment, 
which affects migration by changing one’s ability to earn income, to afford the costs involved, 
and, most important, to obtain government approval. Therefore, hukou system successfully 
confined the population to its place of birth. Rural to urban migration occurred only at an 
extremely small scale, under the auspices of the government. Zhao (2005) argued further that 
hukou system deprived both rural and urban residents of their freedom of mobility. The unique 
household registration system distinguished Chinese migration from migration in other 
developing countries. 
Market reforms since the late 1970s have brought about great changes in Chinese 
population dynamics and significantly weakened the government's control over geographic 
mobility and its ability to enforce hukou system. The people’s commune system and the “iron 
bowl” in the rural areas were replaced by the Household Responsibility System (HRS), aimed at 
increasing the income level of poor, rural areas. The HRS eventually replaced the collective 
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production team system. It returned some degree of personal freedom to rural people, increased 
their productivity, led to the availability of food in the urban free market, and eventually put an 
end to food rationing (Zhao, 1999); it also generated surplus labor in rural areas. In short, the 
market reforms in the late 1970s freed many rural laborers to leave the land and surplus labor 
and underemployment in rural areas became migration push factors. 
On the other hand, the mandate of rapid economic growth has legitimized a strategy of 
export-oriented industrialization and urbanization. Under the open-door policy, both domestic 
and foreign capital search for cheap sites for investment, thus creating a huge demand for cheap 
labor. The adoption of export-oriented, labor-intensive industrialization demanded a labor regime 
different from that of the Maoist period, one that depended heavily on migrant workers. All of 
these factors made rural-to-urban migration both possible and necessary. 
Labor migration from rural to urban areas has emerged as a prominent phenomenon in 
China after decades of stagnation. Since the early 1980s, a large number of migrants have 
successfully entered cities without official approval. Official estimates of the floating population 
are in the range of 150 million, accounting for about 12% of China’s total population (National 
Bureau of Statistics, 2006). Rural migrants reside in cities without the permanent legal status 
required to be there, and a large proportion of these people are circular migrants—i.e., they move 
back and forth frequently (Zhao, 1999). 
In the meantime, the Chinese government relaxed controls on labor migration. Huang and 
Pieke (2003) documented that the government still prohibited migration from 1979 to 1983. 
Then, from 1984 to 1988, the government allowed farmers to enter urban areas as long as they 
provided their own food. Following the “rural migrant wave” of 1989, migration became a 
significant social phenomenon, and the government encouraged rural-to-urban migration. As 
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Zhao (2005) pointed out, since 2000 the government has been reforming hukou system and now 
allows greater mobility among people. As a consequence, rural labor began to move, live, and 
work in cities as so-called temporary residents. Although hukou system still significantly affects 
migration decisions, its effect has been greatly reduced compared with the past. Through China’s 
internal migration, people’s incentives to migrate in response to regional disparities have been 
clearly shown; however, the effect of migration on regional inequality remains ambiguous. 
1.3 REGIONAL INEQUALITY IN CHINA 
In the past thirty years China has pursued an aggressive strategy of market liberalization, the 
opening of trade, and other structural transformations. Through the three decades since 
implementation of the economic reform package, the Chinese economy has experienced rapid 
and sustained growth, with Gross Domestic Product (GDP) expanding by an average of 9.5% per 
year between 1978 and 2005 (Brandt & Rawski, 2008). Absolute poverty, as measured by 
headcount ratios and other measures, consistently fell in Chinese data (Walley and Zhang, 2004), 
and the proportion of the population living in absolute poverty dropped from 75.7% in 1980 to 
12.49% in 2001 (Brandt & Rawski, 2008; Ravallion & Chen, 2004). Other nonincome metrics, 
such as school enrollment, literacy rate, access to electricity, and life expectancy, also show 
similar improvements. 
At the same time, these growth and poverty reductions were unevenly distributed across 
the country. A conspicuous feature of China’s economic growth during the past three decades 
has been the differential rate of growth across regions. Increases in per capita expenditure were 
fastest in urban and coastal areas and slowest in rural and inland areas, such as the western and 
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central regions. Despite moderate increases in per capita expenditures, poverty in these regions 
has persisted at high levels. This is because they were initially relatively poor areas. 
Furthermore, there has been a steady increase in interprovincial inequality, evidenced by the 
increasing disparity in provincial per capita GDP. In 2001, GDP per capita for the eastern region 
as a whole stood at 12,071 yuan, nearly two times that of the central region and more than two 
times that of the western region. The gap between the central and western regions also widened, 
but to a smaller degree (Fan, 2005). 
China has turned from a society with relatively egalitarian income distribution1 to one 
with moderate inequality. Inequality is a currently burning issue in China. The Gini coefficient, 
which measures economic inequality in a country, was estimated to be 0.33 in 1980 and rose to 
0.45 in recent years (World Bank, 2005). Spatial inequalities among different regions and 
between rural and urban areas have also been on the rise. Fujita and Hu (2001) pointed out that 
interprovincial inequality declined during the 1980s and showed signs of increase in the 1990s, 
while inequality between the eastern coastal area and the rest of China has been on the rise since 
the 1980s. Zhang (2001) associated the changes in regional inequality with international trade 
and foreign direct investment. Xu and Li (2006) and Wang (2007) investigated per capita GDP 
up to 2004 and 2005, respectively; both documented a slight decline in interprovincial inequality. 
Fan and Sun (2008) provided further evidence on the recent trend of regional inequality up to 
2006. 
Though most existing literature has documented the rise of inequality in China in the 
1980s and 1990s, there is no consensus on the relationship between migration and regional 
inequality from empirical studies. Hu (2002) developed a spatial model and showed that the 
                                                 
1 Rawski (1982) found that pre-reform income distribution in China was far from egalitarian. 
8 
increasing rural-to-urban migration in China may be one of the reasons for the rising income 
inequality between the coastal area and inland. Lin et al. (2004) examined the relationship 
between labor migration and regional inequality and showed that the intensified migration in the 
1990s was not sufficient to reduce regional income disparity. Whalley and Zhang (2004) used 
calibration and showed that removing migration barriers such as hukou system tends to reduce 
inequality. Using interprovincial migration data from the 1990 and 2000 population censuses, 
Fan (2005) examined the relationship between migration and regional development and showed 
that this relationship has been bidirectional and has become stronger over time. Hertel and Zhai 
(2006) use simulation to argue that reforms in hukou system and increasing labor mobility would 
reduce the rural-urban income inequality. 
In short, there is much ambiguity about the relationship between migration and inequality 
in China. The aim of this study is to investigate the relationship and to try to shed some light on 
the connection. 
1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
In the previous sections, I have shown that China’s economic development in the past thirty 
years has been characterized by rapid globalization, high growth, high concentration of capital, 
rapid poverty reduction, and rising spatial inequality. The research objective of this dissertation 
is to study the role of internal migration against this background, as the relationship between 
migration and inequality remains ambiguous. A good understanding of how the labor market, or 
migration, operates is essential for the design of policies for development and poverty alleviation 
in the context of increasing spatial inequality. The goal of this dissertation is to contribute to 
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such an understanding. The research questions include: What are the relationships between 
migration and regional inequality in China? Is migration complementary to local growth and 
development? Does migration ameliorate or exacerbate spatial or regional economic inequality? 
If so, through what channels? If not, why? What are the effects of intraprovincial migration and 
interprovincial migration on spatial inequality, respectively? What are the effects of urban 
migration and rural migration on spatial inequality, respectively? Is there any difference in the 
effects of migration on inequality across regions in China? Is there any difference in the effects 
of migration on inequality across time? What are the factors that might explain the potential 
regional difference or time difference? What policy implications can be drawn from this study 
against the background of rising inequality and relaxed but still highly restricted migration 
policies in China? 
The main contribution of this dissertation to the migration literature is to link migration to 
spatial inequality at both local and national levels. To study the impact of internal migration on 
regional economic inequality, I use provincial-level data with national coverage, which allows 
me to track patterns and trends across all provinces or regions of the country and capture the 
characteristics and specificities of individual provinces. The longitudinal data start from the point 
marking the intensification of market reforms and cover a sufficiently long time period to 
transcend short-term fluctuations. 
As there is a potential reciprocal effect between migration and spatial inequality, I 
include lagged independent variables in the regression equations to enhance my ability to reduce 
suspect endogeneity bias and determine the direction of causality. I add fixed effects to capture 
heterogeneity among provinces and adopt a structural equations model to test for the changes in 
regression slopes not only across regions but also across time periods. As the regression outcome 
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variable is measured as both a local economic growth rate and a national inequality contribution, 
I examine the migration-inequality relationship through both local growth channels and national 
dynamic channels. Moreover, migration is measured at both interprovincial and intraprovincial 
levels, which allows me to compare relatively long-distance moves with relatively short-distance 
moves. 
There is not much doubt that internal labor migration is driven to some extent by regional 
or spatial inequality, because people tend to move in order to better themselves economically. 
However, the effect of migration on inequality is ambiguous in existing theories and empirical 
studies. The findings of this dissertation imply that previous research often presents mixed or 
even contradictory conclusions for various reasons. For instance, studies focusing on the 
different developmental stages and industrial structures of areas may generate different results. 
Moreover, the distance of migration does matter in most cases. Of course, you may draw 
different conclusions based on whether you focus on “local” or “global” relationships between 
migration and inequality. 
Methodologically, the fixed-effects panel data analysis conducted in this dissertation 
suggests that longitudinal methods are clearly superior to cross-sectional methods. There are two 
major advantages of longitudinal methods for analyzing the relationship between migration and 
inequality. First, simple methods used for longitudinal data, such as taking one-year lags of 
independent variable(s), can reduce potential problems caused by reciprocal relationships 
between migration and economic growth and between migration and spatial inequality. Second, 
“time” is not only useful to determine the model structure, such as fixed-effects models, but 
should also be considered an explanatory variable and be included in the model. This is 
particularly applicable to studies on developing countries like China. 
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Regarding policy implication, the findings of this dissertation indicate that eastern cities 
serve as growth engines for surrounding eastern suburban and rural areas, but the spillover 
effects generated by the richer eastern region are very limited and are too weak to help the poorer 
inland regions catch up. The government can encourage short-distance migration and 
urbanization in the inland regions. To do so, many conditions should be met, among which rural 
education is the most important (Johnson, 2002). More resources should be shifted to rural 
education in order to enhance the skill levels and productivity of the rural population and to 
prepare them for nonagricultural employment, thus increasing their ability and propensity to 
move from farm to city. An equally important condition is the governmental promotion of more 
capital flows and investments in labor-rich but capital-scarce inland areas in order to generate 
more employment opportunities and to encourage skilled labor to remain in or even be attracted 
to inland areas. Government could use similar tools like the Western Development Program (xi 
bu da kai fa) to stimulate growth in the central region and reduce the economic gap between the 
central and eastern regions. The structure and summary of the dissertation is as follows. 
In chapters 2 and 3, I thoroughly review the literature on the theoretical relationship 
between migration and spatial inequality and the empirical findings on migration and its link to 
spatial inequality in China. Chapters 4 and 5 detail the data sources, variables and their 
operationalization, and analytic methods utilized to test the research questions proposed in this 
introductory chapter. Chapters 6 and 7 provide a description and interpretation of the results of 
statistical analyses, and the final chapter summarizes and explains the results and their 
implications for migration theory, methods, and policies, along with directions for future 
research. 
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2.0  RELATED LITERATURE: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
2.1 GENERAL THEORIES OF MIGRATION 
In migration literature, the most widely adopted theoretical approach is the neoclassical, which is 
also called the “functionalist approach” or the “equilibrium approach.” Ravenstein (1889) 
pointed out that people migrate in order to better themselves economically; hence migration is 
considered to be individuals’ responses to regional differentials in economic development. 
Following this argument, neoclassical theory views migration as an outcome of geographic 
differences in labor demand and supply and of individuals’ rational calculation of costs and 
benefits (Sjaastad, 1962). The neoclassical approach was initially a major contribution from the 
realm of economics, and is generally correlated with the functionalist paradigm and 
modernization theory in sociology, which focuses on equilibrium models and considers 
migration a voluntary and rational decision made by individuals who seek better economic 
opportunities to respond to higher wages offered away from home (Lewis, 1954). At the 
aggregate level, migration is viewed as the means by which surplus labor in less-developed areas 
(e.g., rural agricultural sectors) is transferred to more-developed areas (e.g., urban industrial 
sectors) in response to wage differentials. 
There are both macro and micro forms of the neoclassical approach. Because of the 
developmentalist orientation of the field of migration in the early periods of migration theorizing 
(say, the third quarter of the twentieth century), the oldest and best-known neoclassical theory of 
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migration was developed to explain how labor migration responds to economic development 
(Harris & Todaro, 1970; Lewis 1954; Todaro 1976). According to this macro theory and its 
extensions, migration is caused by geographic differences in the supply of and demand for labor, 
and therefore by geographic difference in equilibrium market wage rates (Massey et al., 1993). 
As a result, workers from low-wage areas tend to move to high-wage areas, which leads to the 
changes in the supply of and the demand for labor in both areas, and eventually wage 
differentials reflect only the costs of migration at the new equilibrium. Thus, for less-developed 
areas, out-migration is the only means to solve the problem of surplus labor and proceed in the 
process of development; for the economy as a whole, labor migration is such an equilibrating 
factor that both sending and receiving areas benefit, because it eventually optimizes the 
distribution of human capital among regions and evens out regional wage inequalities. The 
macro version of the neoclassical approach implicitly assumes that the elimination of wage 
differentials will end labor movement, and that labor markets are the primary mechanisms by 
which migration is induced. The simple and compelling explanation of migration offered by 
neoclassical macroeconomics has strongly shaped public thinking and has provided the 
intellectual basis for much immigration policy (Massey et al., 1993). 
The micro version of the neoclassical approach focuses on individual rational choice and 
cost-benefit calculation (Sjaastad, 1962; Todaro, 1976, 1989; Todaro & Maruszko, 1987). This 
framework suggests that rational individuals choose to move in response to wage differences 
between sending and receiving areas, and that they expect higher earnings and a positive net 
return out of migration. As Ravenstein (1889: 286), the undisputed founding father of modern 
migration studies, put it in his famous laws of migration: “Bad or oppressive laws, heavy 
taxation, an unattractive climate, uncongenial social surroundings and even compulsion (slave 
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trade, transportation), all have produced and are still producing currents of migration, but none of 
these currents can compare in volume with that which arises from the desire inherent in most 
men to ‘better’ themselves in material respects.” According to this framework, migration may be 
conceptualized as an investment to increase expected output. In theory, a potential migrant goes 
to where the expected net return is greatest, which in turn leads to distinct conclusions. 
Researchers usually investigate individual migrants’ characteristics, social conditions, or 
technologies for lowering migration costs. Greenwood (1985) studied the effects of various 
individual characteristics (such as age, gender, marital status, education attainment, employment, 
and occupation) on migration. Graves and Linneman (1979) studied the effects of the presence of 
other household members on migration. 
As an extension or modification to the neoclassical approach, Stark and his colleagues 
developed the theory of the new economics of migration (Katz & Stark, 1986; Lauby & Stark, 
1988; Stark, 1984, 1991; Stark & Bloom, 1985; Stark & Levhari, 1982; Taylor, 1986). A key 
insight of this new approach is that migration decisions are not made by isolated individuals but 
by families or households in which people act collectively to maximize expected income and 
minimize the risks associated with various market failures. 
As Massey et al. (1993) pointed out, in developed countries, risks to household income 
are usually minimized through private insurance markets or governmental programs, but in 
developing countries these institutional mechanisms are imperfect, absent, or inaccessible to 
low-income families, giving them incentives to diversify risks through migration. In developed 
countries, moreover, credit markets are relatively well functioning, which enables families to 
finance new projects, such as the adoption of new production technology. In most developing 
areas, in contrast, credit is usually not available, or is procurable only at high cost. In the absence 
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of accessible public or affordable private insurance and credit programs, market failures create 
strong pressures for labor movement. Especially in developing countries, people act collectively 
not only to maximize expected income but also to minimize risks associated with various market 
failures. According to the new economics, the relevant economic variables that explain migration 
are not wages but measures of risk and needs for and access to capital. Using data collected in 
twenty-five Mexican communities, Massey and Espinosa (1997) empirically studied the driving 
forces of Mexico–U.S. migration. They argue that, over the past twenty-five years, probabilities 
of migration are linked more to the forces identified by the new economics of migration than to 
the individual cost-benefit calculations assumed by the neoclassical model. 
The theoretical models growing out of the new economics of migration result in a set of 
propositions and hypotheses that are quite different from those originating from neoclassical 
theory, and hence lead to different policy implications. As we discussed earlier, families or 
households are the appropriate units of analysis for migration research, not autonomous 
individuals. A wage differential is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for labor migration 
to occur; risk-averse households may have strong incentives to diversify risks through labor 
movement even in the absence of wage differentials. Migration and local employment are not 
mutually exclusive, and there are strong incentives for households to choose both migration and 
local activities. Thus, economic development within sending areas need not reduce the pressure 
for labor migration. 
Governments can influence migration rates not only through policies that influence labor 
markets but also through those that affect insurance and capital markets. For instance, 
government insurance programs—particularly unemployment insurance—can significantly affect 
the incentives for labor movement. Government policies and economic changes that influence 
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income distribution will impact the relative deprivation of some households, and thus alter their 
incentives to migrate. In fact, government policies that produce a higher mean income in 
migrant-sending areas may increase migration if relatively poor households do not share the 
income gain. Conversely, policies may reduce migration if relatively rich households do not 
share the income gain (Massey et al., 1993). 
The major contribution of the neoclassical economic model lies in its articulation of a 
formal theory of migration behavior at both individual and aggregate levels and its generation of 
testable hypotheses for empirical research. Nevertheless, no matter which level of analysis 
(macro or micro) one adopts, the neoclassical model of migration research is fundamentally a 
micro-social approach in the sense that it assumes social processes (migration processes, in this 
case) are simply sums of individual actions undertaken on the basis of individual cost-benefit 
calculations (Massy et al., 1993). The “methodological individualism” and reductionism of the 
neoclassical approach makes it problematic to use individual actions to explain or predict 
structural changes—say, reduced or eliminated spatial inequality as a consequence of 
“aggregate” migration flows. In other words, it tends to confuse details with social structures, 
and often commits “the fallacy of composition by assuming that since individuals benefit, the 
society must necessarily benefit” (Papademetriou & Martin, 1991: 8). The neoclassical approach 
is historical, presuming movement toward equilibrium and overlooking the particular 
politicoeconomic conditions under which population movement takes place. Wage differences 
cannot always explain migration; sometimes people migrate because they have no real 
alternative. As Amin (1974: 89) notes: “Would anyone dare to explain the migration from 
Europe to North America in the nineteenth century as having been caused by the motivations of 
the migrants with reference to differences between potential incomes without pointing out that 
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the migrants were peasants who had been driven from their lands by the development of agrarian 
capitalism?” Even though there have been substantial modifications of the neoclassical model 
(e.g., Harris & Todaro, 1970; Todaro, 1981), those modifications still reduce migrants, a 
category that is socially structured by gender, ethnicity, and social class, to mere embodiments of 
labor power, and fail to “adequately take into account the political and other structural barriers to 
mobility” (Goss & Lindquist, 1995). 
The limitations of the neoclassical model are also evident in the context of international 
migration from developing to developed countries. In fact, the neoclassical approach has 
generally become a policy-making orthodoxy for labor migration. For example, many Asian 
countries have encouraged their citizens to seek income opportunities overseas under the 
assumption that labor migration will benefit receiving countries by providing cheap labor and 
solving labor-shortage problems. Labor migration is also expected to benefit sending countries 
by solving labor-surplus problems and serving as “a political safety valve,” since “it is generally 
the most ambitious and potentially vocal individuals who migrate” (Goss & Lindquist, 1995: 
320). Also, remittances sent or brought back by migrants are expected to raise local living 
standards if they are used for household consumption or to increase value-added production and 
incomes, stimulate local production, and create local employment, if spent to purchase additional 
factor inputs or to rent substitute labor for production activities. However, the benefits of 
migration to emigration countries are ambiguous. There is no iron law that automatically 
translates out-migration into economic development, and labor migration does not necessarily 
resolve developmental dilemmas. 
Since the mid-1970s, the Philippine government has been influenced by this model and 
has encouraged its citizens to migrate and work overseas to help combat domestic economic 
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stagnation and to accumulate sufficient capital to stimulate long-term development. However, 
the equilibrating predictions and developmental benefits of labor migration have been 
inconsistent with the Philippines’ experience of migration without development. First, 
remittances are used less for investment than debt repayment and consumption, which may also 
cause inflation and prevent definitive conclusions about economic development. Second, 
migration provides only temporary relief of domestic unemployment, which continued to rise in 
the Philippines in the late 1970s and 1980s despite massive emigration. Third, wages and skill 
levels have not increased as a result of emigration (Goss & Lindquist, 1995). 
The neoclassical model is criticized by conflict theorists. Instead of considering migration 
to be calculated decisions by rational individuals, conflict theorists investigate migration in the 
context of class structure and conflict. Neo-Marxists (Castells, 1975; Castles & Kosack, 1973; 
Nikolinakos, 1973) view migration as the result of the incorporation of less-developed sectors 
into more-developed sectors. This process becomes cumulatively unequal and leads to the 
weakening of the position of the less-developed sectors. Therefore, connection between 
unequally developed states becomes a means of additional surplus extraction by more-developed 
states, and migration should not be expected to lead to equilibrium among regions (Portes & 
Walton, 1981: 28). The structural approach stresses conflict instead of equilibrium and focuses 
on the “contextual factors (structural forces)” that “produce socio-spatial inequalities and 
constrain the life chances of individuals as members of specific social classes in particular 
places” (Goss & Lindquist, 1995: 318). With its strong Marxist overtones, structural perspective 
sees migration (international migration in particular) not as the sum of individuals’ voluntary 
decisions and actions but as the consequence of sociospatial structures and uneven and 
asymmetrical relations that are systematically reproduced within global economies and create the 
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conditions for labor migration. International migration is especially likely to take place between 
past colonial powers and their former colonies, due to cultural, linguistic, administrative, 
transportation, and communication links established early and maintained over time (Massy et al., 
1993). However, migration does not reduce or eliminate spatial inequalities and lead to 
“equilibrium”; instead it intensifies inequalities and perpetuates underdevelopment in sending 
countries due to their loss of human capital through out-migration. 
As a challenge to the neoclassical explanation of migration, the structural approach was 
initially embodied in neo-Marxist dependency theory during the 1960s and 1970s. The 
dependency theory argues that labor migration is a response to uneven spatial development, 
which results from former colonial relationships between developed core countries and 
underdeveloped periphery countries (Goss & Lindquist, 1995). Moreover, due to the selection of 
the most productive and talented migrant workers from the underdeveloped sending countries, 
migration creates a geographical transfer of value greater than the return to sending countries 
through remittance (Amin, 1974). Such “brain drain” in underdeveloped sending countries 
perpetuates and reinforces the inequalities between sending and receiving countries; thus, 
underdevelopment is a by-product of development (Arango, 2000). 
The structural model of migration effectively challenges the neoclassical economic model 
and provides a useful theoretical and conceptual framework for understanding the dynamics of 
international migration by shifting the unit of analysis from individual migrant to international 
power relationship, from microbehavioral to macrostructural processes, and from the study of 
solely economic forces to that of both political and economic forces from a historical-structural 
perspective. 
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However, the school of structural perspective is also burdened by its theoretical 
formulations (Papademetriou & Martin, 1991). With its historical-structural emphasis, the 
structural approach tends to focus on the evolution of the world capitalist system and its gradual 
penetration from rich countries to poor countries, which restricts its analytical scope to 
“international” migration. As Papademetriou and Martin (1991: 10) put it, “the historical and 
structural nature of this process , . . and the disarticulation of periphery actors, make it very 
difficult to apply this sort of analysis to anything less than the global level . . . one appreciates 
the almost insurmountable problems of empirical measurement” (see also Caporaso, 1978a, 
1978b; Cardoso, 1979; Duvall, 1978; de Janvry & Garramon, 1977; Portes & Walton, 1981; 
Skocpol, 1977;). Thus, the structural approach loses sight of the contextual dynamics in the 
“internal” process of labor migration as part of international capitalist integration. As structural 
theorists themselves argue, the dislocations and disruptions in poor countries (e.g., the 
displacement of workers in traditional agricultural sectors) resulting from the global capitalist 
penetration and exploitation lead to a large labor surplus and migration to cities, which create an 
uprooted proletariat prone to migrate abroad. Although internal migration may provide a 
background for the study of specific migratory relationships between countries, it has never been 
a subject of empirical investigation. 
There are certainly many noneconomic motivations for migration. A migration network is 
one such well-known notion. Migration networks can be defined as sets of interpersonal 
relationships that link migrants with relatives, friends, or fellow countrymen at home. They 
convey information, provide financial assistance, facilitate employment and accommodation, and 
give support in various forms. By doing so, they reduce the costs and uncertainty of migration 
and thus facilitate it. Moreover, networks can also induce migration through demonstration 
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effects. Massey et al. (1993) suggest that migration networks can be seen as a form of social 
capital, since they are social relations that permit access to other goods of economic significance, 
such as employment or higher wages. Their arguments rely on social capital theory and are 
associated with James Coleman and Pierre Bourdieu. 
Arango (2000) further argues that social networks for migration could be considered 
some of the most important explanatory factors of migration. Many migrants move simply 
because their socially connected friends and family members migrated in the past. On the one 
hand, family reunion accounts for a substantial part of international migration. On the other 
hand, the importance of social networks is believed to increase as entering receiving countries 
becomes more and more difficult, taking into account the networks’ capacity to reduce the costs 
and uncertainty of migrating. Furthermore, networks are cumulative in nature; therefore, 
networks are the main mechanisms that make migration a self-perpetuating phenomenon. Social 
networks could explain the continuation of migration independent from the causes that induced 
the initial migration. Hence, migration networks may contribute to explaining differential 
migration. However, there certainly exists an upper bound for the networks’ effect. Therefore, 
the dynamics of migration-network growth and stagnation constitute an area that deserves further 
investigation. 
Faist (1997) points out that migration networks constitute an intermediate, relational level 
that stands between the micro level of individual decision-making and the macro level of 
structural determinants. Thus this approach could help to bridge a gap that is one of the major 
limitations in migration thinking. So far, a systematic framework that theorizes about migration 
networks has yet to be developed. 
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This framework could also be used to accommodate intermediary institutions such as 
smuggling rings or humanitarian organizations, which assist migrants to overcome entry barriers 
for different purposes and aims. Once international migration has started, private institutions and 
voluntary organizations arise to satisfy the demand created by the imbalance between the large 
number of people who seek entry into receiving countries and the limited number of immigrant 
visas these countries typically offer. The barriers that receiving countries implement to keep 
people out create a profitable economic niche for entrepreneurs and institutions dedicated to 
promoting international movement, yielding a black market in migration. As this underground 
market develops, humanitarian organizations also arise in developed countries to safeguard the 
rights and improve the treatment of legal and undocumented migrants. For-profit organizations 
and private entrepreneurs provide a range of services to migrants in exchange for fees set in the 
underground market. Humanitarian groups help migrants by providing counseling, social 
services, and legal advice about how to obtain legitimate papers, and even provide insulation 
from immigration law enforcement authorities. Over time, as individuals, firms, and 
organizations become well known to immigrants, they also become institutionally stable, 
constituting another form of social capital that migrants can rely on to gain access to foreign 
labor markets. The recognition of a gradual buildup of institutions, organizations, and 
entrepreneurs dedicated to arranging immigrant entry—legal or illegal—again yields hypotheses 
that are quite different from those originating from neoclassical individual-decision models. 
Another theoretical strand states that migration is a self-sustaining and self-perpetuating 
phenomenon, which was first proposed by Gunnar Myrdal under the label of cumulative 
causation in the context of uneven development in underdeveloped areas. Massey et al. (1998) 
have enlarged the notion, identifying several factors and mechanisms that are responsible for the 
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self-perpetuation of migration. The basic idea is that migration changes reality in a way that 
induces subsequent moves through a number of socioeconomic processes, one of which, the 
expansion of socioeconomic processes, has been discussed previously. Other relevant 
mechanisms include relative deprivation, the development of a culture of migration, perverse 
distribution of human capital, and the stigmatization of jobs usually performed by immigrants. 
Recent theoretical contributions are contributing to a better understanding of the causes 
of migration, and of the mechanisms that contribute to its self-perpetuation. However, the overall 
picture is still far from satisfactory. The usefulness of theories that try to explain why people 
move is limited by their inability to explain why so few people move. This is one of the reasons I 
am determined to investigate labor migration in China, where massive internal labor migration 
has been observed during the last decades. In terms of international migration, more effort should 
be put into studying noneconomic factors that influence migration, such as family types, 
migration networks, and social structures and systems in general. Then we can say something 
about the cultural dimensions and contexts of migration, including the costs of cultural 
adaptation. In addition to these noneconomic factors, politics and the roles played by states 
should be taken into account to explain limited mobility. In practice, nothing shapes migration 
flows and types more than admission policies. Any theory built primarily on economic models is 
bound to be in trouble in an international migration scene in which political considerations and 
states intervene so prominently. As Zolberg (1989) points out, politics and states are usually 
missing in theories of migration, and urgently need to be brought back into them. 
Arango (2000) critically reviews existing theories of migration and calls attention to other 
dimensions of migration, including processes and consequences, the “unsettled relationship” 
between migration and development, social structures such as family and kinship ties, and the 
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state and political context in which migration takes place. My work in this dissertation could be 
considered a reply to Arango’s critique by examining the “unsettled relationship” between 
migration and development, and of regional inequality in particular. 
2.2 MIGRATION AND INEQUALITY 
Migration and inequality are interdependent upon each other. We have seen that inequality or 
regional wage differentials create natural incentives for people to migrate. On the other hand, 
migration also has nontrivial impact on regional development. There is not much doubt that 
internal migration tends to increase the rate of economic growth of a country. This is because 
persons tend to move from regions of relatively high rates of natural increase to regions of 
relatively rapid economic expansion. Thus a better allocation of resources is achieved, resulting 
in a favorable effect on economic growth. 
What is controversial is the nature of the impact of internal migration on regional rates of 
growth and inequality in per capita income. Kuznets (1955) conjectures that income inequality 
widens when the labor force shifts from the agricultural sector to the nonagricultural sector 
during the early stages of economic development. Myrdal (1957) also argued that migration 
widens the gap in per capita income between the sending and receiving areas. Because it is the 
advanced and expanding regions that are usually the receiving regions, internal migration, 
according to Myrdal, widens the gap in per capita income between the advanced and the poorer 
regions. On the other hand, Easterlin (1961) pointed out that inter-region migration contributed 
to the convergence of per capita income levels since 1860 in the United States. Okun (1968) 
argued that it is theoretically impossible to determine the impact of internal migration on 
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regional inequality, as it is required to consider the economic and demographic structures of the 
regions, whether the faster-growth regions are also the more-developed regions, and whether the 
time frame is long-term or short-term. Using data for the time period 1940 to 1950 in the United 
States, he examined the effects and pointed out that further research was required to confirm his 
findings. 
Oberai and Singh (1983) suggest that inequality may be reduced if the very poor migrate, 
as the resulting increase in wages will bring up the wages of those who were at the bottom of the 
scale. Previous research has shown evidence of migration’s impact on reducing income 
inequality among rural households in Northeast Thailand (Guest, 1998). Yang (2004) presents a 
dynamic model for analyzing the link between migration and provincial inequality in Thailand 
and finds that provincial production is highly unequal, while household income exhibits 
moderate between-province inequality. The wage differential drives rural-to-urban migration, 
and in turn the wage rate at the destination is affected by the total amount of migrant labor 
supply. Migration generates a net income gain for migrants, and they share that income gain with 
their family members via remittances, which help redistribute income toward poor provinces, 
resulting in a lower level of provincial inequality in terms of household incomes. 
Using data on interprovincial migration in Vietnam, Phan and Coxhead (2010) 
investigated the relationship between migration and inequality. As in China, Vietnam’s 
economic boom during the transition to a market economy generated rapid growth with unequal 
regional development. Phan and Coxhead examined the role of migration as an influence on 
income inequality between pairs of provinces. Their analysis confirmed economic motives for 
migration but also suggested the existence of poverty-related labor immobility at the provincial 
level. The examination of income inequality between pairs of provinces suggests that the 
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influence of migration on inequality can be either negative or positive. For those provinces 
where most of Vietnam’s export-oriented industries are located, they confirm the robust 
inequality-reducing impact of labor migration. 
Soto and Torche (2004) provide empirical support for their hypothesis that lack of 
convergence in Chile in the 1980s and 1990s seems to be associated with low levels of regional 
migration, and that this phenomenon may be the result, to a large extent, of government social 
policies. They found that annual per capita GDP in Chile grew at 5% per year between 1975 and 
2000. However, regional income inequality remained stagnant even though poverty declined 
significantly in all regions. Moreover, they found that convergence in per capita income and 
productivity levels was “too slow to become a significant force in equalizing regional income.” 
Their study suggests that lack of convergence is mostly associated with low levels of internal 
migration. 
For most developing countries, one main channel of realizing labor force shift is rural-to-
urban migration. In the existing literature, the effect of growth-related migration dynamics on 
regional inequality remains largely unexplained. Jeong (2002) used SES data to show that 
growth and income inequality are closely connected through factors like occupation, financial 
intermediation, and education, but he did not address geographic factors. Jeong and Townsend 
(2003) examined the micro underpinnings of two models of growth and inequality, but failed to 
discuss cross-province inequality. 
As for the consequences of migration, there exists a considerable amount of confusion 
and debate. Migration researchers agree more on the positive effects of migration on individuals 
but are less sure about the effects of migration on income inequality. There has been much 
discussion about whether migration increases or decreases inequality. A commonly held view is 
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that migration increases inequality. Lipton (1980) showed that rural-urban migration does not 
tend to equalize incomes because of the following reasons: the selective nature of migration; 
migration costs or barriers; the absence of the most productive household members; the low 
volume of net remittance; old and sick return migrants; etc. Moreover, he argued that the fact 
that migrants come from the most-productive age groups, that unequal power structures within 
villages go unchallenged as a result, and that migrants from wealthier backgrounds do better all 
conspired to ensure that migration enhanced inequality (Black, Natali, & Skinner, 2006). 
Since 1980, further studies have in some cases supported Lipton’s work, but in other 
cases have come to somewhat different conclusions. One reason for such differences lies in 
methodological variation—which specific economic question is being asked, and which 
econometric or statistical techniques are being used to estimate income and income distribution. 
For instance, if remittances are treated as exogenous variables, the economic question is how 
remittances, in total or at the margins, affect the observed income distribution in the sending 
areas. However, if remittances are treated as potential substitutes for home earnings, the 
economic question becomes how the observed income distribution compares to a counterfactual 
scenario in which no migration takes place but an imputed level of home earnings is included. 
Barham and Boucher (1995) documented a study of migration from Nicaragua using both of 
these methods and suggested that where remittances are considered exogenous, they reduce 
income inequality, whereas if they are considered a substitute for home earnings, they increase 
income inequality. 
Based on the livelihood approach, Waddington (2003) argued that examples can be found 
on both sides and whether migration increases inequality or decrease inequality is essentially 
dependent on the uneven distribution of migrant characteristics such as human capital and 
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networks. Black, Natali, and Skinner (2006) presented their case studies on Central America, 
Eastern Europe, West Africa, and South Asia and argued that migration could either increase or 
decrease inequality, depending on specific contexts. They further argued that “inequality needs 
to be defined in broader terms than simply income or wealth. Inequality, like poverty, is multi-
dimensional, and can be measured at individual, household, regional and international levels. 
There are socio-cultural dimensions to inequality, as well as inequalities in access to power, 
whilst all aspects of inequality are highly gendered.” 
In a specific case study regarding migration and inequality between the U.S. and Mexico, 
Black, Natali, and Skinner (2006) documented an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
migration and inequality. They argued that patterns of network play an important role in 
migration. When migration costs are high to begin with, network effects tend to increase 
migration more for the middle and upper-middle classes. As migration cost continues to fall 
through the building of larger networks, primarily the lower and lower-middle classes benefit, 
which tends to reduce inequality. McKenzie and Rapoport (2007) demonstrated this relationship 
using two datasets: the first consisted of data from fifty-seven rural communities in Mexico 
collected as part of the Mexican Migration Project (MMP), while the second consisted of data 
from ninety-seven rural municipalities from the Encuesta Nacional de la Dinamica Demografica 
(ENADID). Both datasets provided detailed information on international migration, but did not 
include income or consumption data, so inequality was measured instead in terms of data on 
households’ ownership of infrastructure and assets. Although this data did not show increasing 
inequality at low migration-prevalence rates, it did show that an increase in migration prevalence 
was followed by a decrease in inequality. In particular, the ENADID data showed an inverted-U 
relationship between international migration and inequality, with emigration increasing 
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inequality at lower volumes and then reducing inequality as volume approached the levels 
prevailing in the MMP communities. For instance, community migration prevalence fifteen years 
earlier, which served as a proxy of the stock of migration experience in the community, was 
shown to have significant negative effects on community inequality. This effect was strongest 
and most significant for asset inequality, but also was significant for income and consumption 
inequality. 
Given the ambiguous relationship between migration and inequality, it is necessary for 
migration researchers to define which kind of migration and which kind of inequality are being 
analyzed. A bigger question to ask is whether rural-urban migration is socially desirable. 
Economists have developed two distinct approaches to empirically address this question. The 
first approach focuses on the wages migrants receive. If migrants receive higher wages, 
migration is considered socially desirable. Though this approach seems logical in the 
neoclassical framework, there are a few problems complicating the matter. For example, data 
collection might be prohibitively expensive; private gain to migrants might not mean social gain 
due to the negative externality created by migrants. The second approach focuses on the optimal 
size of urban areas, which has its own problems. Due to the problems associated with these two 
respective approaches, economists have made only limited progress in the normative assessment 
of the consequences of migration (Morrison & Guo, 1998). 
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3.0  RELATED LITERATURE: LABOR MIGRATION IN CHINA 
3.1 MARKET FORCES GOVERNING MIGRATION IN CHINA 
To investigate the relationship between migration and inequality, China could serve as a natural 
experiment. Since China began its economic reforms in 1978, rural-to-urban migration has been 
a particularly important social and economic phenomenon and has attracted much attention from 
both academics and policy makers. The growing literature includes contributions from sociology 
treatment such as CASS (2000); demographers such as Li, Chen, and Bao (1999); economic 
researchers such as West and Zhao (2000); and government-sponsored research reports such as 
Zhang and Zhou (1999). 
China is the most populous developing country in the world, and its government has been 
concerned with achieving a more balanced distribution of population. Its unique system of 
household registration (hukou) distinguishes Chinese migration from migration in other 
developing countries. The system was established in the 1950s to control population mobility 
and to limit migration from rural to urban areas.2. Rural to urban migration occurred only at an 
extremely small scale, under the auspices of the government. Since China’s economic reforms in 
1978, the Household Responsibility System (HRS) has emerged and eventually replaced the 
                                                 
2 Zhao (2005) argues that hukou system was not intended to control population mobility. The main reason cited was 
food shortage. Lin, Cai, and Li (1999) argue that hukou system was introduced because the government needed to tie 
farmers to the land in order to provide cheap agriculture products to the industrial sector. 
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collective production team system. The HRS returned some degree of personal freedom to rural 
people, increased their productivity, led to the availability of food in the urban free market, and 
eventually put an end to food rationing (Zhao, 1999a); it also generated surplus labor in rural 
areas. All of these factors made rural-to-urban migration both possible and necessary. 
Labor migration from rural to urban areas has emerged as a prominent phenomenon in 
China after decades of stagnation. The growth of this population group reflects fundamental 
social and demographic changes in Chinese society since the early 1980s. The HRS created a 
strong incentive for peasants to reduce production costs and increase agricultural productivity. 
Thus, surplus rural labor became an even greater problem in China. On the other hand, the 
success of agricultural production in the late 1970s and early 1980s dramatically increased the 
food supply in Chinese cities, making it possible for more rural people to migrate to cities and to 
survive without food ration cards. When migrants left for cities, their remaining family members 
could still take care of their land very well due to increasing agricultural productivity and 
modernization. In short, the market reforms in the late 1970s freed many rural laborers to leave 
the land and surplus labor and underemployment in rural areas became migration push factors. 
In the meantime, the Chinese government relaxed controls on labor migration and 
allowed farmers to enter urban areas as long as they provided their own food. Following the 
“rural migrant wave” of 1989, migration became a significant social phenomenon, and the 
government encouraged rural-to-urban migration. Since 2000 the government has been 
reforming hukou system, and now allows greater mobility among people. 
The analysis above could be considered the supply side of the migration story, while the 
following analysis could be considered the demand side. Under free choice, migration is 
considered a demographic response to macroeconomic development (Lee, 1966; Zelinsky, 
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1971). Most theories and models of migration hold the assumption that people are all rational 
individual decision makers who act in their own interests within the socioeconomic system as 
long as they have enough information and capability. However, in the case of China, government 
policies and economic processes play equally important roles in affecting individuals’ mobility 
behaviors. The industrialization of rural areas and the development of small towns were 
promoted to absorb the rural labor surplus. In particular with the development of towns and 
villages, the peasants could “leave the land but not the countryside” (li tu bu li xiang). At the 
same time, the government recognized the central role of large cities in economic development. 
Market reforms brought about rapid development and great demand for low-skill labor (e.g., 
construction workers) in urban areas. As Li (1998) pointed out, Shanghai completed more 
municipal works in four years than it did in the previous four decades, with thousands of 
skyscrapers rising from the ground. In the Pudong District of Shanghai, more than three-fourths 
of the construction workers were migrants. Unsurprisingly, rural migrant workers were the 
primary labor pool for these construction projects. 
Another demand-side cause of rural-urban migration is the emergence and expansion of 
foreign investment and nonstate sectors and their increasing demand for labor in urban areas. 
Prior to 1980s, the Chinese state used its nationalization program to dissolve the economic 
foundation of private business. But since the market reforms, private enterprises and foreign joint 
ventures began to reemerge, and grew rapidly. Migrant workers constituted an overwhelming 
majority of the labor pool for those nonstate sectors (Li, 1998). As China Daily reported in 1994, 
the number of migrant laborers had surpassed local laborers in some more-developed market 
towns in Jiangsu Province. 
33 
After examining these push-and-pull factors or the supply-and-demand factors that 
contributed to rural-urban migration, it is necessary to look at the government’s response to these 
economic processes and their associated migration dynamics. The increase in agricultural labor 
productivity and demand for low-skill laborers in urban areas in the late 1970s induced a large 
portion of the rural labor force to move to urban areas. Therefore, many population policies were 
implemented to deal with the migration surge. On the one hand, the government attempted to 
control migration through the promotion of rural nonfarm employment opportunities and the 
development of small cities and towns (e.g., the policy of “control the big cities, develop middle 
cities appropriately, and actively develop the small cities” in 1980; the policy of “the farmers 
who want to establish their business with their own capital and grain should be allowed to” in 
1984; and the policy of “leaving the land but not the countryside” (li tu bu li xiang). The 
government hoped that migrants could be kept away from large cities with populations of 
500,000 or more. This was achieved by allowing medium cities of populations of 200,000–
500,000 to grow and actively encouraging the development of small cities and towns with fewer 
than 200,000 inhabitants (Davin, 1999). 
On the other hand, hukou system was gradually relaxed, which made it possible for rural 
residents to move freely without having to change their hukou. As a consequence, rural labor 
began to move, live, and work in cities as so-called temporary residents. Also, hukou system 
underwent reform: a series of social security mechanisms favorable to migrant workers were put 
in place. Moreover, the government no longer prohibited the mobility of rural people through 
tough migration restrictions. New migrants could make their own decisions based on cost/benefit 
calculations and their preferences. Although hukou system still significantly affected migration 
decisions, its effect was greatly diminished compared with the past. In 1997, the Ministry of 
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Public Security started a pilot experimental reform of hukou system in 382 small cities and 
towns. Since 2000, the government has been reforming hukou system, and now allows greater 
mobility among the people.3 Knight, Song, and Jia (1999) used a survey of four Chinese cities 
(Beijing, Shenzhen, Wuhan, and Suzhou) to study government policy on rural-urban migration. 
Chan (2011) argued that interprovincial migration has increased rapidly since the early 1990s, 
spurred by significant wage differentials between provinces. The idea of long-distance migration 
for a better job has gained popularity over time in many provinces, including those in the western 
region of China. Through China’s internal migration, people’s incentives to migrate in response 
to regional disparities have been clearly shown; however, the effect of migration on regional 
inequality remains ambiguous. 
Using 1990 census data, Cai (1996) reported that there were 34.1 million migrants in 
China, of which 32.42% were interprovincial migrants. However, using 2000 census data, Wang, 
Wu, and Cai (2003) estimated that there were around 12.47 million migrants, of which 26.4% 
were interprovincial migrants. Among all migrants, 78% were rural-to-urban and urban-to-urban 
migrants. It is unclear why the number of migrants decreased between these two censuses; it is 
counterintuitive and inconsistent with common wisdom (Zhao, 2005). Compared to the study of 
Huang and Pieke (2003), it seems that Wang, Wu, and Cai (2003) underestimated the scale of 
migration. In general, the migrants were mainly from the central and western regions, and the 
popular destinations were big cities and eastern coastal areas. Wang, Wu, and Cai (2003) 
estimated that of the interprovincial migrants, 75% migrated to eastern areas, and only 9.8% and 
18.3% to central and western areas, respectively. 
                                                 
3 By the end of 2001, several provinces, including Liaoning, Hunan, Fujian, Guangdong, and Jilin, eliminated the 
distinction between rural hukou and urban hukou (Zhao, 2005). 
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Huang and Pieke (2003) suggested that rural migrants were generally more educated and 
younger than nonmigrants. There were fewer female migrants than male; only one-third of rural 
migrants were female. Moreover, minority nationalities were less likely to migrate. Wang, 
Maruyama, and Kikuchi (2000) pointed out that rural migrants usually held informal jobs, since 
hukou system made it difficult for them to find jobs in the formal sector. Cai (1996) showed that 
36% of migrants held jobs in the manufacturing and service sectors. 
3.2 MIGRATION AND INEQUALITY IN CHINA: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Migration scholars have examined the consequences of migration, and economic development in 
particular, with regard to place of origin or place of destination. In the research on place of 
origin, pessimistic scholars found that out-migration tended to deteriorate the economy in the 
sending location (Lucas, 2005). Out-migration is considered a brain drain for the sending place, 
and local productivity suffers from out-migration, since most out-migrants are young, physically 
strong, enterprising, talented, educated, skilled, and not easily replaceable (Harris, 1995; Todaro, 
1997). As a result, the people remaining in sending areas are overwhelmingly women, children, 
and the elderly. Economic development and technological modernization slow down or even 
stagnate, and the sending areas become less and less attractive to investors, causing local 
business and production to get even worse (Davin, 1999). The consequences of migration in 
sending areas are considered to be an evil cycle indeed. 
However, other scholars disagree with the pessimistic model and think it is less 
appropriate for the case of China. First of all, migration, as a “safety valve,” is one of the most 
direct ways to solve the surplus labor problem and reduce population pressure on the land in 
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rural areas. Moreover, most Chinese migrants preserve strong ties with their sending areas. The 
circular nature of migration ensures a high level of connection and remittances sent or brought 
back to the sending areas. Also, modern transportation and communication ensure the flow of 
information between migrants and the remaining population, and help to maintain the link 
between them. Because of such strong ties, optimistic scholars argue that migration and follow-
up remittance are beneficial for sending areas (Harris & Todaro, 1970; Rozelle, Taylor, and de 
Brauw, 1999; Taylor, Rozelle, and de Brauw, 2003). Remittance income can raise local living 
standards if it is used for household consumption. Remittance can also increase value-added 
production and incomes, stimulate local productivity, and create local employment, if spent to 
purchase additional factor inputs or to rent substitute labor for production activities. In addition, 
out-migration can accelerate lifestyle and attitudinal changes in the place of origin. In other 
words, circular migration with strong social ties has generated not only remittance flow but also 
progressive attitudes and modern technological skills, which are essential to the processes of 
urbanization and industrialization in sending areas (Chan, 2001). 
Migration scholars are also interested in the consequences of migration in the place of 
destination. Some scholars believe in-migration in urban areas is beneficial to urban 
development. Cai (1997) noted that in-migration solved the problem of labor shortage and 
stimulated economic development in urban areas. This “reserve army of labor” is also cheap, 
flexible, and capable. They are willing to take low-skill, low-wage, “dirty” jobs that local urban 
residents are not willing to take. Those jobs often require working overtime or under dangerous 
working conditions. Zhao (1995) estimated that the full cost of hiring a migrant worker was only 
about one-fourth of the cost of hiring a local worker. Furthermore, Xu (1997) noted that in-
migration also created new consumption demand and new capital investment in the receiving 
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place—that is, increased demand for food, clothing, housing, schooling, and public facilities due 
to in-migration stimulated further capital investment and economic development. 
As stated above, it is clear that internal migration in China is intimately linked with 
economic development in both sending areas and receiving areas. Thus, it can also have some 
effect on rural-urban inequality. The relationship between migration and inequality is of the 
“chicken or egg” type. On the one hand, rural-urban inequalities may contribute to rural-urban 
migration in China. Back in Mao’s era, the greatest advantage of urban life was access to 
subsidized food (Davin, 1999). Urban employees, almost all of whom were employed in state-
owned enterprises and government, were guaranteed lifetime employment (the “iron bowl”) with 
associated benefits such as health care, pensions, and subsidized housing. On the other hand, 
rural life was full of risk and uncertainty. Peasant life was highly dependent on the success of 
crops. In rural areas, social security and health care were both locally financed. The rural 
household was the most important provider of welfare and security, and was financially 
responsible for the care of children, the elderly, and sick or disabled family members. In short, 
rural families bore all the costs themselves (Davin, 1994). 
Since the market reforms in the late 1970s, the income gap between rural and urban areas 
has been widening, which is considered to be a driving force for the surge of rural-urban 
migration (Li, 1998). The rural-urban income gap grew from 1:1.71 in 1984 to 1:2.55 in 1994. 
From 1992 to 1993, the growth rate of urban income was 12%, while it was only 2% for rural 
residents. Because of this widening income disparity, it is conceivable that many villagers 
migrated to cities in seek of a better life. 
In addition to the widening rural-urban income gap, urban residents have continued to 
have advantages in many aspects of life, such as welfare, health care, education, and pensions. 
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For example, urban residents have access to higher-quality schools and medical services for 
which they pay less than rural residents. Retired workers in cities can continue enjoying pension 
benefits (Davis-Friedmann, 1991). Almost all urban households have electricity and running 
water at low cost. Central heating is common the northern China, and washing machines, flush 
toilets, refrigerators and color television sets are also common in average urban households. In 
the rural areas, decollectivization along with the implementation of the household responsibility 
system severely weakened the already very limited social services and welfare. Most peasants 
now have to pay for their own medical care, and must rely almost completely on their families in 
old age. The quality of life in the countryside is also not comparable to that in the cities. Most 
rural households do not have running water systems, so their water has to be fetched from 
outside; their fuel has to be gathered, and human waste is used as fertilizer. Also, in contrast to 
urban life, rural life offers little amusement. Thus, because of the sharp contrast between rural 
and urban life and the rising costs of living in rural areas, villagers tend to migrate to cities for 
better income to support their families and seek better lives, even though they may not be able to 
become permanent urban residents. Rural-urban disparities clearly affect rural residents’ 
decisions about migration. 
On the other hand, migration has been considered an important mechanism affecting 
inequality between sending areas and receiving areas. In his famous laws of migration, 
Ravenstein (1889) contended that people migrate to better themselves economically. “Migration 
is considered as an individual response to regional differences in economic development” (Fan, 
2005: 296). Neoclassical theorists also view migration as an outcome of regional differences in 
labor demand and supply and of individuals’ rational calculation of costs and benefits (Sjaastad, 
1962). They argue that migration is an equilibrating factor, so that labor migration from low- to 
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high-wage areas will eventually optimize the distribution of human resources and capital among 
regions and even out regional wage inequalities (Borts & Stein, 1964). However, scholars 
adopting structural approaches contend that migration from peripheral (less-developed) areas to 
core (more-developed) areas may accelerate polarization and income inequalities between areas 
(Myrdal, 1957; Hirschman, 1958). 
In the case of China, most scholars (e.g., D. Gale Johnson, 2002) adopted the views 
expressed in neoclassical theories and believed that transfer of labor out of the countryside was 
essential to reduce income disparity between farm and nonfarm people (Lin, Wang, and Zhao, 
2004). Nevertheless, some scholars (e.g., Davin, 1999) note that migration in some cases may 
reinforce and even increase existing inequalities. For instance, migrants from better-off families 
or better-off rural areas can get access to more resources and information, which in turn indicates 
that they can afford the expense of getting to the most-developed cities, where they can earn 
higher wages; and their remittances are more likely to be spent on investment instead of 
consumption. In short, the benefits generated from migration tend to benefit those who already 
have a better foundation. 
Shifting from economic planning to increased utilization of market mechanisms is the 
goal of the Chinese economic reform. The working of a market economy is greatly aided by 
labor migration. Restricting migration creates serious economic losses. Thanks to economic 
reforms, old restrictions are no longer effective in tying rural people to the land and to rural 
areas. As a result, despite government restrictions, a large number of rural people have been able 
to migrate to cities. However, due to the continued policy of restricting migration, the lives of 
these migrants are made much more difficult than they would ordinarily be. If there is no 
significant change in hukou system in the near future, it is likely that migrants will never obtain 
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the same social status as urban hukou holders, and the current clear segregation between local 
residents and migrants will persist, with serious social consequences (Zhao, 2000). 
Though most existing literature documents the rise of inequality in China in the 1980s 
and 1990s, there is no consensus on the relationship between migration and regional inequality 
from empirical studies on China. China has transformed from a society with relatively egalitarian 
distribution of economic resources4 to one with moderate inequality.5 It has been established, 
using micro data, that rural-urban disparities accounted for 50% of inequality in 1995, and 
explained 75% of the increase between 1984 and 1995 (World Bank, 1997). Using population 
census data, Lin, Wang, and Zhao (2004) examined changes in regional income disparity 
between 1990 and 2000 and population migration in the same period. Instead of using per capita 
GDP, they used per capita incomes derived from household surveys.6 Their study advocated the 
importance of labor migration as a way of alleviating income disparity between rural and urban 
areas, but it has not been sufficient to reduce regional income inequality. Following the new 
economics of migration theory, de Brauw, Taylor, and Rozelle (2003) argued that labor 
migration has a negative effect on household income in source areas. On the other hand, 
remittances sent home by migrants partially compensate for this lost-labor effect. Overall, they 
find that migration at the household level increases household per capita income for those left 
behind. 
Whalley and Zhang (2004) studied the effect of hukou system on income inequality and 
labor migration in China. Intuitively, their numerical results suggested a significant role for 
                                                 
4 Rawski (1982) found that pre-reform income distribution in China was far from egalitarian. 
5 Some existing literature has attempted to explain rising regional inequality through uneven development 
opportunities, such as globalization (Wei & Wu, 2002), fiscal decentralization (Kanbur & Zhang, 2001), 
industrialization, and market integration (Park, 2002). 
6 Rawski (2001) argued that GDP statistics in China are problematic. 
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hukou system in preventing movement toward a more equal distribution of income in China. 
Based on the 2002 China Regional Input-Output Table, Xu and Li (2006) constructed a recursive 
dynamic computable general equilibrium model; their simulation results showed that labor 
migration had little effect on regional disparity of per capita GDP. However, they found that 
labor migration decreased the regional disparity of per capita consumption. Their result is 
different from that of many empirical studies of China’s labor migration, most of which argue 
that regional migration contributes much to the convergence of regional income disparity. 
Following a recursive computable general equilibrium model as well, Zhai, Hertel, and 
Wang’s (2003) simulation results showed that reforms in hukou system would dramatically 
reduce urban-rural income disparity. Yao, Zhang, and Feng (2005) argued that labor migration 
could only be regarded as a short-run solution to reduce spatial income inequality. Moreover, it 
might even induce further inequality and other undesirable consequences to both coastal and 
inland areas. They further suggested that the long-run solution to regional inequality and 
development should be encouragement of industrialization of the central and western zones. Hu 
(2002) developed a spatial agglomeration model to explain the increasing regional disparity in 
China and showed that increasing rural-to-urban labor mobility may be one of the reasons for the 
enlarging income disparity between coastal and inland areas. 
Using interprovincial migration data from 1990 and 2000 population censuses, Fan 
(2005) examined the relationship between migration and regional development and showed that 
this relationship has been bidirectional and become stronger over time. The reasons for the 
bidirectional relationship are as follows. On the one hand, economic reforms have widened 
regional disparity. Economic growth, job opportunities, and higher wages in more-developed 
areas exert a strong pull to migrants from poorer areas. On the other hand, cheap labor from poor 
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areas facilitates industrialization in more-developed areas, further accelerating their economic 
growth. Candelaria, Daly, and Hale (2010) studied the persistent inequality of China and found 
that migration was driven by wage differentials, but, contrary to the findings of Whalley and 
Zhang (2004), migration did not reduce wage inequality across provinces. They argued that it 
was restrictions on labor migration during the period they studied that prevented migration from 
having a noticeable equilibrating effect on wage differentials across provinces. Cai, Park, and 
Zhao (2006) documented a significant increase in the urban-rural gap since the mid-1980s. The 
reasons, they argued, lay in the cost of migration, policy barriers to migration (e.g., hukou 
system), and productivity differentials between rural and urban workers. Moreover, they also 
provided an explanation based on the sources of statistics regarding rural-urban per capita 
income. In a framework of convergence in the neoclassical theory of growth, Cai, Du, and Wang 
(2002) investigated the impact of labor migration on regional disparity and economic growth. 
They found that labor migration distortion negatively impacted the regional growth rate in terms 
of per capita GDP. They further argued that relaxation of restrictions on labor migration would 
increase growth in the central and western regions and help to narrow interregional inequality. 
Most empirical studies about migration in China are more or less plagued by 
misinterpretation and problems in the key data (Liu & Chan, 2001). Migration by nature is hard 
to measure, and the underling concepts China uses to define migration are quite different from 
those commonly used in other countries (Chan, 2012). The analysis of Chinese migration is 
further complicated by particular institutional arrangements and systems of population and 
migration management, and of statistical reporting (Chan, 2007). It is difficult to keep consistent 
yearly migration data. Chan, Liu, and Yang (1999) used China’s 1990 census 1% microdata to 
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compare hukou and non-hukou migrations. They found that these two types of migrants shared 
some general demographic characteristics, but displayed substantial socioeconomic differences. 
Some United Nations (1999) researchers once called the Chinese “floating population,” 
the largest group of internal migrants in China, “statistically invisible.” Roberts (2002) found it 
hard to detect these “invisible residents” in Chinese data. For example, even though Shanghai is 
one of China’s major destinations for migrants, there is only one obscure single column reporting 
the number of migrants (wailai renkou) under the Population and Labor Section in the Shanghai 
Statistical Yearbook 2006. Such problems have limited researchers’ ability to analyze not only 
China’s migration but also its urbanization and the relationship between labor migration and 
regional inequality. 
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4.0  DATA AND VARIABLES 
4.1 DATA SOURCES 
In this section, I describe my data sources for migration, inequality, and control variables. For 
this dissertation, I collected migration data from eighteen volumes of the China National 
Population Statistics by County (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo quan guo fen xian shi ren kou 
tong ji zi liao), compiled and published by the Ministry of Public Security of China (MPS), for 
thirty-one province-level administrative units across China for the years 1992 through 2008, 
covering a period of fast economic growth in China. I restricted my attention to after 1992, 
because 1992 is the first year in which migration data were available in this data book series. 
Also, I am interested in changes in migration and inequality during the transition process. Deng 
Xiaoping’s famous southern tour took place in 1992, marking the reinvigoration and 
intensification of market-oriented reforms and the opening up of economic policies. As a result, 
internal labor migration resumed its rising trend, and by 1995 migration flows had exceeded 11 
million per year (Li, 2004). The thirty-one province-level administrative units, hereafter referred 
to as provinces, include twenty-two provinces, five minority autonomous regions, and four 
municipalities directly under the jurisdiction of the central government. I exclude the migration 
numbers for Hong Kong, Macau, and abroad from my analysis. For the data analysis in this 
chapter, I will use the volumes of interprovincial in-migration, interprovincial out-migration, and 
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intraprovincial in-migration and intraprovincial out-migration by urban (shi) and rural (xian) 
areas of each province. A major advantage of the migration data provided by the MPS is that 
they are yearly provincial data with national coverage, while most data used in previous Chinese 
migration research are either surveys taken from samples of one or several provinces (or 
counties) or population censuses taken every ten years (Zhao, 2005). Compared with the 
migration data from decennial censuses, yearly migration data from the MPS better captures 
temporary, seasonal, and return migration within each ten-year time interval. Moreover, the MPS 
data provide not only province-level aggregate migration information but also migration 
information for urban and rural subareas within each province, which is especially useful for 
studying the effect of migration on regional inequality, controlling for the type of migration 
sending or receiving places (e.g., interprovincial in-migration to urban areas of Zhejiang 
Province). A major drawback of the MPS migration data is that they do not include unregistered 
migration—migration without changing hukou status and migration without obtaining temporary 
registration cards in receiving places—so they must underestimate de facto or actual moves, and 
are more likely to reflect the de jure or permanent moves with hukou status changed. 
Data on provincial socioeconomic characteristics, such as gross provincial production (or 
provincial GDP), population, employment, investment, and government expenditure, are mostly 
derived from the Compilation of Statistics on the 60 Years of New China (Xin Zhongguo 60 nian 
tong ji zi liao hui bian), published by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS) in 2009. 
To calculate the initial level of human capital (i.e., initial mean years of schooling of working 
population), ideally I would need the composition of working population by highest level of 
educational attainment and by province in 1992, which had not become available in yearbooks 
until 1997 when China Statistical Yearbook, China Labor Statistical Yearbook, and China 
46 
Population Statistical Yearbook started to publish such information on a yearly basis. Therefore, 
I use the 1990 census data to calculate the initial level of human capital and the source is the 
1993 volume of the China Statistical Yearbook. 
In the case of missing values for certain provinces or certain years, I use the Compilation 
of Statistics on the 55 Years of New China (an earlier edition of the Compilation of Statistics on 
the 60 Years of New China) and the China National Population Statistics by County as 
supplement data sources to fill in those missing values. 
In 1997, Chongqing, which used to be a city in Sichuan Province, was raised to the status 
of provincial-level municipality directly under the jurisdiction of the central government, 
resulting in the creation of a new province and also affecting all the statistics for Sichuan and 
Chongqing. Most of the existing studies deal with this issue by either combining the statistics of 
the two provinces and continuing to treat Chongqing as part of Sichuan after 1997 (e.g., Fan, 
2005; Lin, Wang, and Zhao, 2004) or completely eliminating the statistics of both from the 
datasets. In order to preserve most of the information, I take a different approach, by first 
interpolating Chongqing’s statistics for the period 1992–1997 and then adjusting Sichuan’s 
statistics by removing Chongqing’s portion for the same period. With the separation of 
Chongqing and Sichuan into two provinces, I have a dataset with a total of thirty-one provinces 
for the entire study period. 
4.2 VARIABLES 
As for the measurements of regional economic inequality, previous empirical studies fail to 
distinguish between regional convergence or divergence through the production growth channel 
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and the income redistribution channel (or national dynamic channel), which often leads to 
different or even contradictory conclusions and policy suggestions (Yang, 2004). The 
redistribution channel works in two ways, as neoclassical migration models predict. On the one 
hand, migrants send remittances back to their original households, and these remittances can be 
used to finance consumption. As a result of direct and contemporaneous income rise in sending 
places, the income gaps between sending and receiving places decreased (Phan, 2008). On the 
other hand, neoclassical theorists have long argued that migration is an outcome of regional 
differences in labor demand and supply. Labor migration from low- to high-wage regions will 
eventually optimize the distribution of human resources and capital among regions and even out 
regional income inequalities (Borts & Stein, 1964). 
The growth channel is relatively more indirect and more complicated than the income 
channel. The neoclassical growth model predicts a convergent growth trend among regions in the 
long run due to the diminishing returns to capital—poorer regions tend to grow faster than richer 
regions, catching up to those richer regions (Cai, Wang, and Du, 2002; Mankiw, Romer, and 
Weil, 1992). Against this background, migration is viewed as an equilibrating factor in terms of 
facilitating capital reallocation, narrowing labor productivity differentials, and reducing the 
spatial economic gap. Meanwhile, migration may also act as an indirect converging mechanism, 
because remittances may be used for productive investment in addition to consumption, which 
speeds up the growth of sending regions and improves their levels of economic development, 
and hence reducing regional economic inequality (Phan, 2008). 
In chapter 7, I will examine whether migration helps reduce spatial inequality in China 
through both the local growth channel and national dynamic channel. For the local growth 
channel, the goal is to test whether migration has any statistically significant impact on the speed 
48 
of convergence in production, so the first dependent variable is annual growth rate of per 
capita GDP in province i in year t. Because real GDP instead of nominal GDP is more 
economically meaningful, I used official nominal GDP and official GDP deflator (i.e., official 
annual growth rates of real GDP) to compute real per capita GDP and its growth rate for my 
analysis. Per capita GDP in current prices was converted into that in 2000 constant prices. For 
the national dynamic channel, I will test whether migration affect overall national inequality as a 
result of redistribution of capital and resources, so the second dependent variable is 
contribution share of province i in year t to national Theil Index. The formula is 
)log(log...)log(log)log(log 222111 mmm NWWNWWNWWT    
where mW  is income share of province m; mN  is population share of province m; 
)log(log mmmm NWWT  , which is the contribution share of province m to the national Theil 
Index.  
The independent variables are various province-level migration rates, which I illustrate 
below. Intraprovincial migration rate of province i in year t, indicating migration volumes within 
a province, is computed by dividing intraprovincial in-migration by the total population of the 
province. Intraprovincial in-migration and intraprovincial out-migration of the same province 
should be identical, theoretically, but are slightly different in real data. I use the in-migration 
numbers because, similar to trade data, migration receiving places are more likely to record 
migrant numbers accurately than are sending places. Interprovincial net migration rate of 
province i in year t is the difference of interprovincial in-migration and out-migration of a 
province, divided by the total population of the province. This measure shows the net effect of 
in-migration and out-migration on a province’s population. A positive value represents more 
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people entering the province than leaving it, while a negative value means more people leaving 
than entering. 
As indicated by the previous research, the patterns and trends of migration and its 
subsequent social and economic impacts differ between urban and rural areas. Therefore, in 
addition to the aggregate province-level migration variables, I also created migration variables 
for urban and rural areas, respectively, within a province. This is especially useful for studying 
human migration with both intra/interprovincial dimensions and urban/rural dimensions. Urban 
intraprovincial in-migration rate of province i in year t, indicating moves to urban areas within a 
province, is computed by dividing intraprovincial in-migration of urban areas by the urban 
population of the receiving province. Urban intraprovincial out-migration rate of province i in 
year t, indicating moves from urban areas within a province, is computed by dividing 
intraprovincial out-migration of urban areas by the urban population of the sending province. 
Rural intraprovincial in-migration rate of province i in year t, indicating moves to rural areas 
within a province, is computed by dividing intraprovincial in-migration of rural areas by the rural 
population of the receiving province. Rural intraprovincial out-migration rate of province i in 
year t, indicating moves out of rural areas within a province, is computed by dividing 
intraprovincial out-migration of rural areas by the rural population of the sending province. 
Urban interprovincial in-migration rate of province i in year t, indicating moves from all other 
provinces to urban areas of a province, is computed by dividing interprovincial in-migration of 
urban areas by the urban population of the receiving province. Urban interprovincial out-
migration rate of province i in year t, indicating moves from urban areas of a province to all 
other provinces, is computed by dividing interprovincial out-migration of urban areas by the 
urban population of the sending province. Rural interprovincial in-migration rate of province i in 
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year t, indicating moves from all other provinces to rural areas of a province, is computed by 
dividing interprovincial in-migration of rural areas by the rural population of the receiving 
province. Rural interprovincial out-migration rate of province i in year t, indicating moves from 
rural areas of a province to all other provinces, is computed by dividing interprovincial out-
migration of rural areas by the rural population of the sending province. Migration variables are 
log-transformed to reduce skewness and kurtosis, which will be discussed in the descriptive 
section of this chapter. 
In order to choose appropriate control variables that capture the “fundamentals” of the 
economy and incorporate China’s institutional characteristics, and which therefore should be 
included in convergence regressions, there are three basic criteria to follow: 1) the variables must 
be widely used in the existing literature; 2) they have to be exogenous, or the potential 
endogeneity bias must be avoided; and 3) they must be robust and consistently statistically 
significant in the literature (Phan, 2008). Numerous variables have been found to determine the 
long-run GDP growth rate or the differences in steady states (Cai et a., 2002; Sala-i-Martin, 
1996). Out of these variables, I chose the following province-specific control variables, in line 
with the literature (e.g., Cai et al., 2002; Candelaria et al., 2010; Phan, 2008; Sala-i-Martin, 
1997). 
An important variable in analyzing the economic growth path of areas toward their steady 
states is initial per capita GDP, which is measured as per capita GDP of province i in 1992, as 
the starting year for this study is 1992. Under the assumption that economies with lower initial 
economic development levels tend to grow at faster rates than economies with higher initial 
economic development levels, due to the diminishing returns to capital per worker, we expect 
initial per capita GDP to be negatively correlated with subsequent GDP growth rate (Cai et al., 
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2002). In the long run, poorer economies will catch up, and all economies should converge 
economically as they approach their steady states. This is known as β-convergence in the 
neoclassical growth model (see Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 2004). Unconditional or absolute β-
convergence means that poorer economies catch up with the richer ones even if the differences in 
the determinants of their steady states are not controlled in the convergence regression. These 
differences include investment rate, initial human capital level, population growth rate, 
productivity level, and technological growth rate. Conditional β-convergence regression models 
control for these differences (Phan, 2008). 
Initial mean years of schooling of working population of province i, in 1990, is used as a 
proxy of the initial level of human capital or labor quality. Cai, Wang, and Du (2002) noted that 
human capital, commonly measured by primary-school enrollment rate, secondary-school 
enrollment rate, or mean years of school, is considered a main determinant of differences in 
steady-state GDP across provinces. Primary- and secondary-school enrollment rates in China 
might generate distorted statistics in some provinces due to the suspension of birth control 
among ethnic minority groups, I choose to measure the initial level of human capital by mean 
years of schooling of working population. My calculation of mean years of schooling follows the 
most commonly used approach (see Barro & Lee, 1993, 2010). The formula is shown below. 
 
 
where MYS is mean years of schooling; alHS is proportion of the population in age group a for 
which the level of education l is the highest level attained; alYS is official duration of the level of 
education l for age group a at the time when this age group was in school. The group in my study 
is the working population and the highest educational levels they attained (and the durations) 
 
a l
alal YSHSMYS
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include illiterate or semi-illiterate (0 year), primary school (6 years), junior secondary school (9 
years), senior secondary school (12 years), and college or higher level (16 years).  
Employment rate of province i in year t is the share of employed persons in the total 
population of a province (i.e., employment-to-population ratio), which is assumed to be an 
indicator of labor market conditions and a key component of economic growth (Cai et al., 2002). 
Comparative labor productivity of province i in year t is defined as the ratio of labor 
productivity of the agricultural sector to labor productivity of the industrial sector, indicating the 
allocative efficiency of labor among sectors. Since agriculture is mainly concentrated in rural 
areas while industry is mostly located in urban areas, it is necessary to include comparative labor 
productivity in the regression equations. This is computed by dividing the agricultural value 
added (i.e., the primary industry GDP) by the agricultural labor forces to obtain the labor 
productivity of agriculture, and dividing the industrial value added (i.e., the secondary industry 
GDP) by the industrial labor forces to get the labor productivity of industry, and then computing 
their ratio. If the factor markets are perfect, movement of capital and labor between sectors will 
lead to equal value of marginal product for all factors, and the comparative productivity of 
agricultural labor will eventually equal 100%. On the other hand, if there are barriers to factor 
mobility (e.g., institutional or policy barriers) that hinder the mobility of capital and labor from 
the low-productivity agricultural sector to the high-productivity industrial sector, the 
comparative productivity of agricultural labor will be less than 100% (Cai et al., 2002). 
Investment rate of province i in year t is the proportion of total capital formation (i.e., 
total investment in fixed assets) in the provincial GDP. The higher the investment rate, the higher 
the expected economic growth rate. Cat et al. (2002) noted that the investment rate was highest 
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in the western region between 1978 and 1989, while it was highest in the eastern region between 
1990 and 1998. 
Government expenditure share of province i in year t is the ratio of local governments’ 
consumption expenditure to the provincial GDP. In general, the Chinese government expenditure 
level is highest in the western region and lowest in the eastern region of the country. A common 
assumption is that government intervention should have a negative effect on GDP growth (Barro, 
1998; Cai et al., 2002). 
Last but not least, I will introduce a time period dummy variable, which takes the value 0 
before the year 2000 and 1 in 2000 and later, and a series of migration x time period interaction 
terms (i.e., multiplying migration variables by time period) to test whether the effects of 
migration-independent variables on per capita GDP growth rate differ over time. 
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5.0  ANALYTIC METHODS 
5.1 RECIPROCAL CAUSALITY AND LAGGED INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
As discussed in the literature review section, the relationship between labor migration and 
regional economic inequality is of the “chicken or egg” variety (Richardson, 1978: 108–109; 
Fan, 2005). Similarly, the link between migration and regional economic growth rate may also 
be reciprocal. Labor migration induced by uneven regional development speed and spatial 
economic inequality could further affect economic growth rate and regional disparity. Thus, if I 
use a cross-sectional instead of a longitudinal dataset, I may not know the true causal direction 
between these interdependent variables, because it is possible that economic growth rate predicts 
migration rather than the other way around. In order to deal with this dual causality issue, one 
thing I can do is to determine the temporal order among the independent migration variables. To 
determine if the values of an independent variable predict the values of a dependent variable, the 
independent variable must be measured before the dependent variable (Inglehart & Welzel, 
2005; Kubichek, 2011). In my study, I should run statistical models with lagged values of 
migration to test whether changes in migration predict changes in GDP growth rate. In practice, I 
will take one-year lags of the independent migration variables in the regression equations and 
test how the lagged migration values affect the current growth rate values. 
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Additionally, there may be a spurious relationship between migration and GDP growth 
rate; that is, there may be other factors that cause both the variation in migration and the 
variation in growth rate. For instance, places with higher initial levels of economic development 
attract more incoming migrants but have relatively lower economic growth rates. In this case, it 
is the level of economic development in the starting year that impacts both in-migration flows 
and growth rates in the following years. Once one introduces the initial level of economic 
development (e.g., initial GDP per capita) into the model, the relationship between migration and 
growth rate might be weaker or even disappear, and thus their relationship could be spurious. 
Another possible causal relationship to consider is a chain relationship (Agresti & Finlay, 1997; 
Kubichek, 2011). For example, in-migration rates might affect levels of employment rates in the 
destination places, which in turn might affect local economic growth rates. In this case, 
employment rate might be an intervening variable, and the relationship between migration and 
growth rate might be weaker or even disappear once the level of employment rate is controlled. 
For both spurious and chain relationships, it is important to consider the temporal order of the 
main explanatory variables as described earlier, and which control variables theory and previous 
research would suggest including (Kubichek, 2011). 
5.2 OLS, FIXED EFFECTS, AND RANDOM EFFECTS 
Although ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is a widely used statistical method in social 
science research, it does have a few drawbacks regarding modeling longitudinal data. Some of 
the regular assumptions of OLS cannot be satisfied when applied to longitudinal data analysis. 
The first assumption of OLS is that error terms, with a mean of zero, are independent for all 
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entities and all times. Second, both error terms and the variability in error terms are uncorrelated 
with any of the independent variables. Third, the variance of the error terms remains constant 
across time or across entities—that is, the error residuals are homoskedastic. 
The inherent structure of longitudinal data violates all of the above assumptions. First, it 
is likely that the error terms of different time periods for the same entity are correlated. For 
instance, the error term for the growth rate of per capita GDP of Beijing in 1998 is likely to be 
related to the error term for the growth rate of per capita GDP of Beijing in 1999. Second, the 
residuals for longitudinal data may be heteroskedastic. For example, the variance in error terms 
may be larger in the 2000s than in the 1990s due to economic fluctuations, policy interventions, 
etc. Third, error terms may be correlated with some of the independent variables due to the 
unobserved, time-invariant characteristics associated with individual entities. For instance, it is 
possible that provinces with better weather conditions will attract more in-migrants than 
provinces with worse weather conditions. Since not all affecting variables such as weather 
conditions will be included in the regressions, these unmeasured or omitted time-invariant 
characteristics are treated as part of the error terms. If one uses OLS regression (also called 
pooled OLS regression for longitudinal data) for longitudinal data that does not satisfy the above 
assumptions, the standard errors of the regression coefficients might be increased and the results 
might be biased. A solution is to adopt either fixed- or random-effects models that allow for the 
heteroskedasticity of longitudinal data without introducing bias. Moreover, fixed-effects models 
allow for correlations between time-invariant, unit-specific errors and independent variables as 
well. 
Compared with classic OLS, fixed-effects models have a few advantages. Fixed-effects 
models allow one to control for time-invariant, unit-specific characteristics (e.g., unique features 
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of an individual nation, region, province, or district) for longitudinal datasets. These unique 
features can include a wide range of characteristics that one cannot directly measure, such as 
geographical attributes, cultural norms, weather conditions, or historical attributes of individual 
units. Fixed-effects regressions aggregate data from all time periods to estimate “average” 
coefficients that explain how the dependent variable changes with the independent variables over 
time. In fixed-effects models, an error term includes two parts: the time-invariant, unmeasured 
heterogeneity unique to each entity, and the idiosyncratic error for a random distribution. 
For my analysis in this chapter, the advantage of the fixed-effects model over OLS is that 
it allows me to estimate the effects of migration on GDP growth rate while controlling for 
unobserved province-specific characteristics. In the fixed-effects model, each province acts as its 
own control. In other words, fixed-effects regression essentially “differences out” time-invariant, 
between-province variation in migration variables. The between-province variation in migration 
variables may be confounded by unobserved features of each individual province, such as 
weather conditions or geographic attributes affecting the variations in migration and in GDP 
growth rate. Differencing out these unobserved characteristics allows me to more accurately 
estimate the true relationship between the independent and dependent variables and to generate 
unbiased estimators. 
In the meantime, I have to admit that there are several drawbacks of the fixed-effects 
model for my research. Since the fixed-effects model differences out all time-invariant, entity-
specific characteristics, I cannot directly estimate the effects of observable time-invariant 
variables on the dependent variable. For example, the fixed-effects model cannot be used to test 
unconditional or absolute β-convergence regression—that is, to estimate the impact of initial 
provincial per capita GDP on provincial annual growth rate. To solve this problem, I will use 
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OLS to test the β-convergence hypothesis and utilize both OLS and fixed-effect methods for all 
other equations to see whether the two methods generate statistically significantly different 
results. Similarly, I cannot estimate the effect of the time period dummy (the 1990s versus the 
2000s) on the GDP growth rate using the fixed-effects model. What I can do is include 
interaction terms of independent migration variables and the time period dichotomous variable, 
such as “urban interprovincial in-migration × time period dummy.” 
Another drawback of the fixed-effects model is that it usually produces larger p-values 
and standard errors than the random-effects model does. This is because the fixed-effects model 
uses only information on within-unit variation and discards information on between-unit 
variation. Therefore, if there is a lot of between-province variation in migration variables but not 
much within-province change over time, the fixed-effects coefficients are not likely to be 
statistically significant, though they are unbiased. To determine whether the less restrictive fixed-
effects method is preferred over the random-effects method, I will use the Hausman (1978) test 
of the null hypothesis that the random effects coefficients are identical to the fixed-effects 
coefficients (Allison, 2009). This basically tests whether unique errors are correlated with 
repressors; the null hypothesis is that they are not. If the null hypothesis is rejected, it suggests 
some evidence in favor of the fixed-effects model and against the random-effects model. 
5.3 INTERACTIONS WITH TIME AND STRUCTURAL EQUATIONS IN THE 
FIXED-EFFECTS METHOD 
It is important to account for the differences among the three geographic (and economic) regions 
of China—east, central, and west, also called the “three economic belts”—conceptualized in 
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China’s seventh Five-Year Plan (1985–1990). Each region has its own economic specialization 
and comparative advantage (Fan, 2005), and a large part of the changes in the spatial disparity in 
economic development in China can be attributed to the divergence between regions and the 
convergence within regions (Cai et al., 2002; Lin, Cai, and Li, 1997). For instance, during the 
early 2000s, per capita GDP for the eastern region was almost two times that of the central 
region and more than two times that of the western region; the gap between the central and 
western regions has also increased, but to a smaller degree (Fan, 2005). 
Therefore, I extend the baseline models to allow the coefficients for predictor variables to 
vary across regions and over time. A simple method is to include several interaction terms 
among the explanatory variables of interest in a single equation model. An interaction term is 
sometimes called a slope dummy variable. It is simply the multiplication of a dummy variable by 
a continuous (or ordinal) explanatory variable, which can be included as an additional 
explanatory variable in the regression model. The interaction term allows one to test for 
differences in the slope between different categories, as defined by the dummy variable (Castilla, 
2007). The slope of the relationship between dependent variable and independent variable could 
be different depending on whether the conditions specified by the multiplying dummies are met. 
For example, the effect of migration on spatial inequality may vary across regions and/or across 
time. This is in contrast to an intercept dummy variable, which changes the intercept but does not 
change the slope for different categories, as defined by the dummy variable. Now, suppose I am 
interested in estimating the following simple regression model, in which the dependent variable 
is Growth and there is only one explanatory variable of interest, Migration. For purposes of 
illustration, here I exclude all control variables that would unnecessarily complicate the 
discussion. 
60 
 
 
In addition, a possible regression model taking into account the variation of the effect of 
migration on growth across the two time periods is this: 
 
 
where an interaction term or slope dummy variable has been computed and included in 
the model as a new independent variable. Migration × Time equals explanatory variable 
Migration multiplied by dummy variable Time (0 for the time period 1992–1999, and 1 for the 
time period 2000–2008). A t-test for 2  helps to determine whether the difference in 1 slopes 
between time period 1990s and time period 2000s is significant. 
Alternatively, the model could test whether the effect of migration on growth differs 
between regions. Then the regression equation is this: 
where the central region is the reference group and has been dropped from the model. 
The model could get more complicated if one would like to test whether region-migration 
interaction effects change over time, or whether time-migration interaction effects change across 
regions. To test such hypotheses, one could include three-way interaction terms such as 
Migration × East × Time, which is the product of the variables Migration, Time Period Dummy, 
and East Region Dummy. The magnitude and significance of the coefficients of those three-way 
interaction terms would test for differences in the effects of migration variables on GDP growth 
rate across regions, as well as across time periods in the longitudinal regression model. The 
interpretation in practice of three-way interactions is more complicated than that of two-way 
interactions. For instance, the interaction term Migration × East × Time indicates whether the 
regional difference (between the eastern region and the reference region) in the effect of 
ititit MigrationGrowth   10
ititit TimeMigrationMigrationGrowth   210
ititit WestMigrationEastMigrationMigrationGrowth   3210
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migration on spatial inequality varies across time periods, or whether the time difference in the 
effect of migration on spatial inequality varies across regions. 
Since there are more than one main explanatory variable in most of my regression models 
(e.g., urban intraprovincial in-migration, rural intraprovincial in-migration, urban intraprovincial 
out-migration, and rural intraprovincial out-migration in one equation), incorporating interaction 
terms for multiple independent variables timing three regions as well as two time periods would 
make the statistical results very complicated to interpret. In this case, structural equations 
modeling (SEM) or simultaneous equations modeling (sometimes also called path analysis) are 
recommended. The main advantage of SEM for longitudinal analysis is to allow model 
coefficients to vary across panels (or groups of panels) and/or over time in a deterministic 
manner (Castilla, 2007). To build a system of structural equations for the analysis in this chapter, 
I can specify a causal model and estimate such a model simultaneously either for different 
regions or for different time periods. Since the dominant component of this chapter is temporal, 
and fewer interaction terms lead to more degrees of freedom, I will adopt a region-wise SEM 
instead of a period-wise one, as specified in the following section. 
5.4 MODEL SPECIFICATION 
For the analysis of longitudinal data in this chapter, like most convergence researchers, I will 
first test the standard unconditional or absolute convergence regression—whether initial GDP 
level plays a role in determining subsequent growth rates. Next, I will investigate conditional 
convergence by first adding control variables to the equation and then adding the main migration 
explanatory variables. I will estimate the models in such a way that previous models are nested 
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within subsequent models. This will allow me to test different hypotheses and use the F-statistics 
to determine whether a subsequent model is statistically significantly different or better than its 
previous model. Also, I will implement both pooled OLS and fixed effects and check to see 
whether the latter is superior to the former for longitudinal data modeling, as predicted 
theoretically. Moreover, I will run a Hausman test to decide between fixed or random effects. If 
the null hypothesis—that the preferred model is random effects versus the alternative fixed 
effects—is rejected, I will adopt the less-restrictive fixed-effects method for subsequent SEM 
equations. 
The last step is to estimate the SEM for three geographic and economic regions—east, 
central, and west. Specifically, I have thirty-one provinces or cases, which are grouped into three 
regions (groups of cases) in the sample whose dominant component is temporal. The system of 
equations can be specified as follows: 
 
where:  
tiY , = Annual growth rate of per capita GDP of province i in year t 
1, tiM = Migration rate variables of province i in year t-1 (lagged) 
tiE , = Employment rate of province i in year t 
tiP , = Comparative productivity of agricultural labor of province i in year t 
tiI , = Investment rate of province i in year t 
tiG , = Government budget expenditure share of province i in year t 
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iT = 0 for the time period 1992–1999, 1 for the time period 2000–2008 
The first equation in the SEM is for the eastern region; the second equation is for the 
central region; and the last equation is for the western region. The eastern region includes the 
provinces of Liaoning, Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian, 
Guangdong, Guangxi, and Hainan. The central region includes Heilongjiang, Jilin, Inner 
Mongolia, Shanxi, Henan, Anhui, Hubei, Jiangxi, and Hunan. The western region includes 
Xinjiang, Qinghai, Tibet, Ningxia, Gansu, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Chongqing, Guizhou, and Yunnan. 
The coefficients to be estimated are hypothesized to be different for each region. The error terms 
of the different equations are correlated with each other. This model is referred to as the 
seemingly unrelated regression equations model, since the relationships among each of the 
different equations are not explicit. Rather, such relations come from the correlations that might 
exist among the error terms for each of the regression equations in the system. In other words, 
the equations in the system are related through the random errors (Castilla, 2007). 
The system of equations will be estimated simultaneously or jointly, since it is efficient to 
do so, particularly when the error terms are significantly correlated. If the error terms of different 
regression equations are not significantly correlated, the simultaneous estimation of the systems 
of equations is still accurate, and it is exactly the same as the independent estimation of each of 
the regression equations using classic OLS technique (Castilla, 2007). 
In this way, I can determine whether the coefficients differ across time based on the 
testing results of the interaction terms, and across regions based on the cross-model testing 
results for the SEM. Although it is possible to test whether the impact of a particular independent 
variable on the dependent variable is the same for all groups of units, a common type of test to 
perform in research using SEM is the Chow test, which helps to discover whether all regression 
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coefficients (including constant terms) are equal for different groups of units (Castilla, 2007). 
Based on the result of the significance of the 2 statistic, one can reject or not reject the null 
hypothesis that all equation coefficients do not vary across groups. If the null hypothesis is 
rejected, it confirms that estimating one equation for each group simultaneously is what one 
should do. If the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, meaning there is no difference in the 
coefficients across different groups of units, it probably makes more sense to estimate just one 
equation for all units combined. For my study in particular, I will use the Chow test to find out 
whether all coefficients vary across regions—in other words, whether it is necessary to use SEM 
for different regions instead of the pooled OLS. 
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Figure 5.1 Provincial-Level Administrative Units and Three Regions in China 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Fan 2005. 
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6.0  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
6.1 SUMMARY STATISTICS OF CONTINUOUS DEPENDENT, INDEPENDENT, 
AND CONTROL VARIABLES 
Table 6.1 reports the overall summary statistics of all continuous dependent, independent, and 
control variables (unlogged and logged) that I use in this study. Table 6.2 reports the summary 
statistics of all continuous variables (unlogged and logged) by time period and geographic 
region. The average per capita GDP in China across years (1992–2008) and provinces is 
10551.22 RMB, with standard deviation of 10306.3 RMB. Guizhou Province has the lowest per 
capita GDP of all the provinces in 1992 at 1034 RMB, while Shanghai has the highest in 2008 at 
73124 RMB. The distribution of per capita GDP is positively skewed with a skewness of 2.57 
(greater than 0), and the Kurtosis is 11.42, which is problematic (greater than 10). After taking 
the natural log of the per capita GDP to normalize the distribution, the skewness dropped from 
2.57 to 0.2, and the Kurtosis dropped from 11.42 to 2.7. The mean value of logged per capita 
GDP across years and provinces is 8.92, and the standard deviation is 0.82, which is much less 
than the mean. For the period 1992–1999, the average per capita GDP for the eastern region is 
8232.9 RMB, more than twice that of the central region (3841.03 RMB) or the western region 
(3181.55 RMB). The standard deviation for the east is 5182.66 RMB, more than three times of 
that for the central (1503.3 RMB) or for the west (1266.37 RMB). From the 1990s to the 2000s, 
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the average per capita GDP increased dramatically for all three regions, but the regional 
disparities remained the same. The average per capita GDP and its variation for the east are still 
much larger compared with those of the central or the west. 
The average province-wise annual growth rate of per capita GDP is 15.95%, which is 
consistent with what has been documented in the existing literature. For the majority of the 
observations, the annual growth rate of per capita GDP falls between about 8% and 24% (mean 
minus and plus one standard deviation). Guangxi Province has the lowest average annual per 
capita GDP growth rate of all provinces in 1999 at 2.25%, and Fujian has the highest average 
growth rate in 1994 at 46.03%. The skewness of this variable is 0.82, and the Kurtosis is 3.52; 
both are low, so there is no need for transformation. For the time period 1992–1999, the eastern 
region has the highest average growth rate at 18.79%, followed by the central region at 17.33% 
and the western region at 16.14%. The average economic growth rates decrease from the 1990s 
to the 2000s for all three regions. The decline of the average growth rate of per capita GDP in the 
east is the greatest among the three, indicating the convergence trend across regions over time. 
For the period 2000–2008, the central region has the highest average growth rate at 15.79%, 
followed by the west at 14.65% and the east at 14%. As indicated by the regional standard 
deviations, the variations in growth rates within regions drops by about half from the 1990s to 
the 2000s, which shows the convergence trend within geographic regions over years. 
Migration-independent variables are predictably positively skewed. Some have high 
Kurtosis compared with 3.0 for a normal distribution, suggesting that for these variables there is 
a clump of cases concentrated in one part of the distribution (e.g., the rural intraprovincial out-
migration rate has a Kurtosis of 25.99, and the urban interprovincial in-migration rate has a 
Kurtosis of 47.96). A Kurtosis greater than 10 is considered somewhat problematic, and very 
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serious if it is more than 20 (Acock, 2006). Hence, I normalize all the migration variables by 
taking their natural logs. I will estimate the log-transformed migration rates in the statistical 
models; this functional form is sometimes called the semi-log form, in which some but not all of 
the variables (dependent and independent) are expressed by their natural logs (Studenmund, 
1997). 
From Table 6.1, one can see that, taking all provinces and years together, the mean value 
of the intraprovincial migration rate (1.24%) is much higher than that of either the interprovincial 
in-migration rate (0.33%) or the interprovincial out-migration rate (0.27%). In other words, 
population movements within provinces are more active than movements between provinces. As 
for intraprovincial migration, the largest component is movement into urban areas (averaging 
1.95%), followed by movement out of urban areas (averaging 1.49%) and movement out of rural 
areas (averaging 1.24%). For migration going beyond provincial borders, a large proportion is 
into and out of urban areas (0.67% and 0.45% on average, respectively). These findings are 
consistent with those in the previous migration research literature. As Zhao (2005) argues, rural-
to-urban migration is the most important form of migration in China, followed by urban-to-urban 
and rural-to-rural migration. Empirical research has been largely concentrated on the rural-to-
urban migration form, while research on other forms is still quite limited. 
For the period 1992–1999, the average intraprovincial migration rate was higher in the 
west (1.39%) and central (1.38%) regions than in the east (1.02%). Within each region, urban in-
migration was again the major component of intraprovincial migration. As for interprovincial 
population movement between 1992 and 1999, the eastern region had a higher average 
interprovincial in-migration rate (0.35%) than the western (0.22%) or central (0.21%) regions, 
while the average interprovincial out-migration rates were almost the same for all the three 
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regions. Urban interprovincial in-migration accounted for the largest proportion of overall 
interprovincial migration for all three regions during the 1990s. As indicated by the mean value 
of the interprovincial net migration rates for the 1990s, most of the eastern provinces 
experienced a net increase in population through migration, while the gains and the losses of 
population due to migration almost canceled each other out for the remainder of the country. 
Comparing the migration patterns in the 2000s with those in the 1990s, one finds that 
intraprovincial migration decreases for both the eastern and central regions but increases for the 
western region, so the west still has the highest average intraprovincial migration rate (1.65%), 
followed by the central region (1.24%) and then the east (0.89%), for the 2000s. Urban 
intraprovincial in-migration was still the most important component of overall intraprovincial 
migration for the 2000s. Average interprovincial in- and out-migration rates increased from the 
1990s to the 2000s for all regions, but the increase in the west was greater than that of the central 
region, so the average interprovincial in-migration rate of the west turned out to be higher than 
that of the central region for the 2000–2008 time period. The urban interprovincial out-migration 
rate was higher than the urban interprovincial in-migration rate for the central region in the 
2000s, and the rural interprovincial out-migration rate was also higher than the rural 
interprovincial in-migration rate for the central region in the 2000s. The east still experienced 
positive average net migration through interprovincial migration, but the patterns of 
interprovincial net migration in the 2000s are different from those of the 1990s for the rest of the 
country; during the 2000s the central region started to lose people, while the western region 
began to gain them. 
The mean per capita GDP in the starting year (1992) is 3205.81 RMB. However, there is 
quite a bit of spread about the mean, as the standard deviation is 2049.35 RMB. This means that 
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the initial per capita GDP is between about 1156 and 5255 RMB for 68% of the cases across 
provinces and time. The province with the lowest observed initial per capita GDP is Guizhou 
(1234 RMB), while the province with the highest is Shanghai (11061 RMB). The eastern region 
has the highest average initial per capita GDP at 4912.76 RMB, followed by the central region at 
2296.49 RMB and then the western region at 1975.85 RMB. However, the variation of the initial 
GDP for the east is the greatest, too—almost five times that of the other regions, indicating that 
large disparities existed even among provinces within the eastern region in the early 1990s. As I 
mentioned in the data sources section, Deng Xiaoping made his famous southern tour of China in 
1992, as a method of reasserting his economic policy and reformist platform. Prior to that, there 
were only a few economic (and political) centers in the eastern coastal area, such as the “Golden 
Triangle” region surrounding Shanghai, and most inland areas were still seriously 
underdeveloped. As shown in Figure 6.1, the provinces with the highest initial level of per capita 
GDP (e.g., Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, and Guangdong) are all located in the eastern region, 
while those with the lowest initial GDP levels (e.g., Guizhou, Gansu, and Tibet) are mostly in the 
western region. There is a negative but weak relationship between the initial per capita GDP and 
the average annual growth rate of per capita GDP between 1992 and 2008, which suggests that 
the standard convergence—faster growth speeds of per capita GDP for poorer economies 
compared with those for richer ones, leading to catch-up in levels of per capita GDP—might 
exist with a low chance in China. As with most income-related variables in social science 
research, the initial per capita GDP is very positively skewed, so I transformed it into the form of 
its natural log. 
As a reasonable proxy for initial human capital endowment, the mean years of schooling 
of working population in 1990 has a mean of 6.8 years and a standard deviation of 1.44 years. 
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This means that the majority of observations of initial mean years of schooling of working 
population are between 5.36 and 8.24 years. The province with the lowest initial level of human 
capital is Tibet (2.44 years), while the province with the highest initial human capital is Beijing 
(9.87 years), followed by Shanghai and Tianjin. The eastern region has the highest initial mean 
years of schooling of working population at 7.68, followed by the central region at 7.09 and then 
the western region at 5.49. As also shown in figures 6.4—6.6, the provinces with the highest 
initial educational levels (e.g., Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Liaoning) are mainly located in 
the eastern region, while the provinces with the lowest levels (e.g., Tibet, Gansu, Qinghai, 
Guizhou, Ningxia, and Yunnan) are mostly located in the western region. There is a positive but 
weak relationship between the initial level of human capital and the average growth rate of per 
capita GDP between 1992 and 2008, which is in line with classical convergence theory. 
The average employment rate for all the provinces and all the years is 52.81%, and the 
standard deviation is 6.32%, which is much lower than the mean. Xinjiang has the lowest 
employment rate of all provinces in 2000 at 36.36%, and Shanghai has the highest employment 
rate of all provinces in 2008 at 75.72%. The employment rate is highest in the eastern region and 
lowest in the central region for both the 1990s and the 2000s, and it increased from the 1990s to 
the 2000s for all regions. It is intuitive that migrant receiving places tend to have higher levels of 
employment and lower rates of unemployment, as a pull factor to attract incoming migrants. 
Also, migrant workers tend to have their jobs arranged through networking with their relatives 
and friends before they move, making it very unlikely for them to be unemployed in their 
destination places (Guest, 1998; Phan, 2008). The employment rate is not skewed in my data, so 
there is no need for any transformation. 
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The mean value of the comparative productivity of agricultural labor for all provinces 
and years is 18.49%, and the standard deviation is 8.2%. Guizhou has the lowest mean value 
(3.66%) in 2004, and Beijing has the highest mean value (54.88%) in 1992. The mean 
comparative productivity of agricultural labor in the country as a whole is much less than 100%, 
meaning that factor markets in China are imperfect and there must be institutional and policy 
barriers hindering the mobility of capital and labor from the low-productivity agricultural sector 
to the high-productivity industrial sector (Cai, Wang, and Du, 2002). The comparative 
productivity of agricultural labor in the western region was lower than that in the central or 
eastern regions for both time periods, suggesting a greater misallocation of capital and labor in 
the west. As noted by Cai, Wang, and Du (2002), since the beginning of the market reforms in 
late 1970s, the agricultural-industrial productivity gap narrowed until the mid-1990s. During the 
late 1990s, the rapid slowdown of township and village enterprise (TVE) growth led to a sharp 
decrease in agricultural out-migration, and even some reverse labor migration back into the 
agricultural sector. This trend is reflected in Table 6.2. The comparative productivity of 
agricultural labor declined from the 1990s to the 2000s for the country as a whole, with the 
decline being most severe in the central region (down 11.54%). The comparative productivity of 
agricultural labor is slightly positively skewed, but its skewness is not large enough to require a 
transformation. 
The mean value of investment rate is 41.05%, and the standard deviation is 12.91% for 
the whole country. For the period 1992–1999, investment rate was highest in the east (37.68%) 
and lowest in the central region (29.07%). This pattern changed for the period 2000–2008, 
during which investment rate was highest in the west (55.88%) and lowest in the east (40.68%). 
In other words, the speed of investment growth was higher in the west and central regions than in 
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the east, which is partly due to the Western Development Program launched by the State Council 
in January 2000 to boost the economic development of the twelve provinces in western China. 
The main purpose of this policy was to help the lagging western region catch up to the eastern 
region. The investment rate is slightly positively skewed, but not so much that it requires 
normalization. 
The mean value of government expenditure share is 15.21%, and the standard deviation 
is 11.01%. For the whole country and all years, Jiangsu has the lowest government expenditure 
share in 1995 at 4.92%, and Tibet has the highest expenditure share in 2008 at 96.15%. For all 
years, the government expenditure share is highest in the western region and lowest in the 
eastern region. The percentage of share increased over time for all regions, with the western 
region increasing the most (at 9.07%), which again might result from the Western Development 
Program. The government expenditure share also has positive skewness within an acceptable 
range. 
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Table 6.1 Overall Summary Statistics of Continuous Variables (Unlogged and Logged) 
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis 
 
Per capita GDP (RMB) 9834.84 8648.11 1580.79 62812.67 2.51 11.04 
ln(per capita GDP) 8.92 0.71 7.37 11.05 0.44 2.80 
Annual growth rate of per capita GDP (%) 10.74 3.28 2.10 39.00 1.82 14.00 
Intraprovincial migration rate (%) 1.24 0.56 0.05 5.19 2.24 14.52 
ln(intraprovincial migration rate) 0.10 0.57 -2.92 1.65 -2.51 13.79 
Urban intraprovincial in-migration rate (%) 1.95 1.04 0.03 7.91 0.72 4.88 
ln(urban intraprovincial in-migration rate) 0.45 0.81 -3.62 2.07 -2.04 8.68 
Urban intraprovincial out-migration rate (%) 1.49 0.90 0.01 7.11 1.41 8.29 
ln(urban intraprovincial out-migration rate) 0.13 0.92 -4.79 1.96 -2.12 9.23 
Rural intraprovincial in-migration rate (%) 1.05 0.73 0.01 5.37 2.16 9.37 
ln(rural intraprovincial in-migration rate) -0.17 0.75 -4.33 1.68 -1.72 10.87 
Rural intraprovincial out-migration rate (%) 1.06 0.74 0.02 5.42 2.42 10.44 
ln(rural intraprovincial out-migration rate) -0.13 0.65 -3.86 1.69 -1.07 8.89 
Interprovincial in-migration rate (%) 0.33 0.25 0.04 1.40 2.03 6.98 
ln(interprovincial in-migration rate) -1.33 0.64 -3.31 0.34 0.39 3.15 
Interprovincial out-migration rate (%) 0.27 0.12 0.08 0.73 0.92 3.53 
ln(interprovincial out-migration rate) -1.41 0.42 -2.57 -0.32 0.09 2.27 
Net interprovincial migration rate (%) 0.06 0.21 -0.34 1.06 2.18 8.30 
ln(net interprovincial migration rate) -2.56 1.49 -9.34 0.06 -0.69 4.34 
Urban interprovincial in-migration rate (%) 0.67 0.85 0.05 9.78 5.94 47.96 
ln(urban interprovincial in-migration rate) -0.71 0.74 -2.99 2.28 0.07 5.57 
Urban interprovincial out-migration rate (%) 0.45 0.27 0.06 2.44 2.66 14.97 
ln(urban interprovincial out-migration rate) -0.95 0.58 -2.80 0.89 -0.82 5.44 
Rural interprovincial in-migration rate (%) 0.16 0.14 0.02 0.91 2.56 11.22 
ln(rural interprovincial in-migration rate) -2.05 0.67 -4.07 -0.09 0.32 3.30 
Rural interprovincial out-migration rate (%) 0.19 0.14 0.00 1.16 2.47 13.26 
ln(rural interprovincial out-migration rate) -1.89 0.76 -6.09 0.15 -1.56 9.63 
Initial per capita GDP (1992) 3961.75 2692.83 1580.79 13543.58 2.40 8.43 
ln(initial per capita GDP) 8.14 0.50 7.37 9.51 1.12 4.02 
Mean years of schooling of working pop. (1990) 6.80 1.44 2.44 9.87 -0.49 4.29 
Employment rate (%) 52.81 6.32 36.36 75.72 0.09 3.20 
Comparative labor productivity (%) 18.55 8.74 3.67 62.69 1.07 4.69 
Investment rate (%) 41.05 12.91 21.81 87.30 1.05 3.67 
Government expenditure share (%) 15.21 11.01 4.92 96.15 3.85 21.49 
 
Sources: Author’s calculation based on China Statistical Yearbook (1993), China National Population Statistics by 
County (Volumes 1993–2009), and Compilation of Statistics on the 60 Years of New China (2009). 
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Table 6.2 Summary Statistics of Continuous Variables (Unlogged & Logged) by Time Period & Region 
 
1992–1999 
 
East 
 
Central 
 
West 
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
 
Per capita GDP (RMB) 9112.66 5425.15 
 
4190.98 1220.16 
 
3527.74 1111.45 
ln(per capita GDP) 8.96 0.55 
 
8.30 0.29 
 
8.12 0.32 
Annual growth rate of per capita GDP (%) 12.13 5.09 
 
10.06 2.47 
 
8.96 2.51 
Intraprovincial migration rate (%) 1.02 0.33 
 
1.38 0.24 
 
1.39 0.38 
ln(intraprovincial migration rate) -0.06 0.43 
 
0.31 0.18 
 
0.29 0.26 
Urban intraprovincial in-migration rate (%) 1.87 1.30 
 
2.27 0.81 
 
2.03 0.95 
ln(urban intraprovincial in-migration rate) 0.22 1.05 
 
0.76 0.35 
 
0.60 0.47 
Urban intraprovincial out-migration rate (%) 1.41 1.10 
 
1.71 0.61 
 
1.48 0.84 
ln(urban intraprovincial out-migration rate) -0.21 1.30 
 
0.48 0.34 
 
0.25 0.52 
Rural intraprovincial in-migration rate (%) 1.08 0.83 
 
1.26 0.82 
 
1.30 0.43 
ln(rural intraprovincial in-migration rate) -0.19 0.77 
 
0.10 0.47 
 
0.21 0.32 
Rural intraprovincial out-migration rate (%) 1.22 0.95 
 
1.28 0.93 
 
1.24 0.39 
ln(rural intraprovincial out-migration rate) -0.07 0.77 
 
0.09 0.51 
 
0.16 0.33 
Interprovincial in-migration rate (%) 0.35 0.28 
 
0.21 0.08 
 
0.22 0.17 
ln(interprovincial in-migration rate) -1.29 0.69 
 
-1.64 0.40 
 
-1.72 0.66 
Interprovincial out-migration rate (%) 0.23 0.11 
 
0.21 0.08 
 
0.22 0.09 
ln(interprovincial out-migration rate) -1.56 0.41 
 
-1.64 0.35 
 
-1.59 0.41 
Net interprovincial migration rate (%) 0.12 0.20 
 
0.00 0.06 
 
0.00 0.14 
ln(net interprovincial migration rate) -2.39 1.28 
 
-3.55 1.33 
 
-2.91 1.91 
Urban interprovincial in-migration rate (%) 0.79 0.72 
 
0.39 0.15 
 
0.47 0.28 
ln(urban interprovincial in-migration rate) -0.59 0.91 
 
-1.00 0.33 
 
-1.03 0.85 
Urban interprovincial out-migration rate (%) 0.45 0.31 
 
0.32 0.05 
 
0.41 0.22 
ln(urban interprovincial out-migration rate) -1.00 0.71 
 
-1.15 0.17 
 
-1.13 0.80 
Rural interprovincial in-migration rate (%) 0.16 0.14 
 
0.18 0.22 
 
0.15 0.15 
ln(rural interprovincial in-migration rate) -2.08 0.67 
 
-2.10 0.81 
 
-2.17 0.69 
Rural interprovincial out-migration rate (%) 0.16 0.12 
 
0.22 0.24 
 
0.18 0.08 
ln(rural interprovincial out-migration rate) -2.09 0.66 
 
-1.88 0.78 
 
-1.79 0.38 
Initial per capita GDP (1992) 5928.36 3414.79 
 
2909.11 704.66 
 
2549.19 722.20 
ln(initial per capita GDP) 8.55 0.51 
 
7.95 0.22 
 
7.81 0.26 
Mean years of schooling of working pop. (1990) 7.68 1.10 
 
7.09 0.85 
 
5.49 1.29 
Employment rate (%) 53.81 5.72 
 
49.53 4.70 
 
51.97 5.66 
Comparative labor productivity (%) 25.65 8.71 
 
28.41 8.40 
 
16.37 4.13 
Investment rate (%) 37.68 9.95 
 
29.07 4.56 
 
36.63 8.62 
Government expenditure share (%) 8.99 2.38  10.16 2.23  18.27 13.19 
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Table 6.2 Continued 
 
2000–2008 
 
East 
 
Central 
 
West 
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
 
Per capita GDP (RMB) 20791.57 12071.76 
 
9856.43 3834.80 
 
7559.07 2625.21 
ln(per capita GDP) 9.78 0.57 
 
9.13 0.36 
 
8.87 0.36 
Annual growth rate of per capita GDP (%) 10.80 2.34 
 
11.85 3.04 
 
10.34 1.97 
Intraprovincial migration rate (%) 0.89 0.61 
 
1.24 0.29 
 
1.65 0.81 
ln(intraprovincial migration rate) -0.37 0.88 
 
0.19 0.23 
 
0.41 0.43 
Urban intraprovincial in-migration rate (%) 1.42 1.08 
 
1.90 0.50 
 
2.38 0.99 
ln(urban intraprovincial in-migration rate) -0.03 1.11 
 
0.61 0.26 
 
0.75 0.53 
Urban intraprovincial out-migration rate (%) 1.17 0.97 
 
1.42 0.40 
 
1.85 0.99 
ln(urban intraprovincial out-migration rate) -0.28 1.21 
 
0.31 0.28 
 
0.45 0.63 
Rural intraprovincial in-migration rate (%) 0.60 0.53 
 
0.86 0.39 
 
1.33 0.88 
ln(rural intraprovincial in-migration rate) -0.83 0.98 
 
-0.25 0.44 
 
0.15 0.48 
Rural intraprovincial out-migration rate (%) 0.69 0.55 
 
0.84 0.36 
 
1.21 0.79 
ln(rural intraprovincial out-migration rate) -0.63 0.80 
 
-0.26 0.40 
 
0.06 0.47 
Interprovincial in-migration rate (%) 0.50 0.36 
 
0.27 0.09 
 
0.34 0.19 
ln(interprovincial in-migration rate) -0.91 0.66 
 
-1.38 0.33 
 
-1.23 0.56 
Interprovincial out-migration rate (%) 0.29 0.11 
 
0.33 0.11 
 
0.32 0.12 
ln(interprovincial out-migration rate) -1.32 0.35 
 
-1.18 0.35 
 
-1.24 0.43 
Net interprovincial migration rate (%) 0.22 0.31 
 
-0.06 0.07 
 
0.02 0.16 
ln(net interprovincial migration rate) -1.82 1.17 
 
-4.20 1.29 
 
-2.63 1.40 
Urban interprovincial in-migration rate (%) 1.17 1.60 
 
0.43 0.16 
 
0.60 0.30 
ln(urban interprovincial in-migration rate) -0.30 0.85 
 
-0.90 0.35 
 
-0.63 0.48 
Urban interprovincial out-migration rate (%) 0.53 0.40 
 
0.48 0.18 
 
0.46 0.18 
ln(urban interprovincial out-migration rate) -0.83 0.61 
 
-0.79 0.34 
 
-0.86 0.45 
Rural interprovincial in-migration rate (%) 0.13 0.08 
 
0.16 0.08 
 
0.20 0.12 
ln(rural interprovincial in-migration rate) -2.20 0.67 
 
-1.96 0.49 
 
-1.79 0.62 
Rural interprovincial out-migration rate (%) 0.14 0.09 
 
0.23 0.12 
 
0.24 0.10 
ln(rural interprovincial out-migration rate) -2.32 1.11 
 
-1.58 0.46 
 
-1.51 0.44 
Initial per capita GDP (1992) 5928.36 3412.80 
 
2909.11 704.11 
 
2549.19 721.69 
ln(initial per capita GDP) 8.55 0.51 
 
7.95 0.22 
 
7.81 0.26 
Mean years of schooling of working pop. (1990) 7.68 1.10 
 
7.09 0.85 
 
5.49 1.29 
Employment rate (%) 55.93 7.23 
 
51.03 6.02 
 
53.00 5.89 
Comparative labor productivity 16.65 4.60 
 
15.34 6.37 
 
10.21 3.91 
Investment rate (%) 40.68 8.51 
 
44.08 14.08 
 
55.88 12.41 
Government expenditure share (%) 12.31 3.69  14.43 2.80  27.34 17.26 
 
Sources: Author’s calculation based on China Statistical Yearbook (1993), China National Population Statistics by 
County (Volumes 1993–2009), and Compilation of Statistics on the 60 Years of New China (2009). 
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Figure 6.1 Relationship between Economic Growth Rate and Initial Economic Condition by Province for 
1992-2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Relationship between Economic Growth Rate and Initial Economic Condition by Province for 
1992-1999 
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Figure 6.3 Relationship between Economic Growth Rate and Initial Economic Condition by Province for 
2000-2008 
Figure 6.4 Relationship between Economic Growth Rate and Initial Human Capital by Province for 
1992-2008 
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Figure 6.5 Relationship between Economic Growth Rate and Initial Human Capital by Province for 
1992-1999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.6 Relationship between Economic Growth Rate and Initial Human Capital by Province for 
2000-2008 
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6.2 PATTERNS AND TRENDS OF REGIONAL GROWTH AND ECONOMIC 
INEQUALITY 
Using per capita GDP as a proxy of the level of economic development, figure 6.7 illustrates the 
trend in three commonly used indices of interprovincial inequality—the Gini Coefficient, the 
Theil Entropy Index, and the Coefficient of Variation (CV)—over the period 1992–2008. All 
three measures are popularly used in the literature on regional inequality in China. The Gini 
Coefficient is the most commonly used measure of inequality. The coefficient varies between 0, 
indicating complete equality, and 1, reflecting complete inequality (one person holds all the 
income or consumption, and all others have none). The CV is a distribution’s standard deviation 
divided by its mean. It is commonly used and fairly easy to understand, but is sensitive to 
outliers (Fan & Sun, 2008). A shared disadvantage of both the Gini Coefficient and CV is that 
they measure the overall inequality and are not additive across different groups (i.e., the total 
Gini of an economy is not equal to the sum of the Ginis for its subgroups). The Theil Index is 
less popular and less intuitive than the Gini Coefficient for measuring income inequality, but it 
has the important advantage of being additive across subgroups in a society and is thus more 
easily decomposable than other inequality measures (World Bank). I will take advantage of this 
property of the Theil Index to depict the inequalities among and within regions and their 
contributions to the total inequality. 
As one can see in figure 6.7, the three indices all show a similar trend of interprovincial 
economic inequality over the period 1992–2008. Interprovincial inequality increases with 
fluctuation between 1992 and 1999; remains relatively stable, with only a slight increase, from 
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about 1999 to about 2004; and then declines after 2004. According to figure 6.8, the increased 
interprovincial inequality between 1992 and 2004 can be explained by the enlarged gap between 
the eastern region and the central and western regions combined. After 2004, increasing 
interregional disparities are offset by the decline in intraregional inequality in the eastern region, 
so the overall interprovincial inequality declines. The relative levels and pace of change of 
interprovincial inequality, however, vary among the three measures. The Theil Index reveals a 
more rapid increase of inequality during the 1990s than the other two indices. 
Figure 6.8 decomposes the Theil Index of regional disparity into its intraregional (i.e., 
intraeast, intracentral, and intrawest) and interregional components for the period 1992–2008. 
These components’ contributions to the overall Theil Index vary over time. The contribution 
share of intraregional inequality to overall inequality (73%) is considerably higher than that of 
interregional inequality (27%) in the initial year of 1992. The share of interregional inequality 
increases while the share of intraregional inequality declines during the 1990s; their shares 
remain quite stable during the 2000s. In 2008, the contribution share of intraregional inequality 
to total national inequality decreases to 63%, while the share of interregional inequality rises to 
37%, indicating the increased importance of interregional inequality in determining the change in 
overall interprovincial inequality. 
Further decomposition of intraregional inequality into intraeast, intracentral, and 
intrawest components shows that inequality within the eastern region is considerably higher than 
inequality within the other two regions and remains the major component of overall intraregional 
inequality. The contribution share of intraeast inequality is over 50% in 1992, but declines 
gradually over time. In the western region, intraregional inequality is small and exhibits an 
overall decline. Inequality within the central region is also small and experiences some 
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fluctuation, but largely remains at the same level over the entire study period. Specifically, the 
intracentral contribution is 9.56% of the total inequality in 1992; it drops from 9.56% to 5.99% 
between 1992 and 2000, and then rises again to 11.8% in 2008. The intrawest contribution is at 
its highest level (13.1%) in 1992 and decreases gradually after that, with slight fluctuation during 
the 2000s, to reach 9.79% in 2008. The intraeast contribution is also at its highest point in 1992 
at 50.5% and drops continually to 41.2% in 2008. The interregional contribution is 26.9% in 
1992, then peaks at 38.3% in 2006, before decreasing slightly to 37.2% in 2008. 
Figure 6.9 reveals the trajectories of national and regional per capita GDP over time. The 
eastern region has experienced greatest growth in per capita GDP among the three regions since 
1992, and the gap between the eastern region and the central and western regions combined 
expands throughout the remainder of the study period. Obviously, this gap contributes to the 
increase in interprovincial and interregional inequalities during the 1990s. During the 2000s, the 
divergence between regions is offset by the convergence within the eastern region, as the old 
economic core areas in the northeast experienced a slowdown of economic development, and the 
previously less-developed areas in the southeast experienced rapid economic growth (Fan, 2005). 
Table 6.3 highlights interprovincial, interregional, and intraregional economic inequality 
by revealing variations in the level and growth rate of provincial per capita GDP over the two 
time periods 1992–1999 and 2000–2008. I also include the rank of each province’s per capita 
GDP and its growth rate over each of the two periods, which sheds light on the geography of 
economic development by identifying the leaders and followers at specific time periods (Fan & 
Sun, 2008). Between 1992 and 1999, the average annual per capita GDP for the eastern region 
(7549.26 RMB) is almost twice of that of the central (3982.15 RMB) or the western (3338.45 
RMB) regions, and the gap between the central and the western regions is relatively small. Nine 
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of the top ten average per capita GDP levels belong to eastern provinces; Heilongjiang, a central 
province, ranked tenth. The average annual growth rate of per capita GDP for the eastern region 
is 12.05%—much higher than that of the central (9.94%) and the western (9.13%) regions. 
Again, there is not much difference in growth rate between the two inland regions. 
Within the eastern region, the three centrally administered municipalities—Shanghai, 
Beijing, and Tianjin, which are also the three old industrial centers of China’s pre-reform 
period—are identified as the top three leaders in economic output, with average per capita GDP 
over 10000 RMB per year. These three old industrial core areas are followed by the provinces of 
Guangdong, Zhejiang, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Fujian, and Shandong in the eastern region. The latter 
group (with the exception of Liaoning) is sometimes referred to as the new cores (Fan & Sun, 
2008). The average annual growth rates of the new cores, ranging from 12.18% to 14.56%, are 
above those for the eastern region (12.05%), Beijing (9.23%), Shanghai (11.16%), and Tianjin 
(11.33%; see table 6.3), indicating the relatively slow growth of the more-developed provinces 
and the rapid growth of the less-developed provinces. The net effect is the continued catching-up 
of the new coastal growth cores and the convergence within the eastern region between 1992 and 
1999; Fan and Sun (2008) document the same trend starting prior to 1990. 
As for interregional inequalities, most of the eastern provinces have considerably higher 
growth rates than the central and western provinces. Seven of the top ten provincial growth rates 
belong to eastern provinces, and the eastern-region average growth rate (12.05%; see table 6.3) is 
far above the averages of the other regions. Thus, the 1990s were marked by a rapid increase in 
interregional inequality, which rose to approximately the same level as in 1978 by the mid-
1990s. Cai, Wang, and Du (2002) showed that the regional growth pattern in the 1990s reflected 
divergence between the eastern region and the central and western regions and convergence with 
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the two “clubs.” The main reason for this phenomenon is that the new development cores along 
the eastern coast experienced considerably greater growth than either the eastern old cores or the 
rest of the country. 
However, during the period 2000–2008, the central region’s growth rate (11.28%) rose to 
almost the same level of that of the eastern region (11.43%), and the western region also 
experienced a noticeable progress in growth rate (to 10.71%; see table 6.3). Only the eastern 
region experienced a decline in growth rate, from 12.05% to 11.43%. The net effect is that the 
three regions’ average rates of growth became very similar—all within one percentage point of 
one another. At the provincial level, growth rates also converged during this period. Although 
provinces with leading levels of per capita GDP were still clustered in the eastern region, the 
leading growth rates moved from the eastern provinces to those in the central and western 
regions between the 1990s and the 2000s. In particular, the three eastern old cores—Shanghai, 
Beijing, and Tianjin—still ranked as the top three in average per capita GDP, but were closely 
followed by the eastern new cores—Zhejiang, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Fujian, and Shandong. The 
gap between the old industrial provinces and the new growth provinces continued to shrink in the 
2000s. For example, the ratio between Shanghai (ranked first in both periods) and Shandong 
(ranked ninth in both periods) declined from 3.34 in the 1990s to 2.81 in the 2000s. 
At a time when the eastern region experienced slower growth—the average growth rate 
dropped from 12.05% in the 1990s to 11.43% in the 2000s—several inland provinces, especially 
central provinces that ranked much lower in the 1990s (between thirteenth and twenty-sixth), 
emerged as new growth leaders among noneastern provinces. For instance, the rank of Inner 
Mongolia’s average per capita GDP improved from fifteenth in the 1990s to tenth in the 2000s, 
and the ranking of its average growth rate jumped from seventeenth in the 1990s to first in the 
85 
2000s. Given the convergence of growth rates between regions and even between provinces, it is 
no surprise that both interregional and intraregional inequalities remained relatively stable, and 
will eventually decline. Nevertheless, the absolute sizes of regional gaps remain large, and 
approximately unchanged from the earlier time period. As a matter of fact, the ratio between the 
eastern and central regions even increased slightly from 1.90 in the 1990s to 2.01 in the 2000s; 
the ratio between the eastern and western regions also increased, from 2.26 to 2.50. 
As suggested by Fan and Sun (2008), the changes that led to the gradual halting of 
inequality increase in recent years were not regional in scale, but were due to the growth 
trajectories of selected provinces. As mentioned above, within the eastern region, the new growth 
cores continued to grow rapidly, while the old industrial cores slowed down. However, variations 
do exist among the new cores. The growth rates of Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong retreated 
from the leading level to a level near the regional average, while Jiangsu and Shandong 
continued to hold leading growth positions. Inner Mongolia was an outlier in terms of economic 
growth—its average growth rate of 16.6% was the highest among all provinces, and its level of 
average per capita GDP ranked tenth nationally—the only noneastern province in the top ten. 
Jilin, Henan, and Hubei in the central region, as well as Shaanxi and Chongqing in the western 
region, had growth rates above regional averages and ranked in the top ten of all provinces. In 
summary, while most central and western provinces remained in the below-average group in 
terms of absolute level of per capita GDP, selected provinces within these inland regions 
demonstrated rapid growth trends, causing inequalities at all levels—interprovincial, 
interregional, and intraregional—to have the tendency to decline since the 2000s. 
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Table 6.3 Per Capita GDP by Time Period and Province   
 
1992–1999 
 
2000–2008 
Province 
Average 
per capita 
GDP 
(RMB) Rank 
Average 
annual 
growth rate 
of per 
capita GDP 
(%) Rank   
Average 
per capita 
GDP 
(RMB) Rank 
Average 
annual 
growth rate 
of per 
capita GDP 
(%) Rank 
 
Eastern 7549.26 
 
12.05 
  
18181.54 
 
11.43 
 Beijing 17058.67 2 9.23 23 
 
34448.73 2 8.40 31 
Fujian 7296.09 8 14.48 3 
 
17100.99 8 10.71 20 
Guangdong 8970.71 4 12.18 7 
 
20376.13 5 11.05 15 
Guangxi 3331.19 27 10.87 14 
 
7106.48 28 10.53 23 
Hainan 5221.63 12 11.40 11 
 
9906.78 15 9.33 28 
Hebei 5005.15 14 12.66 5 
 
11761.51 12 10.68 21 
Jiangsu 7590.24 7 14.51 2 
 
19612.47 6 12.30 2 
Liaoning 7920.87 6 9.46 21 
 
17735.70 7 11.39 10 
Shandong 6187.62 9 13.69 4 
 
15953.63 9 12.30 3 
Shanghai 20687.44 1 11.16 13 
 
44791.90 1 9.50 27 
Tianjin 11330.59 3 11.33 12 
 
29079.52 3 12.30 3 
Zhejiang 8751.74 5 14.56 1 
 
21624.96 4 11.13 12 
 
Central 3982.15 
 
9.94 
  
9053.39 
 
11.28 
 Anhui 3234.35 28 12.44 6 
 
7374.79 26 10.89 17 
Heilongjiang 5977.48 10 7.63 28 
 
12857.27 11 10.65 22 
Henan 3711.45 22 11.41 10 
 
8747.24 19 11.69 8 
Hubei 4118.29 16 10.64 15 
 
9695.70 16 11.66 9 
Hunan 3773.12 21 9.68 20 
 
8511.20 20 10.99 16 
Inner Mongolia 4369.77 15 10.08 17 
 
13039.96 10 16.60 1 
Jiangxi 3423.74 24 9.09 24 
 
7556.08 25 11.08 14 
Jilin 5104.20 13 9.80 18.5 
 
11547.22 13 11.72 7 
Shanxi 4006.40 17 9.80 18.5 
 
9378.40 17 11.34 11 
 
Western 3338.45 
 
9.13 
  
7268.54 
 
10.71 
 Chongqing 3813.23 20 11.53 8 
 
9073.36 18 11.83 6 
Gansu 2913.72 30 8.76 26 
 
6337.06 30 10.39 24 
Guizhou 2050.88 31 7.41 29 
 
4056.86 31 9.60 26 
Ningxia 3926.00 18 7.20 30 
 
7987.89 22 9.85 25 
Qinghai 3816.97 19 6.94 31 
 
8065.92 21 10.75 18 
Shaanxi 3342.20 26 9.31 22 
 
7965.92 23 11.89 5 
Sichuan 3357.16 25 10.44 16 
 
7744.53 24 11.12 13 
Tibet 2983.48 29 11.49 9 
 
7215.41 27 10.73 19 
Xinjiang 5576.82 11 7.64 27 
 
10433.20 14 8.47 30 
Yunnan 3496.92 23 8.85 25   6710.57 29 8.72 29 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on Compilation of Statistics on the 60 Years of New China (2009). 
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Figure 6.7 Interprovincial Inequality of Per Capita GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.8 Intraregional and Interregional Contributions to Total Inequality of Per Capita GDP 
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Figure 6.9 Per Capita GDP by Region and Year 
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6.3 MIGRATION STATISTICS 
I now describe patterns and trends in internal migration in China. I focus on the migration that 
took place between 1992 and 2008, using yearly information from hukou registration. In my 
data, I break down in-migration to each province and out-migration from each province into 
urban and rural migrants. I broadly define city and town as urban regions and county as a rural 
region. Given the structure of the data, I am able to observe various migration patterns. 
6.3.1 Intraprovincial Migration 
First, let us examine the characteristics of intraprovincial migration. A large part of migration 
took place within provinces. Table 6.4 depicts intraprovincial migration by time period and 
province. Based on the figures presented in the table, we can identify the overall pattern of 
intraprovincial migration flows, as well as changes over time. During the time period 1992–
1999, all provinces experienced positive net migration in urban areas, implying that rural-to-
urban migration was the dominant flow during that time period. In particular, Guangdong 
Province attracted the most net migration in its urban areas (more than 1.3 million), followed by 
Henan (more than 1.1 million) and Hubei (more than 1 million). On the other hand, Tibet 
received the least net migration in urban areas (7951), followed by Tianjin (38,436), Qinghai 
(65,993), and Ningxia (92,757). Surprisingly, the eastern province of Tianjin received the least 
net migration in urban areas except for Tibet. Comparing the three regions during the time period 
1992–1999, the eastern region had the highest net urban migration, followed by the central 
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region and the western region, which had the least net urban migration. The net effect is that 
intraprovincial rural-to-urban migration was the most active in the eastern region during the 
1990s. 
In rural areas, the majority of central and western provinces gained population, while 
most eastern provinces experienced population loss. Since we are presenting descriptive statistics 
for intraprovincial migration, ideally, the net migration between urban and rural areas would 
cancel out. However, as explained previously, we do not observe such an effect, due to the 
systematic underestimation of rural-in migration. What we do observe from table 6.4 is that, 
during the time period 1992–1999, most rural-to-urban migration was concentrated in the eastern 
region. 
During the time period 2000–2008, the intraprovincial migration pattern did not change 
much. As in the preceding decade, all provinces experienced positive net migration in urban 
areas, showing that rural-to-urban migration was still the dominant flow during the 2000s. 
However, Henan took the place of Guangdong and became the province with the highest net 
migration in urban areas (more than 1.7 million), followed by Guangdong, Anhui, Sichuan, and 
Jiangsu (all above 1 million). Tibet remained the province with the lowest net migration in urban 
areas, followed by Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin, in which migrant workers came mostly from 
other provinces. 
In rural areas, we observe a similar pattern as in the preceding decade. Most eastern 
provinces experienced population loss, implying again that rural-to-urban migration remained 
active in the eastern region. However, most western provinces gained population overall, 
indicating the effect of the Western Development Program on labor mobility in the western 
region. In the central region, the trend was not so dominating. Though Henan, Hunan, Jiangxi, 
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and Inner Mongolia gained population in rural areas, Anhui, Heilongjiang, Hubei, Jilin, and 
Shanxi experienced population loss. 
Regarding the intertemporal pattern, both periods show a positive net migration in urban 
areas for all three regions, suggesting that most migration flows went to urban areas from rural 
areas. Clearly, we can observe that the central region lost population on average, compared with 
the eastern and western regions. Across the two periods, most western provinces except Yunnan 
experienced higher net migration in urban areas. Most central provinces except Hubei and Jilin 
experienced higher net migration in urban areas. This pattern is not so clear among the eastern 
provinces; Beijing, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan, Hebei, Liaoning, and Shanghai had lower net 
migration in urban areas, while Fujian, Jiangsu, Shandong, Tianjin, and Zhejiang had higher net 
migration in urban areas. In rural areas, all western provinces except Gansu and Yunnan 
experienced higher net migration. All central provinces except Hubei, Jiangxi, Jilin, and Shanxi 
experienced higher net migration. In particular, Hubei had positive net migration in rural areas 
during the time period 1992–1999, but had negative net migration in rural areas during the time 
period 2000–2008. Among eastern provinces, intraprovincial migration in rural areas was more 
volatile: Beijing, Guangdong, Liaoning, Shandong, Shanghai, and Tianjin had larger net 
migration, while Jiangsu, Fujian, Guangxi, Hainan, Hebei, and Zhejiang had smaller net 
migration. 
Figure 6.10 shows patterns of intraprovincial migration by region and year. It suggests 
that both eastern and central regions exhibited a decreasing pattern in terms of intraprovincial 
migration. The western region, on the other hand, exhibited a slightly increasing pattern in terms 
of intraprovincial migration, particularly during the time period 2000–2008. Overall, both the 
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volume and the discrepancies among these three regions grew smaller across these two periods, 
indicating that more and more migration became interprovincial as time went on. 
Now let us examine different regions respectively. Figure 6.11 shows that urban areas in 
the eastern region had slightly increasing intraprovincial migration all the time, since urban in-
migration was always larger than urban out-migration. Not surprisingly, within provinces, most 
migration takes place from rural areas to urban areas. Rural areas in the eastern region lost 
population all the time, since rural out-migration was always larger than rural in-migration. 
Clearly, the discrepancies between urban and rural areas grew larger as time went on. Figure 
6.12 shows that urban areas in the central region gained population during the time period 1992–
1999, but lost population during the time period 2000–2008. Rural areas in the central region 
exhibited decreasing intraprovincial migration most of the time, though they had slightly 
increasing migration after 2005. Overall, intraprovincial migration in the central region became 
more volatile during the time period 2000–2008. Figure 6.13 shows that the volume of migration 
in rural areas was much larger than that in urban areas during the time period 1992–1999, while 
the volume of migration in urban areas exceeded that in rural areas during the time period 2000–
2008, indicating the effect of the Western Development Program. In the time period 2000–2008, 
intraprovincial migration in the western region became much more volatile than it was during the 
time period 1992–1999, and the discrepancies between rural and urban areas became smaller. 
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Table 6.4 Intraprovincial Migration by Time Period and Province 
 
Intraprovincial Migration 1992–1999 
 
Intraprovincial Migration 2000–2008 
 
Urban 
 
Rural 
 
Urban 
 
Rural 
Province In Out Net   In Out Net   In Out Net   In Out Net 
 
Eastern 25880561 20320950 5559611 
 
19606321 21220693 -1614372 
 
31697269 25960101 5737168 
 
14671051 16552820 -1881769 
Beijing 201649 89445 112204 
 
547002 632740 -85738 
 
93398 69560 23838 
 
319872 338810 -18938 
Fujian 1173984 798947 375037 
 
1342315 1632307 -289992 
 
2015914 1578050 437864 
 
1337631 1806770 -469139 
Guangdong 5420144 4089234 1330910 
 
2970740 3164882 -194142 
 
5672826 4392008 1280818 
 
2024962 1973037 51925 
Guangxi 1939775 1332693 607082 
 
2479331 2336461 142870 
 
2555572 2121045 434527 
 
1851217 1921838 -70621 
Hainan 324433 202943 121490 
 
307123 328844 -21721 
 
483229 388206 95023 
 
160841 196476 -35635 
Hebei 3252578 2314805 937773 
 
3161432 2970835 190597 
 
3644776 2741308 903468 
 
2431833 2642815 -210982 
Jiangsu 4474341 3973022 501319 
 
2411435 2728261 -316826 
 
6066860 5047190 1019670 
 
1497896 1823240 -325344 
Liaoning 2333639 1854499 479140 
 
1350053 1638735 -288682 
 
2136233 1734737 401496 
 
698517 848488 -149971 
Shandong 4121220 3456738 664482 
 
2965505 3325057 -359552 
 
4560602 3875252 685350 
 
2849622 3111194 -261572 
Shanghai 262533 130236 132297 
 
312464 471681 -159217 
 
103096 62853 40243 
 
33645 74589 -40944 
Tianjin 59714 21278 38436 
 
270109 301371 -31262 
 
1111470 1058286 53184 
 
252279 270487 -18208 
Zhejiang 2316551 2057110 259441 
 
1488812 1689519 -200707 
 
3253293 2891606 361687 
 
1212736 1545076 -332340 
 
Central 23853169 18168404 5684765 
 
23105135 22359366 745769 
 
29486592 22013032 7473560 
 
20511425 19020958 1490467 
Anhui 2484005 1743588 740417 
 
2872873 2972714 -99841 
 
3881983 2686654 1195329 
 
2720196 2810576 -90380 
Heilongjiang 2179251 1674292 504959 
 
1580242 1681369 -101127 
 
3007487 2430939 576548 
 
1486761 1488116 -1355 
Henan 4640379 3483785 1156594 
 
5428292 4792141 636151 
 
6580045 4837709 1742336 
 
5700243 4180064 1520179 
Hubei 3891863 2851095 1040768 
 
2344142 2283690 60452 
 
3297119 2455290 841829 
 
1140658 1148223 -7565 
Hunan 3707793 2987643 720150 
 
4161182 4126971 34211 
 
3766387 2900374 866013 
 
2828267 2744144 84123 
Inner Mongolia 1141007 801208 339799 
 
1472057 1445432 26625 
 
1456057 1016430 439627 
 
1343271 1274289 68982 
Jiangxi 1719644 1286173 433471 
 
2483509 2180157 303352 
 
2607558 1964855 642703 
 
2755674 2595485 160189 
Jilin 2548042 2244580 303462 
 
914926 1013335 -98409 
 
2260163 1969842 290321 
 
608176 736941 -128765 
Shanxi 1541185 1096040 445145 
 
1847912 1863557 -15645 
 
2629793 1750939 878854 
 
1928179 2043120 -114941 
 
Western 12998482 10121700 2876782 
 
18156874 17668048 488826 
 
19777666 15518979 4258687 
 
18785580 17240708 1544872 
Chongqing 1631690 1117559 514131 
 
1649390 1992203 -342813 
 
3394956 2825960 568996 
 
2781481 2656414 125067 
Gansu 955094 612408 342686 
 
1686688 1427664 259024 
 
1700081 1175384 524697 
 
1719949 1631222 88727 
Guizhou 1817307 1445199 372108 
 
1703623 1543254 160369 
 
2414702 1993807 420895 
 
2109660 1843128 266532 
Ningxia 299393 206636 92757 
 
521064 421631 99433 
 
652837 505291 147546 
 
867062 760884 106178 
Qinghai 194656 128663 65993 
 
393032 400436 -7404 
 
508141 375786 132355 
 
626603 565307 61296 
Shaanxi 1184076 804348 379728 
 
2463671 2400791 62880 
 
2053418 1287946 765472 
 
2079101 1958767 120334 
Sichuan 4090241 3644695 445546 
 
6371954 6069628 302326 
 
4822301 3628612 1193689 
 
5036770 4445957 590813 
Tibet 54025 46074 7951 
 
107211 92528 14683 
 
52822 40768 12054 
 
138183 120127 18056 
Xinjiang 1062294 735697 326597 
 
990626 1047890 -57264 
 
1365561 1014305 351256 
 
1242238 1025716 216522 
Yunnan 1709706 1380421 329285 
 
2269615 2272023 -2408 
 
2812847 2671120 141727 
 
2184533 2233186 -48653 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on China National Population Statistics by County (Volumes 1993–2009). 
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Figure 6.10 Intraprovincial Migration by Region and Year                               Figure 6.11 Intraprovincial Migration in Easter Region by Year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.12 Intraprovincial Migration in Central Region by Year                Figure 6.13 Intraprovincial Migration in Western Region by Year 
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6.3.2 Interprovincial Migration 
Second, let us summarize the patterns of interprovincial migration. Table 6.5 depicts 
interprovincial migration by time period and province. Guangdong had the highest net migration 
volume in both the 1990s and the 2000s. Sichuan had the lowest net migration in the 1990s, and 
Heilongjiang had the lowest net migration in the 2000s. Net migration also exhibited 
significantly bigger volumes and larger range; the highest net migration figure increased from 
864,560 (in Guangdong) in the 1990s to 1,642,555 (in Guangdong) in the 2000s, and the lowest 
net migration figure decreased from -303,676 (in Sichuan) in the 1990s to -508,077 (in 
Heilongjiang) in the 2000s. These changes indicate that receiving places were gaining population 
through migration, while sending places lost more through it (Fan, 2005). 
During the time period 1992–1999, most eastern provinces except Fujian experienced 
positive net migration in urban areas. A majority of central provinces except Anhui, 
Heilongjiang, and Jiangxi experienced positive net migration in urban areas. Similarly, a 
majority of western provinces except Guizhou, Qinghai, Sichuan, and Tibet experienced positive 
net migration in urban areas. On average, eastern provinces had higher net migration in urban 
areas than did central provinces, which in turn had higher net migration in urban areas than did 
western provinces. Besides being the province with the largest intraprovincial net migration in 
urban areas, Guangdong was also the province with the largest interprovincial net migration in 
urban areas during the time period 1992–1999. Not surprisingly, Shanghai and Beijing had the 
second and third largest interprovincial net migration in urban areas. Among eastern provinces, 
Fujian was the only province that had negative interprovincial net migration in urban areas. The 
central region had more provinces with negative interprovincial net migration in urban areas, and 
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Jiangxi Province had the largest negative interprovincial migration in urban areas. The western 
region had even more provinces with negative interprovincial net migration in urban areas; 
Qinghai Province had the largest negative number. Among all provinces with negative 
interprovincial net migration in urban areas, the most prominent were located in south-central 
and southwestern China, including Anhui, Jiangxi, Qinghai, Sichuan, Guizhou, and Tibet; these 
provinces are among the least developed in China. Among all provinces with positive 
interprovincial net migration in urban areas, Chongqing Province had the smallest number, 
followed by Guangxi, Gansu, and Hainan. 
In rural areas, a majority of eastern provinces except Beijing, Guangdong, Hebei, 
Shanghai, and Tianjin had negative interprovincial net migration during the time period 1992–
1999. Most central provinces except Henan had negative interprovincial net migration, and most 
western provinces except Ningxia and Xinjiang had negative interprovincial net migration. On 
average, the western region was a population-losing area, with larger negative intensity than both 
the central and eastern regions. Henan Province had the largest interprovincial net migration in 
rural areas, followed by Guangdong and Xinjiang. Among all the provinces with negative 
interprovincial net migration in rural areas, Sichuan had the largest number, followed by Anhui, 
Heilongjiang, and Chongqing. 
Table 6.5 combines interprovincial net migration in both urban and rural areas to show 
that Guangdong was the largest population-receiving province, followed by Henan, Shanghai, 
and Beijing. The southern half of the eastern region, along with Beijing and Tianjin, received the 
largest share of interprovincial migration, and also led most provinces in increase in development 
levels over the time period. On average, the eastern region was the population-receiving area, 
while the central region was the population-losing area. The western region was something in 
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between. In particular, Sichuan is the largest source of interprovincial migration. The increased 
prominence of western provinces such as Xinjiang, Chongqing, and Tibet in attracting migrants 
is reflected by the fact that Xinjiang’s net migration volume rose by almost 60%, from 448,312 
to 706,644, and both Chongqing and Tibet switched from being net exporters in the 1990s to 
being net importers in the 2000s. 
Both periods show positive net migration for the eastern region and negative net 
migration for the western region. The central region had positive net migration in the 1990s and 
negative net migration in the 2000s. Moreover, in the latter period, we observe that both the 
absolute number of net migration and the disparity among the three regions became larger. The 
net result is that the eastern region experienced a greater gain in interprovincial migration; the 
central region was a net importer but replaced the western region to become the largest net 
exporter; and the western region remained a net exporter, but its loss of population through 
interprovincial migration dropped. In other words, these changes indicate the predominance and 
acceleration of migration flows from the two inland regions to the coastal region, with a possible 
step migration phenomenon—western migrants moved to the central region, and then to the 
eastern region—between the early 1990s and the late 2000s. 
During the time period 2000–2008, table 6.5 shows that Guangdong remained the 
province with the largest interprovincial net migration in urban areas, again followed by Beijing 
and Shanghai. All eastern provinces, including Fujian, had positive interprovincial net migration 
in urban areas, pulling migrants from many especially poor provinces. Moreover, most eastern 
provinces had much larger interprovincial net migration between 2000 and 2008 than during the 
time period 1992–1999. Shandong and Hebei are two exceptions: they both had less 
interprovincial net migration in urban areas. Most central provinces except Shanxi, however, had 
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negative interprovincial net migration, while in the time period 1992–1999 there were only three 
provinces—Anhui, Heilongjiang, and Jiangxi—that had negative interprovincial net migration in 
urban areas. Interestingly, in the time period 2000–2008, most western provinces except Gansu 
had positive interprovincial net migration in urban areas. This is quite different from the time 
period 1992–1999, during which more western provinces, such as Guizhou, Qinghai, Sichuan, 
and Tibet, had negative interprovincial net migration in urban areas. 
Table 6.5 show that during the time period 2000–2008, most western provinces except 
Xinjiang and Tibet experienced negative interprovincial net migration in rural areas. Most 
central provinces except Henan experienced negative interprovincial net migration in rural areas. 
In the eastern region, the pattern is not so clear. The most-developed provinces, such as Beijing, 
Shanghai, Guangdong, Tianjin, and Zhejiang, had positive interprovincial net migration even in 
their rural areas, while the less-developed provinces, such as Fujian, Guangxi, Hainan, Hebei, 
Jiangsu, and Shandong, had negative interprovincial net migration in rural areas. 
Now let’s identify more specifically the gainers and losers of migration at the provincial 
level. In the time period 1992–1999, Guangdong revealed the highest net migration. Eight other 
eastern provinces (including Shanghai and Beijing), five central provinces (including Henan), 
and two western provinces (Xinjiang and Ningxia) also demonstrated positive net migration. The 
rest of the country had negative net migration. In the time period 2000–2008, variations in 
provincial net migration increased. Guangdong, Beijing, and Shanghai led the nation with close 
to or over 1 million. Guangdong was the most sought-after destination of interprovincial 
migration for both decades. Other eastern provinces, except Guangxi and Hebei, all showed 
positive net migration volumes. As in the previous period, the two western provinces of Xinjiang 
and Ningxia continued to have positive net migration; they were joined in the time period by 
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Chongqing and Tibet in the southwest. In particular, Xinjiang attracted a larger volume of net 
migration than most other inland provinces, partially due to its trade-related economic growth 
(Loughlin & Pannell, 2001). 
Combining the effects of interprovincial migration in both urban and rural areas, 
Guangdong was the province with the largest net interprovincial migration during the time 
period 2000–2008, again followed by Beijing and Shanghai. The next-highest population-
absorbing provinces were Xinjiang, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang. 
Regarding intertemporal patterns in urban areas, most eastern provinces except Hebei and 
Shandong experienced significant increases in interprovincial migration. Fujian had negative 
interprovincial migration in urban areas during the time period 1992–1999, but had positive 
interprovincial migration in urban areas during the time period 2000–2008. Interprovincial 
migration in urban areas in Guangxi increased by more than twenty-six times across these two 
periods. Most western provinces except Gansu had significant increases in interprovincial 
migration in urban areas across these two periods. In particular, interprovincial migration in 
urban areas in Chongqing increased by more than 120 times across the two periods. However, all 
central provinces had significant decreases in interprovincial migration in urban areas. Generally 
speaking, as time went on, urban areas in most eastern and western provinces witnessed 
population gain in terms of interprovincial migration, which is consistent with the continuing 
development of coastal areas and the influence of the Western Development Program proposed 
by the central government in the late 1990s. 
Considering the intertemporal patterns in rural areas, most eastern provinces except 
Fujian, Hainan, and Zhejiang experienced significant deceases in interprovincial migration. Most 
central provinces except Hunan also experienced significant decreases in interprovincial 
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migration in rural areas. Most western provinces except Sichuan, Tibet, and Xinjiang 
experienced significant decreases in interprovincial migration. Generally speaking, as time went 
on, rural areas in most provinces all over China witnessed a drop in population in terms of 
interprovincial migration, which is consistent with the urbanization process in modern China 
over the past twenty years. 
Except for Xinjiang and Ningxia, all previously net-importing provinces in the inland 
regions, including Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jilin, and Shanxi, turned into net exporters in the 
2000s. Among provinces with negative net migration across China, the most prominent during 
the time period 1992–1999 were concentrated in south-central and southwestern China, including 
Fujian, Guangxi, Anhui, Jiangxi, Chongqing, Guizhou, and Sichuan. Heilongjiang was also a 
prominent migrant exporter during the 1990s. These provinces were among the least developed 
in China. In the time period 2000–2008, only Sichuan, Anhui, and Heilongjiang remained among 
the most prominent sending places; they were joined by the western province of Gansu. Sichuan 
was the largest source of interprovincial migration in the 1990s, but in the 2000s its rank dropped 
to fourth in net out-migration, and the central provinces of Heilongjiang and Anhui moved ahead 
of it. Clearly, Heilongjiang and Anhui contributed significantly to changing the central region 
from a net importer in the 1990s to a net exporter in the 2000s. These changes also reflect the 
fact that the origins of interprovincial migration flows became more and more diverse, partly 
because many more poor provinces, following the model of Sichuan, aggressively utilized labor 
exports as an economic strategy. 
Figure 6.14 shows that net interprovincial migration in the eastern region exhibited a 
significant increasing pattern across these two periods. Net interprovincial migration in the 
central region exhibited a significant decreasing pattern across the two periods. Net 
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interprovincial migration in the western region remained stable, and showed a slight increasing 
trend during the time period 2000–2008, indicating the effect of the Western Development 
Program. Moreover, we can observe clearly that both the net volume and the discrepancy among 
these three regions grew larger. During the time period 1992–1999, net interprovincial migration 
in the central region was larger than that in the western region, but the ranking reverses in the 
time period 2000–2008, indicating that the eastern region became more and more concentrated in 
terms of attracting migrants from both the central and western regions. In particular, the central 
region was a population-gaining area during the time period 1992–1999 and a population-losing 
area during the time period 2000–2008. 
Now let us examine the different regions respectively. Figure 6.15 shows that urban areas 
in the eastern region exhibited a significant increasing pattern across these two time periods, and 
that urban-in migration was much more intense than urban-out migration. The pattern of 
interprovincial migration in rural areas in the eastern region looks stable, though rural out-
migration was slightly larger than rural in-migration. Overall, it is no surprise that most 
interprovincial migration in the eastern region flowed to urban areas. Figure 6.16 shows that 
urban areas in the central region gained population during the time period 1992–1999, since 
urban in-migration was larger than urban out-migration. However, the relation reversed during 
the time period 2000–2008, because urban in-migration became less than urban out-migration. 
Most of the time, rural areas in the central region lost population to the eastern region in 
particular, and to the western region as well. Figure 6.17 shows that urban areas in the western 
region gained population during the time period 1992–1999, and the volume of the gain 
significantly increased during the time period 2000–2008, thanks to the Western Development 
Program. Rural areas in the western region lost population all the time. 
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In the following three sections, I address two sets of explanations for interprovincial and 
interregional inequalities. I test whether intraprovincial and interprovincial migration help offset 
inequalities and whether the offsetting effects differ across regions and time periods. 
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Table 6.5 Interprovincial Migration by Time Period and Province 
 
Interprovincial Migration 1992–1999 
 
Interprovincial Migration 2000–2008 
 
Urban 
 
Rural         Total
 
Urban 
 
Rural 
 
  Total 
Province In Out Net 
 
In Out Net 
 
Net 
 
In Out Net 
 
In Out Net 
 
Net 
 
Eastern 7485228 4692076 2793152 
 
2605393 2601638 3755 
 
2796907 
 
14089902 8022706 6067196 
 
3254659 3729438 -474779 
 
5592417 
Beijing 716529 296568 419961 
 
131208 49760 81448 
 
501409 
 
1545135 444523 1100612 
 
54649 10471 44178 
 
1144790 
Fujian 305908 332127 -26219 
 
128935 219428 -90493 
 
-116712 
 
633230 535074 98156 
 
286064 353123 -67059 
 
31097 
Guangdong 1251825 642212 609613 
 
488627 233680 254947 
 
864560 
 
2447208 984390 1462818 
 
427529 247792 179737 
 
1642555 
Guangxi 164639 161952 2687 
 
158283 311255 -152972 
 
-150285 
 
493667 418748 74919 
 
423722 587440 -163718 
 
-88799 
Hainan 81473 66045 15428 
 
43836 94928 -51092 
 
-35664 
 
309117 209996 99121 
 
41309 73138 -31829 
 
67292 
Hebei 630293 419365 210928 
 
457689 381851 75838 
 
286766 
 
1137576 976445 161131 
 
634369 800605 -166236 
 
-5105 
Jiangsu 876335 657725 218610 
 
258387 276527 -18140 
 
200470 
 
1920553 1210822 709731 
 
345102 466031 -120929 
 
588802 
Liaoning 749446 454780 294666 
 
189253 207222 -17969 
 
276697 
 
1057628 726868 330760 
 
182935 201434 -18499 
 
312261 
Shandong 1016135 728766 287369 
 
415189 513778 -98589 
 
188780 
 
1311454 1083203 228251 
 
404531 582720 -178189 
 
50062 
Shanghai 880534 404354 476180 
 
100205 57506 42699 
 
518879 
 
1286773 357275 929498 
 
31676 11531 20145 
 
949643 
Tianjin 328155 175801 152354 
 
63112 52973 10139 
 
162493 
 
731914 385586 346328 
 
56933 55854 1079 
 
347407 
Zhejiang 483956 352381 131575 
 
170669 202730 -32061 
 
99514 
 
1215647 689776 525871 
 
365840 339299 26541 
 
552412 
 
Central 4202884 3395041 807843 
 
2639594 3011419 -371826 
 
436017 
 
6566841 7438703 -871861 
 
3647153 4868806 -1221653 
 
-2093514 
Anhui 301281 318162 -16881 
 
272344 434171 -161827 
 
-178708 
 
508193 690821 -182628 
 
467350 755663 -288313 
 
-470941 
Heilongjiang 564655 582702 -18047 
 
293693 460933 -167240 
 
-185287 
 
706618 1001161 -294543 
 
263039 476573 -213534 
 
-508077 
Henan 793824 423983 369841 
 
891988 608548 283440 
 
653281 
 
911090 1016656 -105566 
 
805932 768567 37365 
 
-68201 
Hubei 748274 562557 185717 
 
170190 198142 -27952 
 
157765 
 
1488559 1606301 -117742 
 
355106 507955 -152849 
 
-270591 
Hunan 537921 391760 146161 
 
267826 353600 -85774 
 
60387 
 
760758 808792 -48034 
 
596240 669925 -73685 
 
-121719 
Inner Mongolia 221479 202888 18591 
 
202828 270307 -67479 
 
-48888 
 
349655 384652 -34997 
 
284790 417886 -133096 
 
-168093 
Jiangxi 201564 252443 -50879 
 
156457 261580 -105123 
 
-156002 
 
649019 701349 -52330 
 
475399 663742 -188343 
 
-240673 
Jilin 491262 423728 67534 
 
204565 228234 -23669 
 
43865 
 
652807 732965 -80158 
 
126803 209441 -82638 
 
-162796 
Shanxi 342624 236818 105806 
 
179703 195904 -16201 
 
89605 
 
540142 496006 44136 
 
272494 399054 -126560 
 
-82424 
 
Western 2161909 1813039 348870 
 
1541634 2215866 -674232 
 
-325362 
 
4579461 3695245 884216 
 
2691694 3712770 -1021076 
 
-136860 
Chongqing 245717 243619 2097 
 
128700 288781 -160081 
 
-157984 
 
841531 580732 260799 
 
268044 488336 -220292 
 
40507 
Gansu 256571 244131 12440 
 
103190 175879 -72689 
 
-60249 
 
347957 455369 -107412 
 
216233 517443 -301210 
 
-408622 
Guizhou 141847 159106 -17259 
 
101838 217568 -115730 
 
-132989 
 
291767 291251 516 
 
219544 391421 -171877 
 
-171361 
Ningxia 82966 56122 26844 
 
59329 56773 2556 
 
29400 
 
182280 132383 49897 
 
78861 92308 -13447 
 
36450 
Qinghai 44208 65619 -21411 
 
37777 80286 -42509 
 
-63920 
 
87346 84025 3321 
 
66093 119848 -53755 
 
-50434 
Shaanxi 402816 296330 106486 
 
180167 298484 -118317 
 
-11831 
 
807252 688367 118885 
 
366118 497769 -131651 
 
-12766 
Sichuan 388319 404310 -15990 
 
381333 669019 -287686 
 
-303676 
 
887166 844542 42624 
 
714846 1034360 -319514 
 
-276890 
Tibet 23926 24754 -828 
 
18914 20753 -1839 
 
-2667 
 
36405 23524 12881 
 
42827 28005 14822 
 
27703 
Xinjiang 449507 223474 226033 
 
383100 160821 222279 
 
448312 
 
793283 381933 411350 
 
512202 216908 295294 
 
706644 
Yunnan 126032 95574 30458 
 
147286 247502 -100216 
 
-69758 
 
304474 213119 91355 
 
206926 326372 -119446 
 
-28091 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on China National Population Statistics by County (Volumes 1993–2009). 
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Figure 6.14 Net Interprovincial Migration by Region and Year                      Figure 6.15 Interprovincial Migration in Eastern Region by Year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.16 Interprovincial Migration in Central Region by Year                 Figure 6.17 Interprovincial Migration in Western Region by Year 
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7.0  MIGRATION AND CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS 
In this chapter, I address two sets of explanations for interprovincial and interregional 
inequalities. I test whether intraprovincial and interprovincial migration helps offset inequalities 
and whether the offsetting effects differ across regions and time periods. Specifically, I present 
and discuss the results of statistical models for the growth rate of provincial per capita GDP and 
for provincial contribution to the national Theil Index, with main input variables being 
intraprovincial migration variables and interprovincial migration variables, respectively. 
7.1 UNCONDITIONAL AND CONDITIONAL CONVERGENCES 
It has been mentioned in the descriptive statistics that interprovincial inequality increases with 
fluctuation between 1992 and 1999, remains relatively stable and increases only slightly from 
around 1999 to around 2004, and declines after 2004. This indicates a possible convergence 
tendency across provinces within my study period. There are two important concepts of 
convergence in the neoclassical growth model: absolute or unconditional α-convergence, and 
conditional β-convergence. The former refers to the reduction in the variance of income across 
economies, while the latter occurs when poorer economies catch up to the richer ones (holding 
only within groups of economies that share the same steady states). In other words, conditional 
β-convergence should control for the differences in the determinants of their steady states in the 
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convergence regression equation. The differences included in the following convergence 
regressions are initial per capita GDP, initial human capital level, employment rate, comparative 
agricultural productivity, investment rate, and government intervention. In theoretical growth 
models, β-convergence is based on the assumption of diminishing returns to capital—that is, the 
marginal productivity of capital decreases with its accumulation (Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 2004; 
Phan, 2008). 
In this section, I discuss the results of statistical models for unconditional and conditional 
convergences. Model 1 in table 7.1 presents the result of a standard unconditional or absolute 
convergence regression for China, in which the log of average growth rate of per capita GDP 
from 1993 to 2008 is regressed against the log of 1992 per capita GDP. There is no evidence of 
either convergence or divergence: initial economic condition plays no role in determining 
subsequent growth rates for the entire study period, which confirms our previous observation in 
figure 6.1. 
It has often been argued that subnational economic units (e.g., provinces) within a nation 
should not differ too much in their steady states, so poorer units growing faster than richer ones 
and the with-country unconditional convergence is expected (Phan, 2008). However, sometimes 
there are reasons for developing countries to not expect similar steady states across subnational 
units. For instance, as noted by Phan (2008), if product markets and factor markets are less well 
integrated and capital is highly concentrated by location, the mechanism for convergence will 
operate imperfectly, and unconditional convergence within a country might be prevented. 
Studies of subnational convergence within other developing countries also find no evidence of 
unconditional convergence due to similar reasons (Phan (2008) on Thailand; Toya et al. (2004) 
on the Philippines; Kirdar & Saracoglu (2006) on Turkey). Another possible explanation is 
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related to the famous Kuznets curve—the inverted U-shaped relationship between income and 
inequality—which states that for low-income countries, the distribution of income first becomes 
more unequal as income increases, and then inequality decreases as income continues rising. 
This reason seems more relevant to this study based on the findings in the descriptive statistics 
section. 
I next investigate conditional convergence by including all the control variables (i.e., 
initial per capita GDP, initial mean years of schooling of working population, employment rate, 
comparative labor productivity, investment rate, and government expenditure share) in the 
equation. These control variables represent a set of province-specific characteristics that 
determine the long-run steady state growth path of per capita GDP. The analytic results of 
conditional convergence for all Chinese provinces and for the three regions (SEM) are presented 
in model 2a and model 2b in table 7.1. Despite only partially controlling for steady-state 
variables, most coefficients are statistically significant with expected signs, including that of 
initial per capita GDP. In addition, I regress the dependent variable measuring provincial 
contribution to the national interprovincial Theil Index against the aforementioned control 
variables, for all provinces and for the three regions (SEM), to provide supplementary 
explanations for interprovincial convergence. 
First, I consider the initial conditions—per capita GDP and human capital stock in 1992. 
Controlling for other control variables measuring provincial characteristics, the relationship 
between initial per capita GDP and economic growth is negative and significant, consistent with 
the conditional convergence hypothesis. The estimated coefficient implies that a 1% increase in 
initial level of per capita GDP is estimated to result in about a 0.05% decrease in provincial 
economic growth, holding other factors constant. The results of SEM or seemingly unrelated 
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regression equations (model 2b in table 7.1) show that the negative relationship between initial 
per capita GDP and economic growth is significant only for the eastern region. This finding 
confirms my previous observation in the descriptive statistics section that when the old industrial 
provinces in the eastern region experience slower growth, several coastal provinces—
Guangdong, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Fujian, and Shandong—with much lower initial developmental 
conditions continue to grow at rapid rates and emerge as new growth cores. The net effect is a 
convergence in per capita GDP within the eastern region. 
Initial human capital endowment has a significantly positive impact on economic growth. 
A 1% point higher initial mean years of schooling of working population is associated with a 
0.11% higher growth rate of per capita GDP. Since human capital is a cumulative factor and is 
essential to the long-term growth process, investment in education helps reduce spatial economic 
disparity (Cai, Wang, and Du, 2002; Fleisher & Chen, 1997); my results confirm this hypothesis. 
The results of SEM (model 2b in table 7.1) show that the positive relationship between initial 
human capital level and economic growth exists only for the western and central regions, and is 
significant only for the western region. A possible explanation for this finding is that over my 
study period, the inland regions, especially the western region, were in the process of adopting 
new and advanced technologies imported from the eastern region to speed up economic 
development. It is often argued that high levels of human capital facilitate technology adoption 
and therefore promote economic growth. 
Second, the estimated coefficient of the variable measuring the comparative productivity 
of agricultural labor has unexpected negative sign and no significance. The region-wise SEM 
does not generate significant results either. The literature suggests that improvements in 
intersectoral allocative efficiency of labor, indicated by the comparative productivity of 
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agricultural labor, contribute to the economic growth (e.g., Cai, Wang, and Du, 2002). My results 
contradict the literature and imply that there are certain impediments to labor allocation, which 
might explain its inability to affect local economic growth and reduce spatial inequality. As 
discussed earlier, internal labor migration in China is heavily controlled and regulated by hukou 
system, and thus it is understandable that labor allocation is not efficient enough to boost 
convergence. 
Last, the estimated coefficients of the following three variables have their expected signs 
and reasonable significance. The implications are as follows. The correlation between 
employment rate and provincial growth rate is positive and statistically significant, as expected. 
An increase of 1% in the employment rate is associated with an increase in the growth rate of 
0.19%. Based on the results of the SEM, the positive relationship between employment rate and 
provincial growth is significant only for the eastern and western regions. I find these results 
intuitive, as the coastal areas have long concentrated in labor-intensive manufacturing and 
service industries, and thus their unemployment rates have been relatively low compared to those 
of the rest of the country. On the other hand, the Western Development Program launched in 
1999 promoted industries that rely on the west’s comparative advantages in minerals and other 
resources, crops (such as fruit in Xinjiang), and cattle, and encouraged tourism and related 
service industries in the west. All of the above efforts created employment opportunities, 
facilitated labor reallocation, and reduced unemployment and underemployment. 
The share of investment in GDP has a positive and significant effect on provincial 
growth. An increase of 1% in the share of investment in GDP raises annual economic growth by 
0.31%. According to the SEM, the positive relationship between investment and growth exists in 
all three regions but is significant only in the central and western regions. Again, the Western 
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Development Program supported massive investments in infrastructure and income-generating 
activities in the inland areas. Moreover, less-developed regions (e.g., the western and central 
regions) grew faster because investment in capital produced higher returns than in richer regions 
(e.g., the eastern region) with ample accumulated capital. In other words, poorer regions tend to 
use their resources more efficiently, and there are diminishing returns to capital. Thus, as my 
results imply, the positive impact of investment on growth speed only shows significance for the 
two inland regions. 
The impact of government consumption expenditure in GDP on provincial economic 
growth is negative and statistically significant. An increase of 1% in the share of government 
expenditure in GDP is associated with a 0.23% decrease in growth rate. The SEM results show 
that this negative relationship between government intervention and economic growth exists for 
all three regions, but it is only statistically significant for the eastern and central regions. The 
magnitude of its regression coefficient is greatest for the eastern region, followed by that for the 
central region. Along with the fact that government consumption in GDP takes on the highest 
value in the western region and the lowest value in the eastern region, these findings indicate that 
areas closer to the outside world are more on the side of market-oriented mechanisms in which 
government intervention may hinder economic growth, and the inland areas are still on the side 
of legacy central planning, in which top-down policies like the Western Development Program 
can be quite beneficial to economic development. 
As noted in previous studies, analytic results based on conventional OLS regression need 
to be interpreted with caution, given that there are many omitted variables and that correlations 
exist among the independent variables on the right side of the regression equation (Phan, 2008). 
Therefore it is necessary to utilize the fixed-effects method to control for all time-invariant 
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differences between provinces, so the estimated coefficients of the fixed-effects models cannot 
be biased due to omitted time-invariant characteristics, such as geographic conditions, weather, 
culture, etc. However, one side effect of the features of fixed-effects models is that they cannot 
be used to examine time-invariant explanatory variables (e.g., initial per capita GDP and initial 
mean years of schooling of working population) because those variables are constant for each 
province (Torres-Reyna). Therefore, for the first two models testing unconditional and 
conditional convergence hypotheses, I use pooled OLS regression to explain the relationship 
between initial state and growth rate. For the following models that incorporate migration-
independent variables, I use fixed-effects models to deal with the potential problem of omitted 
variables and to control for time-invariant characteristics of provinces. 
Now let us consider the link between migration and convergence. As discussed earlier, 
the neoclassical growth model predicts that labor typically flows from low-wage areas to high-
wage areas to maximize personal income, which equalizes the capital-labor ratio and per capita 
GDP growth across areas, speeding up convergence (Phan, 2008). Models 3a and 3b in table 7.2 
and models 4a and 4b in table 7.3 show fixed-effects estimates using the same group of control 
variables, except for the initial-conditions variables, due to their invariability over time, as well 
as intraprovincial migration variables as the main predictors. The signs of fixed-effects estimates 
for control variables are largely the same as those of the OLS estimates, with slight changes in 
statistical significance. These changes might be caused by multicollinearity between the two 
dropped variables measuring initial state conditions and the remaining control variables; the 
latter are sensitive to the former even if the former are not significant variables. Regarding the 
impact of intraprovincial migration, urban in-migration has a positive effect on the provincial 
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GDP growth rate, while urban out-migration has a negative effect on provincial growth. These 
effects are statistically significant only for the western region. 
7.2 INTRAPROVINCIAL MIGRATION AND CONVERGENCE 
After examining unconditional and conditional convergence in China, the next task is to 
introduce the influence of the labor market into the discussion and to consider the link between 
migration and convergence. As discussed thoroughly in the review of existing literature, the 
theoretical impact of labor migration on economic convergence and the related empirical 
findings are ambiguous, even within the paradigm of neoclassical models. For example, 
conventional neoclassical models predict that labor will flow from less-developed places (and 
hence lower wages) to more-developed places (and hence higher wages), and that labor mobility 
tends to equalize the ratio of capital to labor across places, therefore facilitating spatial 
convergence (Phan, 2008). On the other hand, theories like the new economic geography 
introduce the effect of agglomeration externalities: there are economies of scale in the production 
function, and thus labor migration from poor to rich areas promotes rich areas’ high growth and 
facilities poor areas’ low growth and income traps (Phan, 2008). Similarly, Rapport (2005) 
argued that under the assumption that migrants do not bring much capital with them, the exit of 
labor from poor economies lowers the return to capital there, and therefore hinders gross capital 
formation (Phan, 2008). 
Against this background, I add migration variables into the convergence regression and 
examine the link between migration and convergence. I test the impact of intraprovincial 
migration in this section and the impact of interprovincial migration in the next section. For each 
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section, I separate the four migration variables (urban in-migration, urban out-migration, rural in-
migration, and rural out-migration) into two groups based on the urban/rural division within a 
province—urban in-migration and urban out-migration versus rural in-migration and rural out-
migration—and analyze two separate regression equations. The reason for doing this is to 
remedy the imperfect multicollinearity resulting from highly correlated explanatory variables 
such as urban in-migration and rural out-migration. As frequently reported in news and academic 
research, a majority of the rural out-migrants in China choose urban areas as their destinations. 
As Chan (2012) noted, the last three decades witnessed the world’s “Great Migration,” in which 
an estimated 200–250 million members of the rural population moved to cities and towns within 
China. Therefore, it is intuitive that rural out-migration and urban in-migration are highly 
positively correlated, if not perfectly correlated, which is confirmed by examining the simple 
correlation coefficients between them using my dataset. Moreover, the Variance Inflation Factors 
(VIFs) calculated for both independent variables equal 36.0, confirming the quite severe 
multicollinearity we already suspected to exist. 
The results (model 3a in table 7.2) show that a firm conclusion about the impact of 
intraprovincial migration related to urban areas cannot be drawn on the full sample, because the 
coefficients of urban in-migration and urban out-migration are neither of them statistically 
significant. However, one can find in the SEM results that, for intraprovincial migration in 
western provinces, urban in-migration has positive and significant effects on the GDP growth 
rate, while urban out-migration has negative and significant effects. These effects are not 
significant at all for the rest of the country. 
For intraprovincial migration in central provinces, urban in-migration has no significant 
effect on growth, but its interaction with the time period dummy has a negative and significant 
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effect. To further examine why and how its impact differs across time for the central region, I 
break the sample into two separate subsamples by the two time periods and estimate the SEM 
regression separately for each subsample. The SEM results for subsamples, not reported in table 
7.2, show that for the central region, intraprovincial urban in-migration has a positive and 
significant effect on growth for the 1990s subsample, but the positive effect decreases and loses 
significance in the 2000s subsample. This difference can explain why intraprovincial urban in-
migration has no significant effect for the central region but significant difference across time 
periods. 
Based on model 4a in table 7.3, intraprovincial rural out-migration has a positive and 
significant effect on the growth rate, while intraprovincial rural in-migration has a negative and 
significant effect on the growth rate. Their effects are stronger during the 1990s than in the 
2000s, due to the significant period interaction terms. Moreover, when looking closely at the 
SEM results, one can find that these effects mostly come from the western region. Specifically, 
the effects of intraprovincial rural in-migration and out-migration are statistically significant only 
for the western region. 
The next step is to test how intraprovincial migration affects overall inequality in China. 
In the conventional convergence analysis reported above, we consider the potential convergence 
or divergence tendency through the relative growth speed of each province. With the 
decomposition methodology using the additively decomposable Theil Index (explained in the 
methods section), one can assess the relative contributions over time of each province to the 
evolution of overall inequality in China. In other words, the first method studies whether 
migration leads to convergence by looking at individual provinces’ behavior at the local level, 
while the second method focuses on the simultaneous behavior of all relevant locations at the 
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national level and considers the costs and benefits of migration for both the home and host 
provinces (and regions). 
The results are reported in models 5a and 5b in table 7.4 and models 6a and 6b in table 
7.5, in which the provincial contribution to the overall Theil Index is regressed against 
intraprovincial migration variables. In such models, a positive estimated coefficient means a 
diverging effect, while a negative estimated coefficient means a converging effect. There is no 
evidence of either convergence or divergence in the pooled model, except that the result of the 
time slope dummy variable indicates that the effect of intraprovincial urban in-migration on 
growth rate differs across time periods. Further examination of the same regression equation for 
subsamples based on time period shows that intraprovincial urban in-migration has a negative 
and significant effect on total inequality in the 1990s subsample; this converging effect decreases 
and loses significance in the 2000s subsample. 
The SEM results in model 5b show that intraprovincial urban in-migration has a negative 
and converging effect on overall inequality; this effect is statistically significant only for the 
central and western regions. For the central region, the negative effect of urban in-migration 
becomes smaller as we move from the time period 1992–1999 to the period 2000–2008. The 
estimated coefficient of intraprovincial urban out-migration has significance only for the central 
region. It has a positive and diverging effect on overall inequality during the 1990s; the effect 
becomes negative and converging during the 2000s. The estimated coefficient of intraprovincial 
rural out-migration is significant only for the central region again. It has a negative and 
converging impact on overall inequality for the time period 1992–1999, and the effect becomes 
positive and diverging for the period 2000–2008. The estimated coefficient of rural in-migration 
is not significant for the central region, but it differs significantly across time periods. Further 
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examination of period-based subsamples shows that the estimated coefficient of intraprovincial 
rural in-migration is positive (diverging) and significant on the 1990s subsample, but turns to 
negative and significant on the 2000s subsample. 
Now let’s summarize the findings of the link between intraprovincial migration and 
spatial economic convergence. For the entire country, urban in-migration reduced overall 
inequality only for the 1990s; rural out-migration accelerated economic growth, but its effect 
diminished over time. These effects came largely from the western region, and to a lesser extent 
from the central region. 
In the eastern region, intraprovincial migration had no significant impact on economic 
growth rate or total national inequality. 
For intraprovincial migration in the central region, urban out-migration accelerated 
economic growth only in the 1990s; it reduced overall inequality, but this effect diminished over 
time. Urban out-migration increased overall inequality during the 1990s, but decreased 
inequality during the 2000s. Rural out-migration reduced overall inequality in the 1990s, but 
increased inequality in the 2000s. Rural in-migration increased overall inequality during the 
1990s, and decreased inequality during the 2000s. 
For intraprovincial migration in the western region, urban in-migration accelerated 
economic growth and reduced overall inequality, while urban out-migration reduced the growth 
rate. Rural out-migration increased the growth rate, while rural in-migration reduced the growth 
rate, but its effect diminished over time. 
In short, the results imply that rural-to-urban migration within a province accelerated the 
province’s economic growth in general. This effect was particularly prominent in the western 
provinces, followed by the central provinces. And this effect was stronger during the time period 
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1992–1999 than during the period 2000–2008. As for its convergence effect, intraprovincial 
rural-to-urban migration generally reduced the total inequality across all provinces, especially for 
intraprovincial migration occurring in inland provinces. However, this effect diminished over 
time; for the central region, the converging effect even switched to a slightly diverging effect in 
the 2000s. 
These results are in line with the predictions of neoclassical growth theory that migration 
plays a critical role in promoting efficient factor allocation, arbitraging labor productivity 
differentials, and spreading the benefits of growth. Along with the implementation of economic 
reforms, the relaxation of migration controls brought about a sharp increase in mobility from 
low-productivity regions/sectors to high-productivity ones. Mass labor movement from the rural 
hinterland to urban areas has been the most impressive result. My results confirm that rural-to-
urban migration within a province contributes greatly to the province’s GDP growth by 
transferring underemployed or surplus rural labor to unskilled jobs in urban industrial sectors, 
thereby facilitating urban development and allowing the sending back of remittances to finance 
consumption and investment in rural areas. 
The reason the positive impact of migration on growth is not significant for the eastern 
region is perhaps that the coastal region has had advantages in developing rural nonagricultural 
sectors and creating employment opportunities for local surplus labor. Thus, large numbers of 
rural laborers who were previously engaged in agriculture shifted to rural nonagricultural sectors 
such as the Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs), while rural underemployed laborers in 
inland regions had fewer opportunities to be employed locally, making migration the best option 
for them to better themselves through higher wages, and to better their families left behind 
through remittances. As a result, intraprovincial rural-urban migration seems to benefit the 
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economic growth of inland provinces and to reduce the coastal-inland gap, and thus the overall 
inequality level. 
The beneficial effects of intraprovincial migration declined over time and became 
statistically insignificant or even reversed (in the case of the central region) during my second 
study period, the years between 2000 and 2008. The declining effects might be explained by the 
fact that the relative importance of intraprovincial migration declined and was replaced by 
increasingly active interprovincial and interregional migration through the 2000s, as elaborated 
in the descriptive statistics section. Moreover, the transfer of surplus rural labor to the urban 
sectors in the same provinces played an important role in efficiently reallocating factors of 
production and facilitating urban economic development in the initial years of the decade. 
However, since labor mobility within a province does not lead to change in the (physical and 
human) capital-to-labor ratio at the provincial level due to the low levels of physical capital in 
the inland areas, it is unable to cause sustainable growth in the long run. 
7.3 INTERPROVINCIAL MIGRATION AND CONVERGENCE 
Now let’s consider whether migration across provinces has any impact on convergence at all. 
The results of the growth model (model 7a in table 7.6) show that no inferential conclusion about 
the impact of interprovincial migration can be drawn, because interprovincial migration 
variables’ coefficients are not statistically significant at all for the full sample. 
After getting into the SEM results, we find that for interprovincial migration occurring in 
eastern provinces, urban in-migration has a positive and significant impact on the provincial 
growth rate of per capita GDP; this impact increases over time. 
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For interprovincial migration occurring in central provinces, urban out-migration has a 
positive and significant impact on the growth rate. Urban in-migration has no significant effect 
on growth, but its coefficient differs over time. Further examination of subsamples separated by 
time period shows that for the central region, interprovincial urban in-migration has a positive 
and significant effect on growth in the 1990s subsample, but this effect decreases and becomes 
negative and significant in the 2000s subsample. 
For interprovincial migration occurring in the western region, rural out-migration has a 
positive and significant effect on growth, while rural in-migration has a negative and significant 
effect that weakens over time. 
In model 10a in table 7.9, the provincial contribution to the overall Theil Index is 
regressed against interprovincial migration variables. In the pooled model, interprovincial rural 
in-migration has a negative (converging) and significant impact on total inequality; this 
converging effect gets stronger during the second time period. Interprovincial rural out-migration 
has a positive and significant impact on total inequality. 
Detailed results from the SEM model indicate that the abovementioned findings for the 
full model come mainly from the influence of the central region, and to a lesser extent the eastern 
region. For the eastern region, interprovincial rural out-migration has a positive (diverging) and 
significant effect on national inequality; this effect increases over time. 
For the central region, interprovincial urban in-migration has a negative (converging) and 
significant effect on overall inequality; this negative effect weakens during the 2000s. Rural out-
migration is a diverging factor between 1992 and 1999, but becomes a weak converging factor 
(coefficient negative but close to 0) between 2000 and 2008 due to the significance of the time 
period slope dummy. Rural in-migration has no significant effect on the full sample, but there is 
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a significant difference of estimated coefficient between the two time periods. Further analysis of 
the SEM on time-based subsamples shows that for central provinces, interprovincial rural in-
migration has no significant effect on overall inequality during the 1990s but does have a 
negative (converging) and significant effect during the 2000s. 
For the western region, the estimated coefficient of interprovincial urban out-migration is 
negative (converging) and statistically significant for the 1990s, but becomes positive and 
diverging for the 2000s. Rural in-migration has a positive and diverging effect on overall 
inequality; the effect is greater before 2000 than it is after. Rural out-migration has a negative 
and converging effect on overall inequality, but this effect turns positive and diverging after 
2000. 
Now let’s try to synthesize and explain the findings of the relationship between 
interprovincial migration and spatial economic convergence. For the entire country, rural out-
migration increased overall inequality; rural in-migration reduced overall inequality, and the 
converging effect was greater in magnitude and significance after 2000 than before. And both 
effects came mainly from the central region, and from the eastern region. 
For the eastern region, urban in-migration accelerated the GDP growth of the receiving 
province; this effect increased over time. Following Deng Xiaoping’s call for economic 
acceleration and further opening of China to the world in 1992, more cities—mostly 
concentrated in the eastern region, including the new cores of growth as discussed in the 
descriptive chapter—were opened, and China became a main trading country in the world and 
the largest recipient of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) among the developing countries. The 
eastern region benefits much more from this push and various associated preferential policies 
than inland regions, in terms of attracting FDI and developing export industries (Zhang, 2012). 
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As a result, a vast volume of labor migration is attracted to the fast-growing eastern cities from 
the inland areas, as well as from relatively less-developed eastern areas, which helps the coastal 
region maintain rapid growth. 
As in-migration to fast-growing coastal cities continued to relax labor supply constraints 
and attenuated the decrease in the marginal productivity of capital, fast growth was sustainable in 
the 2000s (Faini, 1996; Fu, 2004). Moreover, sufficient labor supply through in-migration might 
have interacted with increasing returns to scale to create industrial agglomeration or the so-called 
cumulative causation effect (Golley, 2002; Zhang, 2012). As a result, coastal provinces enjoyed 
higher growth rates, driven by the agglomeration effect and scale economies, during the 2000s. It 
is worth mentioning that in comparing the two time periods, the relative demand (and supply) for 
various skills has altered as a consequence of the change in the division of labor on the world 
scale. The majority of the leading coastal areas, as well as some following inland areas, now 
have stronger demand for skilled labor and reduced demand for unskilled workers (Zhang, 
2012). Thus, urban in-migration has been an important driving force to meet the growth in 
demand for labor (increasingly for skilled labor) in the eastern provinces and enable their 
sustainable growth. 
Moreover, for the eastern region, rural out-migration raised overall inequality, and this 
effect grew over time. Similarly, in the inland areas, rural surplus or underemployed labor was an 
issue at the beginning of the economic reforms. Those rural surplus laborers along the coast 
either moved to coastal cities that had large demand for labor to sustain their rapid development, 
or stayed where they were to be employed in local rural nonagricultural sectors such as TVEs. In 
other words, they mostly left their provinces but did not leave their regions. 
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On the one hand, rural out-migrants to eastern cities constitute an increasingly important 
group that meets the growth in demand for labor and enables cities and the entire coastal region 
to sustain their rapid growth. Remittances sent back to the eastern countryside can help rural 
areas overcome capital constraints and fuel rural growth, which is beneficial to the eastern 
economy as well. As a result, rural out-migration of eastern provinces may lead to a widening 
gap between the coastal and inland regions. 
On the other hand, large numbers of migrants moved from the rural agricultural sector to 
rural nonagricultural sectors in the eastern fast-growth provinces, especially in the 1990s when 
reforms led to rapid growth of TVEs. As discussed earlier, the rural areas surrounding the coastal 
urban growth cores have benefited as some of the growth areas spilled over into these rural areas 
(Kanbur & Zhang, 1999). Consequently, these rural nonagricultural employees helped the 
development of the rural economy and received skill training in various export-oriented 
industries such as electronics and computer parts and textiles and footwear. During the late 
1990s and the 2000s, the TVEs experienced major restructuring and decline, possibly due to 
increased deregulation of China’s market economy and the resulting increase in private and 
foreign-owned enterprises. As a result, skilled labor gradually moved from relatively slow-
growth eastern areas (including rural nonagricultural sectors) to fast-growth eastern areas to meet 
the growth in demand for skilled labor. Since these interprovincial rural out-migrants left their 
provinces but not their regions, their movements enabled the coastal region to sustain rapid 
growth as a whole and thus enlarge regional gaps. This effect was greater in magnitude and 
statistical significance after 2000 than it was before. 
For the central region, interprovincial urban out-migration sped up the economic growth 
of the sending provinces. As a large proportion of the inland out-migrants moved to the coastal 
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areas, and emigrants usually remit 20 to 50 percent of their income back home (Fu, 2004; World 
Bank, 1997), it is not surprising that urban out-migration had a positive impact on the economy 
of the central region. 
Interprovincial urban in-migration in the central region accelerated the growth of the 
receiving provinces during the 1990s but decelerated the growth of the receiving provinces 
during the 2000s. Moreover, urban in-migration reduced overall inequality; this effect 
diminished over time. Central urban in-migrants have mostly been underemployed laborers from 
rural areas and unskilled workers migrating from the relatively less-developed western 
provinces. During the 1990s, the marginal product of these migrants was much more than their 
wage rate, and they generated a large amount of surplus over their earnings; this surplus 
contributed to the development of selected central host provinces. During the 2000s, the coastal 
regions kept attracting FDI while the inland regions (especially the central region) had low levels 
of physical capital; urban in-migration in the central provinces lowered the (physical plus 
human) capital-to-labor ratio there (Zhang & Zou, 2012). Increasing out-migration of skilled 
labor from the inland to the coast also led to a decrease in the capital-to-labor ratio—the key 
determinant of per capita GDP growth in the neoclassical growth model (Phan, 2008)—and a 
decrease in marginal productivity of unskilled labor. As a result, urban in-migration decelerated 
the growth speeds of the central provinces and attenuated the decrease in regional gaps, as well 
as overall inequality. 
Interprovincial rural out-migration in the central provinces raised overall inequality 
during the 1990s, but this diverging effect declined significantly, becoming a slightly converging 
effect during the 2000s. In the 1990s, most of the rural out-migrants in the central region chose 
coastal cities and the surrounding rural nonagricultural sectors where they could find better 
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opportunities and receive higher wages as their destinations. Out-migrants’ remittances helped 
their home regions to alleviate capital constraints and promote economic growth, but the host 
coastal region tended to benefit more from these labor movements because they helped 
overcome labor supply constraints and contributed to sustainable growth in the east. Therefore, 
rural out-migration of central provinces led to an enlarged gap between the eastern and central 
regions and rising overall inequality during the 1990s. In the 2000s, the demand for and supply 
of skill levels changed in the coastal areas in a manner corresponding to changes in the division 
of labor on a world scale, relatively strengthening demand for skilled labor along the coast. The 
marginal productivity of unskilled labor decreased, and the surplus of output over average 
earning of unskilled labor also decreased in the eastern region. Hence, the contribution to the 
eastern development of rural migration from the central areas declined in the 2000s; its widening 
of regional gaps also declined significantly. 
Interprovincial rural in-migration in central provinces reduced overall inequality only for 
the period after 2000. As discussed previously, the demand for unskilled rural labor in the coastal 
areas declined during the 2000s, thereby increasing the number of return migrants to inland 
home regions. Returnees brought back skills and capital and thus facilitated growth in the home 
economies and helped narrow the gap between their home regions and the fast-growth eastern 
region. 
For the western region, both interprovincial urban out-migration and interprovincial rural 
out-migration reduced overall inequality in the 1990s while increasing overall inequality in the 
2000s. As most of the out-migrants of western provinces flowed into eastern and central cities, 
the implications are as follows. During the 1990s, due to labor surplus and insufficient capital 
inflow in the western region, out-migration to capital-rich areas benefited the home region 
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through remittances, which raised household incomes and increased labor productivity resulting 
from resource reallocation. In addition, out-migration in the western region also helped relieve 
the fiscal burden imposed on native taxpayers. Thus, both urban and rural out-migration in 
western provinces helped narrow the regional gaps, and therefore reduced overall inequality. 
Moreover, as discussed in the descriptive statistics section, a proportion of the western out-
migrants chose central cities to be their initial destinations as part of their step migration during 
the 1990s, which benefited the central economies and thus helped close the gap between the 
central and eastern regions (see findings for the central region above). 
However, the beneficial effects of western out-migration were mostly due to the one-time 
(physical and human) resource reallocation and started to decrease after 2000. In addition, the 
western region lost the relatively young and educated population to out-migration. As Fu (2004) 
noted, a shortage of educated, working-age labor appeared in some inland provinces. Therefore, 
out-migration in western provinces may have caused the coastal and inland regions to grow at 
different rates, bringing about increasing economic disparity in the long run. Moreover, as some 
of the western out-migrants flowed to the central cities as unskilled laborers and were no longer 
in high demand in the central region during the 2000s, the fiscal burden imposed on the central 
region by these migrants may increase while the surplus generated by them may decrease. 
Hence, both urban and rural out-migration in western provinces may decelerate the growth rates 
of the central provinces and attenuate the decrease in regional gaps as well as overall inequality. 
Last but not least, interprovincial rural in-migration in the western region decelerated the 
economic growth of the receiving provinces; this effect was greater in the 1990s than it was in 
the 2000s. Moreover, interprovincial rural in-migration raised overall inequality, though this 
effect diminished over time. As estimated in the previous literature (e.g., Cai, Wang, and Du, 
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2002; Carter, Zhong, and Cai, 1996), the ratios of surplus labor to the total supply in the central 
and western regions were higher than that in the eastern region, meaning underemployment in 
the agricultural sector of the inland regions remained greater than that in the coastal region. As a 
result, rural out-migration in the western region facilitated resource reallocation and benefited 
local economies, and thus rural in-migration may have had the opposite effects in general. 
However, my finding that the impact of interprovincial rural in-migration in the western region 
differs between the two time periods may reflect the fact that more and more returning migrants 
brought skills and capital back to their home regions and thus contributed to both human and 
physical capital accumulation and promoted growth in the home economies (Fu, 2004). 
To sum up, both intraprovincial and interprovincial analyses provide evidence of the 
impact of migration on provincial growth rates and overall economic inequality. This impact 
varies widely and depends on the urban/rural status and geographic region of the sending place 
or the receiving place—indicating that different industrial structures and thus population 
movements from or to different places may represent entirely different types of migration, as 
well as the time period indicating different stages of economic development. How this study 
contributes to the literature and to society overall and its policy implications and limitations are 
discussed in the following chapter. 
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Table 7.1 Unconditional and Conditional Convergence Regressions (OLS) 
Dependent Variable:                                  
ln(per capita GDP growth rate) 
Model 1 
 
Model 2a 
 
Model 2b (SEM) 
    
East 
 
Central 
 
West 
Coef. Std. Err.   Coef. Std. Err.   Coef. Std. Err.   Coef. 
Std. 
Err.   Coef. 
Std. 
Err. 
ln(1992 per capita GDP) -0.001 0.026 
 
-0.080* 0.042 
 
-0.081 0.083 
 
-0.189 0.186 
 
-0.221* 0.099 
1990 mean yrs. of schooling of working 
pop. 
   
0.008 0.016 
 
-0.014 0.043 
 
-0.014 0.049 
 
0.115** 0.034 
ln(employment rate) 
   
0.321** 0.112 
 
0.650** 0.214 
 
-0.463† 0.265 
 
0.656** 0.222 
ln(comparative labor productivity) 
   
-0.005 0.034 
 
-0.017 0.104 
 
-0.063 0.046 
 
0.123* 0.051 
ln(investment rate) 
   
0.278** 0.047 
 
0.039 0.108 
 
0.405** 0.088 
 
0.018 0.105 
ln(government expenditure share) 
   
-0.201** 0.042 
 
-0.260** 0.088 
 
-0.230* 0.107 
 
0.276** 0.111 
Constant 2.342** 0.213   1.172** 0.490   1.090 0.784   5.100** 1.884   -0.457 1.442 
N 
 
496 
  
496 
  
496 
  
496 
  
496 
Note: †p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01 (two-tailed tests) 
              
 
Table 7.2 The Impact of Intraprovincial Urban Migration on Provincial Growth Rate (Fixed Effects) 
Dependent Variable:                                        
ln(per capita GDP growth rate) 
Model 3a 
 
Model 3b (SEM) 
  
East 
 
Central 
 
West 
Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err.   Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err.   Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err.   Coef. 
Robust 
Std. 
Err. 
ln(lagged intraprovincial urban in-migration) -0.038 0.091 
 
-0.324 0.236 
 
0.068 0.248 
 
0.309* 0.140 
ln(lagged intraprovincial urban out-
migration) 0.024 0.077 
 
0.242 0.196 
 
-0.011 0.282 
 
-0.214† 0.130 
ln(lagged intraprovincial urban in-migration) 
× period 0.059 0.092 
 
0.117 0.195 
 
-0.402† 0.224 
 
-0.018 0.121 
ln(lagged intraprovincial urban out-
migration) × period -0.041 0.087 
 
-0.092 0.160 
 
-0.438 0.278 
 
0.054 0.131 
ln(employment rate) 0.129 0.260 
 
0.401 0.345 
 
-0.138 0.537 
 
0.377 0.492 
ln(comparative labor productivity) -0.067 0.059 
 
0.072 0.142 
 
-0.120 0.081 
 
-0.009 0.072 
ln(investment rate) 0.365** 0.064 
 
0.344** 0.110 
 
0.596** 0.074 
 
0.041 0.117 
ln(government expenditure share) -0.223* 0.088 
 
-0.328* 0.147 
 
-0.618** 0.149 
 
0.187 0.129 
Constant 1.604† 0.912   0.780 1.216   2.539 1.984   -0.235 1.945 
N 
 
496 
  
496 
  
496 
  
496 
Note: †p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 7.3 The Impact of Intraprovincial Rural Migration on Provincial Growth Rate (Fixed Effects) 
Dependent Variable:                                         
ln(per capita GDP growth rate) 
Model 4a 
 
Model 4b (SEM) 
  
East 
 
Central 
 
West 
Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err.   Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err.   Coef. 
Robust 
Std. 
Err.   Coef. 
Robust 
Std. 
Err. 
ln(lagged intraprovincial rural in-
migration) -0.382** 0.152 
 
0.054 0.380 
 
-0.010 0.390 
 
-0.597** 0.215 
ln(lagged intraprovincial rural out-
migration) 0.426** 0.151 
 
-0.004 0.378 
 
0.197 0.379 
 
0.511* 0.230 
ln(lagged intraprovincial rural in-
migration) × period 0.293* 0.147 
 
-0.027 0.315 
 
-0.135 0.403 
 
0.386† 0.219 
ln(lagged intraprovincial rural out-
migration) × period -0.364* 0.157 
 
-0.108 0.335 
 
-0.122 0.392 
 
-0.213 0.233 
ln(employment rate) 0.005 0.275 
 
0.157 0.435 
 
-0.718 0.580 
 
0.662 0.500 
ln(comparative labor productivity) -0.077 0.057 
 
0.120 0.114 
 
-0.186* 0.080 
 
-0.051 0.066 
ln(investment rate) 0.363** 0.064 
 
0.310* 0.136 
 
0.600** 0.070 
 
-0.060 0.118 
ln(government expenditure share) -0.186** 0.071 
 
-0.204 0.176 
 
-0.496** 0.132 
 
0.219† 0.128 
Constant 2.508** 0.960   1.540 1.645   4.877* 2.149   -0.687 1.975 
N 
 
496 
  
496 
  
496 
  
496 
Note: †p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01 (two-tailed tests) 
           
 
 
Table 7.4 The Impact of Intraprovincial Urban Migration on Provincial Contribution to National Theil Index (Fixed 
Effects) 
Dependent Variable:                                       
ln(provincial contribution to national 
Theil) 
Model 5a 
 
Model 5b (SEM) 
  
East 
 
Central 
 
West 
Coef. 
Robust 
Std. 
Err.   Coef. 
Robust 
Std. 
Err.   Coef. 
Robust 
Std. 
Err.   Coef. 
Robust 
Std. 
Err. 
ln(lagged intraprovincial urban in-
migration) -0.0002 0.0011 
 
-0.0016 0.0028 
 
-0.0048** 0.0013 
 
-0.0017** 0.0005 
ln(lagged intraprovincial urban out-
migration) 0.0011 0.0009 
 
0.0031 0.0024 
 
0.0037** 0.0014 
 
0.0006 0.0004 
ln(lagged intraprovincial urban in-
migration) × period 0.0018† 0.0011 
 
0.0041 0.0026 
 
0.0028** 0.0010 
 
0.0005 0.0005 
ln(lagged intraprovincial urban out-
migration) × period -0.0002 0.0010 
 
-0.0015 0.0023 
 
-0.0042** 0.0015 
 
0.0001 0.0005 
ln(employment rate) -0.0030 0.0031 
 
-0.0099 0.0094 
 
-0.0009 0.0029 
 
0.0054** 0.0019 
ln(comparative labor productivity) -0.0005 0.0007 
 
0.0006 0.0020 
 
-0.0024** 0.0008 
 
-0.0010** 0.0002 
ln(investment rate) 0.0055** 0.0008 
 
0.0097** 0.0019 
 
0.0034** 0.0006 
 
0.0008 0.0005 
ln(government expenditure share) -0.0064** 0.0010 
 
-0.0058† 0.0034 
 
-0.0057** 0.0012 
 
-0.0027** 0.0009 
Constant -0.5980** 0.0109   -0.5846** 0.0287   0.0157† 0.0098   -0.0098 0.0065 
N 
 
496 
  
496 
  
496 
  
496 
Note: †p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 7.5 The Impact of Intraprovincial Rural Migration on Provincial Contribution to National Theil Index (Fixed Effects) 
Dependent Variable:                                    
ln(per capita GDP growth rate) 
Model 6a 
 
Model 6b (SEM) 
  
East 
 
Central 
 
West 
Coef. 
Robust 
Std. 
Err.   Coef. 
Robust 
Std. 
Err.   Coef. 
Robust 
Std. 
Err.   Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
ln(lagged intraprovincial rural in-
migration) 0.0011 0.0018 
 
-0.0007 0.0044 
 
-0.0022 0.0020 
 
0.0010 0.0006 
ln(lagged intraprovincial rural out-
migration) 0.0024 0.0018 
 
0.0050 0.0043 
 
0.0031† 0.0019 
 
0.0007 0.0006 
ln(lagged intraprovincial rural in-
migration) × period -0.0022 0.0018 
 
-0.0049 0.0036 
 
0.0038* 0.0020 
 
-0.0012 0.0008 
ln(lagged intraprovincial rural out-
migration) × period 0.0006 0.0019 
 
0.0042 0.0036 
 
-0.0049** 0.0020 
 
0.0001 0.0006 
ln(employment rate) -0.0037 0.0033 
 
-0.0032 0.0094 
 
-0.0054* 0.0027 
 
0.0042** 0.0016 
ln(comparative labor productivity) -0.0024** 0.0007 
 
-0.0037† 0.0024 
 
-0.0028** 0.0009 
 
-0.0010** 0.0003 
ln(investment rate) 0.0058** 0.0008 
 
0.0099** 0.0018 
 
0.0034** 0.0007 
 
0.0009† 0.0005 
ln(government expenditure share) -0.0062** 0.0009 
 
-0.0081** 0.0026 
 
-0.0051** 0.0014 
 
-0.0020** 0.0007 
Constant -0.5877** 0.0117   -0.6020** 0.0258   0.0315** 0.0096   -0.0093† 0.0058 
N 
 
496 
  
496 
  
496 
  
496 
Note: †p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01 (two-tailed tests) 
           
 
 
Table 7.6 The Impact of Interprovincial Urban Migration on Provincial Growth Rate (Fixed Effects) 
Dependent Variable:                                        
ln(per capita GDP growth rate) 
Model 7a 
 
Model 7b (SEM) 
  
East 
 
Central 
 
West 
Coef. 
Robust 
Std. 
Err.   Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err.   Coef. 
Robust 
Std. 
Err.   Coef. 
Robust 
Std. 
Err. 
ln(lagged Interprovincial urban in-
migration) 0.025 0.063 
 
0.051 0.147 
 
0.059 0.091 
 
-0.029 0.087 
ln(lagged Interprovincial urban out-
migration) 0.049 0.067 
 
0.030 0.173 
 
0.217* 0.109 
 
0.081 0.088 
ln(lagged Interprovincial urban in-
migration) × period 0.042 0.062 
 
0.246† 0.133 
 
-0.241* 0.111 
 
0.028 0.095 
ln(lagged Interprovincial urban out-
migration) × period 0.005 0.062 
 
-0.209 0.135 
 
0.124 0.115 
 
0.050 0.092 
ln(employment rate) 0.015 0.260 
 
0.088 0.365 
 
-0.080 0.514 
 
0.500 0.479 
ln(comparative labor productivity) -0.056 0.058 
 
0.173 0.139 
 
-0.102 0.081 
 
-0.087 0.077 
ln(investment rate) 0.361** 0.066 
 
0.341** 0.133 
 
0.458** 0.073 
 
0.039 0.119 
ln(government expenditure share) -0.171* 0.079 
 
-0.295 0.194 
 
-0.597** 0.129 
 
0.190 0.122 
Constant 2.714** 0.981   3.721* 1.722   3.027 1.924   -0.260 1.909 
N 
 
496 
  
496 
  
496 
  
496 
Note: †p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 7.7 The Impact of Interprovincial Rural Migration on Provincial Growth Rate (Fixed Effects) 
Dependent Variable:                                         
ln(per capita GDP growth rate) 
Model 8a 
 
Model 8b (SEM) 
  
East 
 
Central 
 
West 
Coef. 
Robust 
Std. 
Err.   Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err.   Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err.   Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
ln(lagged Interprovincial rural in-
migration) -0.012 0.055 
 
0.094 0.150 
 
0.107 0.089 
 
-0.282** 0.079 
ln(lagged Interprovincial rural out-
migration) 0.048 0.058 
 
-0.046 0.143 
 
-0.016 0.099 
 
0.364** 0.104 
ln(lagged Interprovincial rural in-
migration) × period 0.001 0.435 
 
-0.038 0.131 
 
-0.102 0.100 
 
0.089 0.059 
ln(lagged Interprovincial rural out-
migration) × period -0.010 0.048 
 
-0.008 0.134 
 
0.056 0.112 
 
-0.073 0.073 
ln(employment rate) 0.199 0.273 
 
0.333 0.448 
 
-0.192 0.529 
 
0.748† 0.472 
ln(comparative labor productivity) -0.081 0.061 
 
0.074 0.126 
 
-0.160* 0.078 
 
-0.164* 0.073 
ln(investment rate) 0.337** 0.068 
 
0.275† 0.155 
 
0.579** 0.075 
 
0.063 0.117 
ln(government expenditure share) -0.207† 0.085 
 
-0.293 0.190 
 
-0.658** 0.147 
 
0.113 0.122 
Constant 1.241 0.997   1.526 1.962   3.312† 1.976   -0.846 1.883 
N 
 
496 
  
496 
  
496 
  
496 
Note: †p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01 (two-tailed tests) 
 
 
 
          Table 7.8 The Impact of Interprovincial Urban Migration on Provincial Contribution to National Theil Index (Fixed 
Effects) 
Dependent Variable:                                       
ln(provincial contribution to 
national Theil) 
Model 9a 
 
Model 9b (SEM) 
  
East 
 
Central 
 
West 
Coef. 
Robust 
Std. 
Err.   Coef. 
Robust 
Std. 
Err.   Coef. 
Robust 
Std. 
Err.   Coef. 
Robust 
Std. 
Err. 
ln(lagged Interprovincial urban in-
migration) -0.0011 0.0008 
 
-0.0016 0.0034 
 
-0.0014** 0.0005 
 
0.0005 0.0004 
ln(lagged Interprovincial urban out-
migration) 0.0008 0.0009 
 
0.0021 0.0041 
 
-0.0005 0.0008 
 
-0.0009* 0.0004 
ln(lagged Interprovincial urban in-
migration) × period -0.0004 0.0008 
 
-0.0001 0.0027 
 
0.0014† 0.0009 
 
-0.0016** 0.0004 
ln(lagged Interprovincial urban out-
migration) × period -0.0006 0.0008 
 
-0.0015 0.0028 
 
-0.0010 0.0008 
 
0.0015** 0.0004 
ln(employment rate) -0.0052** 0.0033 
 
-0.0119 0.0115 
 
-0.0034 0.0030 
 
0.0036** 0.0015 
ln(comparative labor productivity) -0.0007 0.0007 
 
-0.0010 0.0032 
 
-0.0026** 0.0009 
 
-0.0003 0.0002 
ln(investment rate) 0.0064** 0.0008 
 
0.0111** 0.0019 
 
0.0044** 0.0008 
 
0.0010* 0.0005 
ln(government expenditure share) -0.0070** 0.0010 
 
-0.0093** 0.0032 
 
-0.0051** 0.0011 
 
-0.0018** 0.0006 
Constant -0.5889** 0.0126   -0.5687** 0.0389   0.0174† 0.0101   -0.0096† 0.0057 
N 
 
496 
  
496 
  
496 
  
496 
Note: †p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 7.9 The Impact of Interprovincial Rural Migration on Provincial Contribution to National Theil Index (Fixed Effects) 
Dependent Variable:                                    
ln(per capita GDP growth rate) 
Model 10a 
 
Model 10b (SEM) 
  
East 
 
Central 
 
West 
Coef. 
Robust 
Std. 
Err.   Coef. 
Robust 
Std. 
Err.   Coef. 
Robust 
Std. 
Err.   Coef. 
Robust 
Std. 
Err. 
ln(lagged Interprovincial rural in-
migration) -0.0017** 0.0006 
 
-0.0015 0.0015 
 
-0.0008† 0.0005 
 
0.0016** 0.0004 
ln(lagged Interprovincial rural out-
migration) 0.0045** 0.0006 
 
0.0056** 0.0012 
 
0.0016** 0.0006 
 
-0.0008† 0.0005 
ln(lagged Interprovincial rural in-
migration) × period -0.0009† 0.0005 
 
-0.0020** 0.0008 
 
0.0016** 0.0006 
 
-0.0013** 0.0003 
ln(lagged Interprovincial rural out-
migration) × period 0.0006 0.0005 
 
0.0018* 0.0008 
 
-0.0017** 0.0006 
 
0.0014** 0.0003 
ln(employment rate) 0.0058* 0.0029 
 
0.0127† 0.0080 
 
-0.0041 0.0029 
 
0.0039** 0.0015 
ln(comparative labor productivity) -0.0022** 0.0007 
 
-0.0049* 0.0021 
 
-0.0028** 0.0010 
 
-0.0004† 0.0002 
ln(investment rate) 0.0031** 0.0007 
 
0.0038** 0.0014 
 
0.0032** 0.0006 
 
0.0001 0.0004 
ln(government expenditure share) -0.0060** 0.0009 
 
-0.0059** 0.0025 
 
-0.0052** 0.0014 
 
-0.0020** 0.0006 
Constant -0.6266** 0.0107   -0.6719** 0.0285   0.0286** 0.0097   -0.0045 0.0053 
N 
 
496 
  
496 
  
496 
  
496 
Note: †p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01 (two-tailed tests) 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
132 
8.0  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
8.1 SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
This dissertation has aimed at understanding the role of internal migration in China’s economic 
development, which is characterized by high growth, rapid globalization, rapid poverty 
reduction, and rising spatial inequality. In order to discuss the ambiguous theoretical relationship 
between labor migration and spatial inequality, I have attempted to answer a number of the 
following questions. Are there any links between migration and spatial economic inequality in 
China? Does migration contribute to spreading the benefits of growth spatially and reducing 
economic inequality? If so, does it work through the local growth channel or through the national 
dynamic channel? What are the effects of intraprovincial migration and interprovincial migration 
on spatial inequality, respectively? What are the effects of urban migration and rural migration 
on spatial inequality, respectively? Does the effect of migration on spatial inequality differ across 
regions? Does the effect of migration on spatial inequality differ across time periods? What 
policy implications can be drawn from this study against the background of rising spatial 
inequality and relaxed but still highly restricted migration policies in China? 
I have used aggregate data to answer the above questions and empirically examine the 
relationship between migration and inequality in China, through both the local growth channel 
and the national dynamic channel. Regarding the local channel, there is evidence that within-
province rural-to-urban migration had no statistically significant effect on economic growth 
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speed in the coastal provinces but had a positive effect on growth in the inland provinces, 
especially during the 1990s. Interprovincial migration flowed from the western rural areas to 
efficiently reallocate surplus rural labor and thus speed up GDP growth of the western sending 
provinces, especially during the 1990s. Interprovincial migration flowing into the eastern cities 
was beneficial to the economic growth rate of the eastern receiving provinces, where most of 
China's trade-oriented industrial investments are located, and this effect became stronger over 
time. The impact of interprovincial migration on growth is more complicated for the central 
region. During the 1990s, interprovincial movements from central cities and into central cities 
both had positive effects on local economic growth, though for different reasons. During the 
2000s, because of continued low levels of physical capital and gradually saturated low-skilled 
labor, the capital-to-labor ratio declined, and further movements into central cities would reduce 
the local growth rates. 
Regarding the national channel—overall interprovincial inequality at the national level—
there is evidence that within-province rural-to-urban migration in the eastern region had no 
statistically significant effect on overall inequality, while within-province rural-to-urban 
migration in the inland regions reduced overall inequality at the national level, especially during 
the 1990s. Interprovincial migration from the western provinces reduced overall inequality in the 
beginning of the study period, but turned out to increase overall inequality at the end. 
Interprovincial migration flows from eastern rural areas, mostly from the countryside of the 
relatively less-developed eastern provinces to the cities of more-developed eastern provinces, 
tended to increase overall inequality, particularly during the later time period. The impact of 
interprovincial migration in the central region on overall inequality is again more complicated. 
During the 1990s, interprovincial migration into the central cities reduced overall inequality 
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against the background of fast urbanization and economic development in central cities, partly 
due to globalization and spillover effects from the eastern region. In the 2000s, growth in the 
central region was attenuated due to the lack of continued and sufficient supply of both physical 
and human capital, as well as a surplus of unskilled labor. Consequently, further movements into 
the central urban areas made a much smaller contribution to the reduction of overall inequality 
compared to the earlier decade. 
Everything considered, the evidence found in this study confirms that there are strong but 
complicated relationships between internal migration and economic growth and between 
migration and spatial inequality in China. In response to the research questions raised earlier, at 
least five important propositions may be drawn from this dissertation. 
First, intraprovincial rural-to-urban migration in inland provinces accelerates provincial 
economic growth and reduces overall national inequality. These effects are consistent over time 
for western provinces, while they decrease dramatically over time for central provinces. 
Intraprovincial migration is beneficial to inland provinces and thus reduces the economic gap 
between the coastal and inland regions due to the following reasons. Remittances sent back home 
raise rural household incomes, which may be used to finance consumption or productive 
investments that bolster economic growth in the rural areas. Out-migration also increases rural 
labor productivity due to resource reallocation. Moreover, in-migration facilitates urban 
development and the urbanization process in inland provinces. Migration within inland 
provinces, however, diverts part of the migration flow to the coastal region, which supplies 
almost unlimited cheap labor to power coastal development and ensure the sustainability of its 
faster growth. Everything considered, intraprovincial rural-to-urban migration in inland 
provinces narrows the gap between inland and coastal regions and thus reduces overall spatial 
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inequality. These effects are consistent over time for western provinces, possibly because the 
Western Development Program has brought foreign and domestic investments to the western 
region, boosting the western economy, creating more employment opportunities, and thus 
keeping the demand for labor at about the same level in western cities. The central region has not 
enjoyed such preferential policies for development, and eastern growth has generated only 
limited spillover to the adjacent central region. Hence, the effects of intraprovincial migration 
decreased with time for central provinces due to continued low levels of physical capital and 
gradually saturated low-skilled labor, and thus declined the capital-to-labor ratio in the 2000s. 
Second, interprovincial migration into eastern cities accelerates the GDP growth of the 
receiving provinces, and this effect increases with time. Interprovincial migration from eastern 
rural areas to eastern core cities enlarges overall inequality, and this effect increases with time. 
On the one hand, the fiscal burden imposed by in-migration tends to be low in coastal areas, 
since the majority of in-migrants are not eligible for regular welfare benefits, social services 
(e.g., local schools, urban pension plans, and public housing), and other entitlements. On the 
other hand, the benefits brought by in-migrants to host areas are large, due to their contribution 
to sustainable growth in the entire coastal region as a whole and to the newly emerged core cities 
in particular. In-migration from slower-growing areas supplies almost infinite low-cost human 
labor to power the economic engine in the faster-growing areas and attenuates the decrease in the 
marginal productivity of capital so that faster growth is sustainable in receiving areas (Faini, 
1996; Fu, 2004). In addition, industrial agglomeration took place gradually, and the coastal 
region enjoyed persistently higher-than-average growth rates driven by the economy of scale 
(Zhang & Zou, 2012). As a result, the growth rate of the coastal region tends to be accelerated 
due to increasing returns to scale and the agglomeration effect (i.e., the so-called cumulative 
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causation effect) (Golley, 2002; Zhang & Zou, 2012), and the gap between the coastal and inland 
regions is likely to widen over time. The inequality could be further exacerbated when a few 
eastern cities emerged as new growth cores and attracted substantial volumes of labor to migrate 
from not only inland provinces but also less-developed eastern areas. Interprovincial migration 
within the eastern region has increasingly beneficial effects on both ends of the movement—e.g., 
relaxed labor supply constraints in faster-growing core cities, increased labor productivity of 
rural households due to resource reallocation, and remittances that account for a large proportion 
of the total household income in home areas. As these migrants leave their provinces without 
leaving their region, benefits remain and accrue to the eastern region as a whole, and 
interregional gaps are likely to increase. 
Third, both interprovincial in- and out-migration in central cities are positively 
associated with the provincial GDP growth rate in the 1990s, but the positive impact of 
interprovincial in-migration turns negative in the 2000s. Similarly, interprovincial in-migration 
in central cities reduces overall inequality in the 1990s, but this effect decreases in the 2000s. 
These findings about the central region imply limited spillover effects from coastal to inland 
areas and lack of technology transfer and physical and human capital to support long-term 
economic growth in the central region. FDI-funded processing-type exports have been the major 
driving force of economic growth for the coastal region but generated only limited backward 
linkages and weak spillover to the inland regions (Fu, 2004). Coastal cities have served as 
growth engines for the surrounding areas (e.g., coastal urban areas and coastal less-developed 
areas), but provided only weak and short-term spillover even to adjacent central provinces due to 
the structure of the export sector, and the spillover effects were not strong enough to lead the 
inland regions to catch up. As export-led rapid growth served as the growth engine for the 
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surrounding central provinces through weak spillover effects in the early stages of reform, 
migration induced to relatively faster-growth central cities enabled the host provinces to sustain 
their growth and catch up to the rich coastal provinces. However, as technology transfer and 
knowledge spillover from foreign investment to indigenous firms and from the coastal region to 
inland regions were very limited (Fu, 2004), the inland regions were unable to sustain their 
development without advanced production technology. The situation of the central region during 
the later period of reform was further aggravated by the shortage of skilled labor, the surplus of 
unskilled labor, and low levels of physical capital, and thus decreased the capital-to-labor ratio. 
As a result, central in-migration accelerated central growth rates before 2000 but decelerated 
central growth rates after 2000, and its role in narrowing the gap between central and coastal 
regions decreased with time. 
Fourth, interprovincial migration from western rural areas is beneficial to the GDP 
growth of sending provinces in both decades, while interprovincial migration from western 
provinces reduces overall inequality in the 1990s but enlarges overall inequality in the 2000s. It 
is intuitive that out-migration would always bring back some benefits to the home economy 
through channels like remittances, investments, and resource reallocation. First, remittances sent 
back by out-migrants can be used to finance consumption, raise the levels of income and welfare, 
and relax capital constraints in source communities. Second, remittances can also be used to 
finance productive investments and support economic growth in home regions. Third, out-
migration can play an important role in promoting efficient resource reallocation and thus 
increase the labor productivity of laborers remaining in home regions. However, the impact of 
migration on overall spatial economic inequality depends not just on the above benefits accruing 
to sending regions but also on the costs and benefits of migration for both sending and receiving 
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regions. That is why studying the national dynamic channel in addition to the local growth 
channel is necessary to answer questions about convergence or divergence. Western out-
migration reduced overall inequality before the year 2000 but increased overall inequality after 
2000. The implications are as follows. For the western region, exporting labor to labor-shortage 
and high-growth areas such as the coastal provinces might be a short-term solution to stimulate 
local economic growth, increase labor productivity, and reduce unemployment through 
remittances and one-time resource reallocation as we discussed above. However, without the 
basic ingredients of sustainable development, such as technological progress and sufficient 
physical and human capital (e.g., skilled labor), the long-term effect of out-migration on the 
western region can be unfavorable on balance, even though the benefits generated to the home 
region cannot be ignored. Moreover, the western sending region may suffer from losing 
relatively more-educated and skilled laborers to out-migration, and the coastal region as the main 
destination may enjoy those skilled migrants’ contributions to sustainable and faster growth. As a 
result, different regions grow at different rates, and economic inequalities between them will 
increase. 
Fifth, interprovincial migration into western rural areas decelerates provincial growth 
and increases overall inequality; however, these effects diminish over time. This particular 
finding may reflect the recent trend and potential role of return migration partly related to 
western development initiatives starting around 2000. Although returning migration may impose 
welfare costs on sending areas and worsen local labor market inefficiency due to a surplus of 
unskilled labor, the more important and increasingly apparent trend is that returning migrants 
bring capital and skills back to their original areas and thus promote economic growth and 
generate employment opportunities there. Moreover, returning migrants may contribute to 
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productive investments, market intelligence accumulation, and labor training in their home areas 
(Fu, 2004). Against the background of western development efforts including the development of 
infrastructure, the enticement of foreign and domestic investments, and the stimulation of the 
region’s output, skilled laborers that remain in or even be attracted to the western region have 
become increasingly critical for the sustainability of development, and their growth-inducing 
positives will eventually exceed the negatives in the long run. 
8.2 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
This dissertation contributes to the literature and to society overall in various ways. The 
theoretical, methodological, and policy implications are discussed in the following three sections. 
Let’s begin with the theoretical implications. 
Labor migration has been the subject of vast amounts of academic literature, as 
researchers have attempted to understand how many migrants there are, who migrates, why they 
migrate, and what the determinants and consequences of migration are. In terms of the 
relationship between migration and regional economic inequality, migration is commonly 
considered to be responsive to regional differences in economic development and market wage 
rates, as people migrate to better themselves economically. Economists also view migration as an 
outcome of regional differences in labor demand and supply and of individuals’ rational 
calculation of costs and benefits. However, studies investigating the impacts of migration on 
regional inequality display a mixture of conclusions. 
The neoclassical theory is the dominant one, viewing migration as the means by which 
surplus labor in less-developed and lower-wage areas is transferred to more-developed and 
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higher-wage areas. As a result, migration leads to changes in the supply of and demand for labor 
at both ends, and eventually wage differentials will reflect only the costs of migration at the 
equilibrium stage. For the economy as a whole, labor migration serves as an equilibrating factor, 
and both sending and receiving areas benefit because it eventually optimizes the distribution of 
human capital among regions and evens out regional inequality. Several theories that challenge 
the neoclassical approach suggest that underdevelopment is a by-product of development, and 
inequality between sending and receiving areas is perpetuated and reinforced through the brain-
drain effect of migration (Arango, 2000). In other words, migration leads to a loss of valuable 
labor and a slowdown in economic growth in sending areas, and thus widens spatial inequality, 
instead of the other way around as predicted by the neoclassical approach. Furthermore, theories 
such as the new economic geography emphasize the economies of scale in production and argue 
that labor migration facilitates increasingly faster growth and higher wage levels in richer areas 
due to agglomeration effects, which worsen the gap between richer and poorer areas. 
In short, there is not much doubt that internal labor migration is to some extent driven by 
regional or spatial inequality, because people tend to move to better themselves economically. 
However, the effect of migration on inequality is ambiguous in existing theories and empirical 
studies (Phan, 2008). The findings of this dissertation imply that previous research often presents 
mixed or even contradictory conclusions due to the following reasons. 
First, studies focusing on different developmental stages and industrial structures of areas 
may generate different results. For example, during the 1990s western provinces might benefit 
greatly from exporting their unemployed and underemployed workers to the labor-needy 
provinces along the coast. Remittances from migrants and increased labor productivity should 
then stimulate economic growth in the west. Since the 2000s, the Western Development Program 
141 
and massive investments have boosted western output, and some western provinces have started 
to switch from a labor-intensive industry structure to a capital-intensive one that increased their 
capacity to retain or even absorb laborers. As a result, exporting labor became less beneficial to 
the western economy during the more recent time periods of the reform. On the other side of the 
story, the positive effect of in-migration on the host coastal provinces was great during the 1990s 
due to the relaxation of labor supply constraints and contributions to sustainable growth, and this 
positive effect became even larger during the 2000s due to increasing returns to scale and 
agglomeration effects (Fu, 2004). 
Second, the distance of migration does matter. Distance is generally considered in 
theories and empirical studies to be one of the major factors influencing the volume and 
characteristics of migration. My research suggests that distance not only affects migration itself 
but also how migration affects economic growth and spatial inequality. I adopt two broad 
distance categories for migration—migration within a province (intraprovincial migration) and 
migration between provinces (interprovincial migration)—and find a difference between the two 
in terms of their impacts on growth and inequality. For instance, intraprovincial migration is 
almost always good for the economy of the western provinces over my entire study period, as it 
helps the reallocation of various resources, reduces the surplus of labor and increases labor 
productivity in rural areas, maintains the supply of cheap labor for urban development, and 
accelerates the urbanization process of the province. However, the influence of interprovincial 
migration on the western economy is mixed and inconsistent. Initially out-migration may benefit 
the western economy through remittances and resource reallocation, and thus it may appear to 
have a catch-up effect for the western region and a convergence tendency for the economic gap 
between richer and poorer regions. As time goes by and the one-time benefits of out-migration 
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fade out, the western economy may lose the more capable and educated people due to migration 
and thus may lose the growth engine in the long run. As a result, the gaps between richer and 
poorer regions may first stagnate or even decrease, but then eventually gradually increase. 
One of the main differences between shorter-distanced (intraprovincial) and longer-
distanced (interprovincial) migration is that the former has a higher probability of inducing 
return migration. Returnees may bring capital and skills back to their hometowns and therefore 
contribute to the accumulation of both human and physical capital, the creation of employment, 
investments in infrastructure development, market intelligence and labor training, and the growth 
of both home and provincial economies as a whole (Fu, 2004). The changes in the effects of 
western rural in-migration across time periods in this study also indicate that the benefits of 
western return migration began to appear and rise along with the transition of economic structure 
and policy-driven capital inflow. 
Third, different conclusions may be drawn based on whether you focus on “local” or 
“global” relationships between migration and inequality. In my research, the growth channel 
(i.e., conventional convergence analysis) represents how migration influences inequality locally. 
Neoclassical theory argues that labor-sending places tend to grow faster and eventually catch up 
to receiving places, as migration promotes efficient resource allocation, reduces labor surplus, 
and raises labor productivity in sending places. Against this theoretical background, most 
empirical studies measure migration as a territorial attribute—particularly for labor-exporting 
places—and test how migration influences local growth speed and whether it facilitates or 
impedes the local catch-up effect and spatial convergence. However, such operationalization of 
migration loses sight of the relational mechanism of migration as a linkage between sending and 
receiving places. Thus, I introduce a second national dynamic channel to take into consideration 
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the relativity of places in terms of their uneven economic positions and analyze the direct effect 
of migration on the national GDP inequality level. It turns out that the findings from the two 
channels in this study provide us with some seemingly contradictive insights generated from 
different angles of the story. For example, western rural out-migration speeds up local economic 
growth throughout the whole study period, which helps equalize the regional differential for the 
earlier study period. But this equilibrating impact decreases over time and turns to the opposite 
for the second study decade. In other words, both boats rise, but the gap between them increases. 
The above example displays the importance of relational measures, which should be considered 
as further migration theoretical frameworks are developed. 
8.3 METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The fixed effects panel data analysis conducted in this dissertation suggests that longitudinal 
methods are clearly superior to cross-sectional methods. There are two major advantages of 
longitudinal methods for analyzing the relationship between migration and inequality. First, 
simple methods used for longitudinal data, like taking a one-year lag of the response variable, 
can reduce potential problems caused by reciprocal relationships between migration and 
economic growth and between migration and spatial inequality. Taking into consideration the 
temporal order of independent variables is also important when there is a spurious or chain 
relationship between independent and dependent variables. Second, panel data with enough time 
points allows us to adopt methods such as fixed effects to control for the heterogeneity between 
entities (e.g., provinces), test the true relationship between independent and dependent variables 
within each entity, and generate unbiased estimates. This is especially critical to cross-national 
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studies or cross-province/cross-state studies for large countries like China, assuming there are 
many unobserved, immeasurable, and time-invariant characteristics unique to each entity, such 
as weather conditions, geographic attributes, historical attributes, and culture and customs. Few 
previous studies have explored the relationship between migration and inequality across time 
periods, partly due to the scarcity of reliable and consistent longitudinal data for all the relevant 
variables. However, if data allows, longitudinal analysis is the most appropriate method to 
uncover the relationship between migration and spatial inequality. 
The second methodological implication, related to the first, is that “time” is not only 
useful in determining model structure (such as the fixed-effects model), it is also vital to be 
considered as an explanatory variable and to be included in the model. This is particularly 
applicable for studies on developing countries such as China. As we see in this dissertation, the 
relationships between migration and growth and between migration and inequality differ greatly 
across the two time periods (1992–1999 and 2000–2008). As they move toward their steady 
states, developing countries like China grow and change quickly over time. Change of trade 
share in GDP, change of industrial structure, change of governmental development policies, 
infrastructure development, urbanization, industrialization, and privatization all contribute to 
China’s ongoing rapid growth and transformation. Therefore, it is important to conduct our 
research with the effect of time taken into account. 
The final methodological implication of this dissertation has to do with the 
regionalization scheme in China studies. Although the “three economic belt” scheme based on 
the seventh Five-Year Plan (1986–1990) is well recognized in research on regional inequality in 
China, sometimes scholars combine the central and western regions into one category and adopt 
a more convenient “inland versus coastal” two-region scheme for their empirical analysis or 
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hypothesis tests (e.g., Chen & Fleisher, 1996; Fan & Sun, 2008; Fujita & Hu, 2001; Kanbur & 
Zhang, 1999, 2005). There is no doubt that the eastern region has had the most rapid economic 
growth and that the gap between the eastern region and the central and western regions combined 
is the greatest and has widened over time. However, my findings show that the western and 
central regions are different in terms of their own comparative advantages, economic 
specializations, and growth engines. As a result, the impacts of migration on growth rates are 
different between the two inland regions. Especially more recently, due in part to the Western 
Development Program that increases capital inflows and investment in western China and boosts 
western economic development as a whole, the increased demand for labor—particularly skilled 
labor—and the brain-drain problem start to attract some attention. These patterns are not evident 
in the central region partly due to a lack of similar preferential developmental policies and 
insufficient capital inflow and investment. 
8.4 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Rapid export-oriented manufacturing growth, concentrated in coastal urban centers, has made 
China the “world’s factory” in the global economy. Regional wage differences and enormous 
employment opportunities along the coast have attracted epic-scale migration of inexpensive 
human labor from the inland regions. The findings of this dissertation indicate that eastern cities 
serve as growth engines for surrounding areas such as eastern suburban and rural areas, but the 
spillover effects generated by richer eastern regions are very limited and too weak to lead the 
poorer inland regions to catch up. Fu (2004) argued that the weak economic growth spillover 
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effect is because coastal exports through labor-intensive manufacturing and processing trade 
have limited backward linkages to remote regions. 
Therefore, for less-developed hinterlands, simply sending labor to capital-rich areas with 
labor shortages does generate growth benefits and raise income levels in home regions due to 
one-time resource reallocation and remittances, but it tends to benefit receiving communities 
more than sending communities and thus eventually widens regional inequality. In addition, the 
costs of exporting labor may exceed the benefits for poor inland provinces in the long run due to 
the brain-drain effect of out-migration, which may cause severe and permanent harm in sending 
areas. Thus, retaining the relatively more-educated, skilled, and able labor is crucial for the long-
term development of inland provinces, and the role of governmental intervention is very 
important in regard to resource allocation, local employment creation, information distribution, 
and so on. 
One possible measure that could be taken by the government is to encourage short-
distance migration (e.g., within-province migration) and urbanization in the inland regions. To 
do so, many conditions should be met, among which rural education is the most important 
(Johnson, 2002). More resources should be shifted to rural education in order to enhance the skill 
levels and productivity of the rural population and prepare them for nonagricultural employment, 
and thus increase their ability and propensity to move from farm to city. An equally important 
condition is that the government should promote more capital flow and investment in labor-rich 
but capital-scarce inland areas so that more employment opportunities will be generated and 
skilled labor will remain in or even be attracted to inland areas. The government should use tools 
like the Western Development Program to stimulate growth in the central region and to reduce 
the economic gap between the central and eastern regions. 
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8.5 DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This study has expanded on existing understanding about the relationship between migration and 
inequality across various dimensions. Although this work has provided new evidence on the 
topic, it has also raised new questions and issues within the migration and health body of 
research. Evidence from this dissertation supports the notion that the effect of migration on 
spatial inequality changes across regions and time periods. Future research should expand on 
these findings to explain not simply whether the interconnection between migration and 
inequality changes across these dimensions, but how and why it does so. For instance, rather than 
using provincial migration summary statistics, further analyses could collect and utilize dyadic 
migration data between pairs of provinces (or regions) to estimate whether net migration flows 
between pairs of provinces affect the economic gaps between the two ends, and in turn affect 
overall national inequality. In this way, we can better measure the distance of migration with 
such categories as “migration within a province,” “migration between contiguous provinces,” 
and “migration between noncontiguous provinces,” or we could even treat distance as a 
continuous variable instead of adopting the “within a province” and “between provinces” 
scheme. Moreover, we could implement more sophisticated research techniques such as Social 
Network Analysis (SNA) to address potential interdependence across observations due to dyadic 
autocorrelation. 
Most existing research does not make a clear distinction between human capital and 
labor, and often uses them interchangeably. The flow of human capital involves the movement of 
high-skilled workers, such as technicians, professionals, and managers, in order to receive 
relatively high returns on their skills when they reach their destinations. Highly skilled workers 
have much more bargaining power and face relatively less competition in the labor markets than 
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low-wage, unskilled workers do. Therefore, the flow of labor should be kept conceptually 
distinct from the flow of human capital, and the heterogeneity of migrants’ skill levels should be 
clearly recognized in future studies (Massey et al., 1993). The distinction of migrants along skill 
lines would help us better understand the issue of brain drain—the sustained out-migration of 
relatively well-educated, skilled, and productive workers that leads to the depletion of human 
capital and stagnation or even decrease of productivity in home regions, and hence widened 
regional gaps. 
A final recommendation is that further research should incorporate more recent years of 
data as they become available. Additional data collection and analysis will allow further 
investigation of time periods and test whether the effects of migration on development and 
regional inequalities continue to change. 
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